Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

271. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson¹

Washington, October 15, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Administration of Revolutionary Development

I. Introduction

You requested a position paper on the administration of the “other war” in Viet-Nam. Let me begin by offering two powerful first impressions which I believe bear decisively on that question.

1. My overriding impression after five days in Viet-Nam is of a topic so common it is all-too rarely reported and so obvious it is all-too rarely considered: the unceasing, backbreaking toil of the peasant population.

To see rows of coolies bending down, hour after hour, tending rice plants in the exhausting sun, is to recognize that it is not so much water that their rice grows in; it is sweat. They seed, nurture, replant, irrigate, dig manure, harvest, dry, and carry day upon day, year upon year to squeeze only the barest of essentials from the land.

And to see all this is to recognize a political fact: how easy it is for these people not to give a whit whether they are governed by the GVN or by the VC or by anyone else. Given the dawn-to-dusk imperative of their work, what they may wish more devoutly than anything is simply to be left alone. They wish no longer to be bombed and shelled or knifed and shot, drafted or kidnapped, propagandized or harangued, gouged by landlords or “taxed” by guerrillas.

2. Second, I could not help but be struck by the extent to which Viet-Nam is commonly discussed in a strange language of abbreviation and acronym. For example, “If we can get MACV, USAID and JUSPAO to prod the GVN, then maybe ARVN—working with the PF, RF, PFF, CIDG and the PAT cadres—can get RD off the ground.”

It is easy to understand why such sentences would be common in Saigon, where people talk of little other than the war and where shorthand thus becomes a necessity. The same is true, however, at a less superficial level, when shorthand is applied to concepts as well as to agencies—when real words become shorthand symbols—but destructive symbols because they mean such different things to different speakers.

An example—and one closely relevant here—is the word “security,” which has come to blanket a variety of different meanings. I believe decisive, effective revolutionary development depends on a clear and precise common understanding of the security we all recognize to be the foundation of success in “the other war.”

To illustrate the divergence of meanings, let me report briefly on a conversation I had with a small group of reporters in Saigon. It quickly degenerated into a debate, not between the reporters and me, but between Ward Just of the Washington Post and Charles Mohr of the New York Times.

Just argued heatedly that RD could not even begin to be effective unless security were first guaranteed both to the peasants and RD workers. “An AID man cannot do his work,” he said, “while he is being shot at by the VC.”

Mohr responded, just as heatedly, that security could not come first—because security from guerrillas is meaningless and impossible until the peasant populace is motivated to support the GVN and deprive the guerrillas of havens, secrecy, and resources.

Obviously, the easy answer to this circular chicken-egg debate is to say that both are necessary—military protection and public motivation against the VC. And yet even that answer is incomplete for it defines security only in the American frame of reference (more police in Central Park; or National Guard against riots).

What we must also ask is, what does security mean to the Vietnamese peasant, stooped over in the rice paddies?

Does security mean a guarantee of the absence of physical danger? Or is the peasant willing to take some risks in exchange for other factors?

If so, what are those factors:

• Communist ideology?
• Land reform?
• Lowering of crushing taxes—whether imposed by the GVN or VC?
• No further conscription—again by either side?
• Social justice—such as the elimination of corruption which requires under-the-table payments even for an act so elemental as registering a birth?
• A voice in local government?

The VC have found effective answers to such questions, tailored to specific local needs. We must do at least as well. And indeed each of these factors is important to the peasantry in some, many, or all areas. They must be seized on as a critical element in defining and providing true security.

If the peasant were not willing to accept any risks, then the outlook for revolutionary development would be grave, indeed. No matter how effectively they are administered, even military security and capable RD efforts cannot bring instant success. At best, they can give us a mutually reinforcing stairstep route to success.

A high level of physical security (against guerrilla, rather than main-force opposition) cannot be achieved without motivating the populace. Such motivation cannot be achieved without considerable progress toward physical security. Both must be sought at once, in a way designed to lower the peasantʼs current risks while at the same time inducing him to accept the risks of involvement that remain.

Given limited time, we must carefully identify and concentrate on those risks which are least acceptable to him and on those gains which are most essential to him.

II. The Ideal, Theoretical Program

I know of no one who believes we have begun effectively to achieve this goal, despite a series of pacification programs and despite even the budding early efforts of Ambassador Porterʼs new program.

The Military Aspect. Secretary McNamara, Mr. Komer, Ambassadors Johnson, Lodge, and Porter, Mr. Gaud, I, and all others who have approached the problem are perfectly agreed that the military aspect of Revolutionary Development has been spindly and weak.

This probably is the result of the entirely understandable preoccupation by MACV in recent months with the main-force military emergency. However justifiable this has been, a major effect has nonetheless been our failure effectively to press RVNAF to even start meeting their crucial RD responsibilities.

(I know of no one who believes that these should be met principally by American forces—unless we should wish the whole RD effort to collapse once we leave.)

The Civil Aspect. Similarly, the work of civilian agencies has fallen short—largely, but not only because of the failure of RVNAF to provide a military screen behind which to work.

For example, we have been successful in persuading farmers to turn to modern insecticides and fertilizers, overcoming the skepticism and hostility borne of old ways used for centuries. But having sold the peasants on the concept, there is not enough insecticide in the whole country now to meet the demand in Long An province alone.

We have built—as Mr. Komer outlined in such careful detail in his report to you of September 13²—large numbers of school rooms. But, again to cite Long An, the province which I visited, we built 65 school rooms in 1965—but 55 American-funded schoolrooms were so located that they were blown up by the VC.

We have sent 2.2 million textbooks to Viet-Nam, but how many are still tied up in warehouses?

Recent discussions of such shortcomings have been conducted in terms of who should control the program—civilian agencies or the military. I believe this is too narrow a frame of reference. It is too late to worry about organizational symmetry or inter-agency niceties.

