Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

212. Memorandum of Meeting of the Negotiations Committee¹

Washington, August 18, 1966, 4:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• W. Averell Harriman
• U. Alexis Johnson
• William Bundy
• Leonard Unger
• Benjamin Read

SUBJECT

• Vietnam

1. Memorandum to President and Secretary

The Governorʼs memorandum for the President and the Secretary² was read and approved by the Group.

2. Ambassador Thaiʼs Conversation

The Governor noted that he and Ambassador Unger had talked at length with Vietnamese Ambassador Thai on August 17 and that Thai had made a number of interesting observations about the situation in Vietnam.³ Ambassador Unger observed that the Governor had tried to draw Thai out on the subject of contacts with the NLF-VC. Thai, however, had not committed himself on the desirability of such contacts. Instead he had turned the conversation toward the subject of talks with Hanoi. Mr. Bundy commented that Thai might be reluctant to reveal his true feelings in a formal conversation with Departmental officials. Ambassador Unger agreed that this might be so, but said that Thai had been extremely candid about other subjects including GVN personalities.

3. Corruption

Mr. Bundy mentioned Ambassador Lodgeʼs talk with Ky about corruption. In this conversation Ky indicated that he was aware that Generals Co and Quang were deeply implicated. Lodge had asked for guidance from the Department on what to tell Ky. Mr. Bundy said that his inclination was to tell Lodge that if Ky was confident that he could get rid of these officers smoothly and efficiently without bringing down the government, he should do so. Ambassador Johnson observed that the IV Corps situation was a mess and that action to clean it up was overdue. He pointed out that if Co and Quang were to be removed, the timing had to be just right. Ambassador Unger thought we should ascertain whether Co and Quang had significant support in the army. The Group generally agreed that both officers should be purged if the operation could be accomplished efficiently after the September 11 elections. Mr. Bundy commented that it was encouraging to see that Ky was doing some soul-searching on the problem of corruption.

4. U Thant in Moscow

Governor Harriman raised the subject of U Thantʼs special talks in Moscow. He said that Arthur Goldberg wants the Department to develop questions that the SYG could put to Ho. These might include an effort to interpret Hanoiʼs 4 Points in a way that would be acceptable to us. Governor Harriman noted that Chester Cooper was preparing an analysis of the 4 Points along these lines. It was agreed that U Thant did not expect anything from us immediately to convey to Ho.

5. NLF Rep in Algiers

Governor Harriman referred to the information which the SYG had given Arthur Goldberg about the new NLF representative in Algiers. The SYG understood that the new rep was a senior Lao Dong official and had suggested that we try to contact him through a non-American intermediary. The Governor said that he had approved a telegram⁴ asking our Embassy to provide us with the best information it could obtain on the NLF rep and to suggest the names of non-American newsmen presently in Algiers who might be good intermediaries.

Ambassador Unger said that information available in Washington did not indicate that the NLF rep was a significant Lao Dong official. The Governor thought it would be useful to supplement this information through CIA sources abroad. Ambassador Unger said that he would have CIA check their sources in Saigon [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and elsewhere to see if other significant information was available.

6. POWs

Governor Harriman noted that the objectives which we hoped to achieve by encouraging direct contacts with the NLF-VC included increased defections and divisions in the ranks of the NLF-VC. His memorandum to the President and the Secretary spoke of the possibility of a proposal by the GVN for a general amnesty by early October. The Governor said that our ability to achieve these objectives would be impaired if we did not take immediate and effective steps to improve treatment of POWs in the South and to put more steam into the Chieu Hoi program. He recalled that General Johnson had made some encouraging remarks about improvements being made in the Chieu Hoi program. The POW question was difficult and complicated. The Governor wondered whether our military in Vietnam were sufficiently well indoctrinated on treatment of POWs. Ambassador Johnson said that the handling of POWs was always a problem but that he thought that General Westmoreland was keenly aware of the importance of handling it correctly. He observed that in Korea we had to offer a bounty to our forces to guarantee a flow of captives for intelligence purposes.

Governor Harriman said that he understood that the critical period for prisoners in Vietnam was between the time they were captured at the front and the time they were delivered to a place of detention. Ambassador Unger said that Frank Sieverts was working on a series of recommendations which would help assure the security of POWs while being transported to detention areas.

7. Kissingerʼs Impressions

Mr. Bundy said that Henry Kissinger had formed a number of interesting opinions about GVN contacts with the NLF-VC, some of which had not been reported when he was in Saigon. Kissinger had found Thieu and Vien negative about the value of such contacts. Tran Van Do had been less rigid and had told Kissinger that contacts between GVN officials in Paris and resident Vietnamese “neutralists” had been undertaken at Doʼs initiative. Mr. Bundy said that Dan Davidson was putting together a memorandum on Kissingerʼs views.

8. DeGaulleʼs Trip

The group briefly discussed the pros and cons of communicating our views on Vietnam and Cambodia to the French prior to DeGaulleʼs trip. It was agreed that a message from Secretary Rusk to Couve would be preferable to a message from the President to DeGaulle. Mr. Bundy said that he would prepare a draft for the Groupʼs consideration.

9. 3-Track Paper on Negotiations

Mr. Bundy said that he had discussed the 3-track paper⁵ with Kissinger. He thought it would be useful to supply a copy to Lodge and to Arthur Goldberg before his proposed trip to Eastern Europe. Mr. Bundy thought that the paper was useful in setting down the fundamental elements of our thinking about the problems and possibilities of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. Governor Harriman said that he wanted to re-read the paper and would let Mr. Bundy know his views about it.

Note: Ambassador Goldberg is on leave in Virginia for a week. No definite date has been set for his trip to Eastern Europe.

10. Sainteny

Mr. Bundy referred to the proposal that Henry Kissinger see Sainteny in Paris on or about September 9. He though Kissinger was the right man to talk to Sainteny and that there were two subjects in particular that we would like to see explored: (a) could Sainteny obtain clarification of Pham Van Dongʼs reported indication in an earlier conversation with Sainteny that Hanoi might be willing to stop infiltration into the South if we stopped bombing the North? (b) could Sainteny find out what Hanoi has in mind for a political settlement in the South? Governor Harriman agreed that Kissinger was the right man to talk to Sainteny and said it would be useful for him to determine what Sainteny thought we should be saying to Hanoi.

11. Tokyo Contact

Mr. Bundy said that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had received information from a Japanese businessman to the effect that the President of a Japanese news agency who is an ex-communist had offered to set up a contact with DRV representatives and had claimed that Hanoi would be willing to have discussions with us which were not confined to or conditioned on Hanoiʼs 4 Points. Mr. Bundy said that he was telling Bill Colby to go ahead and see what the self-proclaimed intermediary could accomplish. If he could arrange for unconditional talks we would be there.

12. Thanat Proposals

Governor Harriman asked whether there was anything further that we could do at this time on the Thanat proposals. He observed that even if the Thanat initiative did not produce a conference it was an extremely valuable example of Asian initiative. Mr. Read commented that Chuck Percy is claiming credit for Thanatʼs proposal and Senator Douglas would appreciate anything that could be done to show that Thanat was not a registered Republican.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Viet-Nam Negotiations, 1968. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stearns. The meeting was held in Harrimanʼs office.
2. Document 213.
3. See Document 211.
4. Not further identified.
5. For information on the paper, see footnote 2, Document 209.