Rather than engage in a civil-military debate, I think we should devote our efforts toward trying to devise an administrative structure that capitalizes on the assets each agency can offer to RD.

What should be the elements of an ideal organization?

1. It should have maximum leverage on RVNAF to engage in clear and hold operations in direct support of RDM efforts.

2. It should have a single American “negative”, anti-VC channel—that is a single commander for all action against Communist guerrilla forces. This commander would calibrate and choose among the various force alternatives—depending on whether he believed the need to be military, para-military, or police.

This command would include complete responsibility for all anti-VC intelligence—that is, concerning all VC suspects either in the infrastructure or in guerrilla units.

3. It should have a single, unified channel for all “positive”, pro-people aspects of RD, irrespective of the present lines of command within civilian agencies, allowing a single commander to calibrate and assign priorities to relevant positive programs on behalf of the peasantry.

This, too, would include the immediate expansion of and control over all “pro-people” intelligence—that is, detailed district-by-district and province-by-province reporting on the particular gains most wanted by the populace (land reform, for example, in one province; or schools in another; or agricultural assistance in another).

4. Sensitivity to political inputs and wise political guidance of the whole process are needed to ensure that military programs support rather than negate efforts to win public support and participation. Failure to assure this—which characterized French efforts in Indochina and Algeria, in contrast to civil-led, successful, British efforts in Malaya and the Filipino campaign against the Huks—means that the very process of gaining security would be weakened and prolonged, at increased cost in Vietnamese and American lives.

Thus, overall civilian command of the RD program is needed for fundamental practical reasons, by no means for considerations of international image alone (though on the latter point, it must be observed that as soon as we put “the other war” under obvious military control, it stops being the other war). In particular, it is important not to block or reverse—by the way we organize our efforts—the current genuinely hopeful Vietnamese trend toward increased civilian influence and participation in government.

In short, it is not the precise form of organization or the precise choice of flow chart that is important. What is important is:

1. An immediate and effective military screen for RD efforts; and

2. Authoritative and compelling administration of the efforts of civilian agencies.

III. Achievement of the Ideal

I believe we can institute effective administration of the RD program—which Ambassador Lodge has aptly described as the heart of the matter—achieving all of these ideals:

1. Maintain the effect and the appearance of civilian control by immediately assigning overall supervision of all RD activities to Ambassador Porter (and assigning a second deputy to Ambassador Lodge to absorb the substantial other responsibilities now met by Ambassador Porter).

2. That the several civilian lines of command within agencies be consolidated into one. Thus, USAID, JUSPAO, OSA, and the Embassy personnel assigned to RD all would continue under the nominal administrative control of their respective agencies but full, unified operational control would rest solely with Ambassador Porter.

3. That Ambassador Porterʼs authority be made clear and full to each constituent agency of the RD team, including:

• —relocation of personnel;
• —the establishment of priorities irrespective of agency priorities;
• —and the apportionment of the funds allocated by each agency to Viet-Nam, bounded only by statutory limitations.

4. That MACV immediately give highest-level command focus and consolidation to its RD concerns and staff, now that it is no longer so completely distracted from RD by the compelling requirements of main-force combat. This would be organized around the thesis that the central need is the most effective persuasive power or leverage on RVNAF. This thesis is strengthened substantially by:

• —The firm intent, expressed to us in Saigon last week, of President Thieu and Prime Minister Ky to shift ARVN infantry to revolutionary development work starting in January;
• —The enhanced powers they intend to give to General Thang, already an able chief of RD for GVN.

5. That the MACV effort embrace at least advisory control over all levels of force—starting with ARVN but also including RF, PF, CIDG, and the para-military operations of the RD cadre, PFF, and PRV.

These steps would greatly strengthen both the military and civil lines of command. They would contribute significantly to the success of RD. But not even these changes would be decisive without a strong link between them.

The civil side requires the capacity to influence military movement which no organizational chart can provide. The MACV side requires the political and substantive expertise which a military organization does not—and is not expected to—possess.

Thus the fundamental recommendation I would make is:

6. To appoint, as principal deputy and executive officer to Ambassador Porter, a general of the highest possible ability and stature—of two, three or even four-star rank. To do so would win the following advantages:

a. Compelling indication of the seriousness with which the Administration regards RD;

b. The rank and stature to insure optimum RD performance from MACV.

c. The rank and stature to afford maximum impact on GVN military leaders and capacity to persuade them properly to prod RVNAF when necessary.

d. Demonstrated command administrative capacities with which to assist Ambassador Porter, while bridging the inevitable institutional difficulties that might well otherwise develop from one arm of MACVʼs taking orders from a civilian.

e. A solution to the military control image problem, by which the advantages of close military support would be veiled by civilian control.

f. The capacity and position to formulate an effective, qualitative plan encompassing both military and civil realities. Previous plans have focussed on numbers of provinces, volume of RD cadre trained, and so on. They have put an unrealistic premium on quantitative, “statistical” success. Meaningful criteria, however, must be qualitative. I would envision such a qualitative plan intended to cover at least the next 12 months.

There would be an additional prospective advantage as well. If it should later be found that dual lines of authority—even given this strong link—are not successful, then we could more readily fall back to a unitary, military command structure—with the new RD general taking charge.

He would have the benefit, in that situation, of having been under civilian control and his relationship to RD would already be evident, making the change to military control less abrupt and less susceptible to criticism.

Beyond the form of organization, I also would, later, like to advance a series of specific thoughts on matters of substance for the RD program.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, vol. IX. Top Secret.
2. “The Other War in Vietnam—A Progress Report,” printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 10, 1966, pp. 549–567, and October 17, 1966, pp. 591–601.