Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

211. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 17, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Vu Van Thai, Vietnamese Ambassador
• Ambassador W. Averell Harriman—S/AH
• Mr. Leonard Unger—FE

1. Ambassador Vu Van Thai called on Ambassador Harriman following Ambassador Harrimanʼs having undertaken at the Presidentʼs request a “peace mission” on Viet-Nam. Their conversation, which lasted almost two hours, was quite full and frank and ranged over many aspects of US-Vietnamese relations as well as the situation inside South Viet-Nam. There are recorded below the more significant points which emerged from the conversation and which have not been recorded elsewhere.

2. Ambassador Thai agreed with Ambassador Harriman on the importance of a good turnout at the September 11 elections for a constituent assembly. He expected the Viet Cong to be trying in a few instances to infiltrate candidates sympathetic to their cause and, behind the scenes, to drum up votes for them. Of more significance he felt would be the Viet Cong efforts to discredit and interfere with the elections by various means including terror. He pointed out, however, that an election situation was different from a VC terror campaign aimed at one or several objectives and that the Viet Cong resources were probably insufficient to permit them to be effective all over the country at once.

3. The Governor turned to the question of Chieu Hoi and encouraging defections from the Viet Cong and splits in VC/NLF ranks. He emphasized the importance of the treatment of Chieu Hoi, as well as the treatment of prisoners in general and asked Ambassador Thai for his thoughts about what might be done to encourage defections, particularly of important figures like Nguyen Huu Tho. Thai reviewed his own acquaintance with Tho dating back to about 1954 when the latter was active although not an important figure in a peace movement. He mentioned Thoʼs imprisonment along with the present Finance Minister, Thanh, and of the efforts he, Thai, had made with Prime Minister Diem to secure their release or at least good treatment of them. Thai said that Tho was not a strong figure and was used by the VC/NLF primarily as a figurehead, someone who is pliable. He believes that the Viet Cong and the fighters and doers are separated from the NLF who play the role of spokesmen and he considers the latter not a fundamentally significant group. He expressed doubt as to how much would be achieved even if some of these front individuals should defect from the VC/NLF. While Thai recognized that important defections would have great significance internationally, he did not feel persuaded it would have real impact on either the Viet Cong or on the population of South Viet-Nam. The only effective action would be if some of the core Communist group could be influenced—here the personalities are not too well known to us. In answer to the Governorʼs question he agreed that Phat is perhaps a more important person and seemed dubious about the chances of his defecting.

4. With regard to North Viet-Nam Thai referred to the basic division between the Le Duan and Giap groups and he reminded the Governor of Le Duanʼs adamant opposition to compromise even as far back as when he opposed Ho Chi Minhʼs accepting the Geneva Accords of 1954. After some discussion of the relation of the Chinese-Russian split to North Vietnamese positions, Ambassador Thai stated that a fundamental difficulty for North Viet-Nam was that today it could not come to the conference table or in some other fashion bring the war to an end without ending up by being unacceptably dependent on the U.S. and its close friends in the Southeast Asian region. To bring the fighting to an end means a cooling off of relations with Communist China; since Chinese Communist prestige is so much at stake in the Viet-Nam war it is unlikely to acquiesce in North Viet-Namʼs bringing the war to an end. If it cuts its ties in that direction, North Viet-Nam has no alternative but to face a knuckling under to the United States since the Russians are not at present a force of any significance in the region. Thai thought that perhaps an environment could be created in Southeast Asia which would appear to the North Vietnamese to be some alternative to an exclusively U.S.-run show. He was thinking of some association of aligned and non-aligned countries, particularly in the economic field, in which the Japanese and French and others might also play some role. An important incentive to North Viet-Nam would also be concessions by South Viet-Nam on the matter of food supply, a field in which China can offer no effective competition. To illustrate the importance of this point, Thai referred to the situation in 1959 when the North Vietnamese dropped their five-year plan. He said this resulted from their having discovered, from a recent census, that their population was growing at 3% per annum as opposed to the previously understood 2 or 2–1/2% and this made them realize that without the possibility of securing food from abroad they could not proceed with the plan. At this time Vu Van Thai said he pled with President Diem to open trade but to no avail.

5. This led Thai into a discussion of his belief in the importance of stimulating economic development in South Viet-Nam and in the Southeast Asian region as a means of persuading Viet Cong sympathizers in the south of the wisdom of coming back to the Governmentʼs side and to demonstrate to North Viet-Nam the value of turning to cooperation within the region. Thai felt that within five years economic activity and output could be 200% of its present level and this might even be achieved sooner if cooperation within the area grows. He talked about the Mekong project and his favorite theme of a regional university and of selected industries in each of the four Mekong countries. He noted that both from the point of view of power requirements and food requirements North Viet-Nam was even more interested than South Viet-Nam in the Mekong. Governor Harriman pointed out that the five years which the Ambassador had mentioned might be an impractical period to wait in view of the dangers among other things of escalation.

6. The discussion then turned to the internal situation in South Viet-Nam and Ambassador Thaiʼs conviction that effective and clean administration, particularly on the part of the district and province chiefs, could do more than anything else to weaken the VC and increase the attractiveness of the Government side. He felt the quality of district officers was continuing to decline at present and attributed this, in answer to Governor Harrimanʼs question, to the fact that the military have taken over so many of these posts. He recognized that some of the military were quite competent but expressed concern particularly about growing corruption. This grows inevitably, according to Thai, as the scale and scope of the war grows and the opportunities for getting hold of large sums of money are expanded. He said the military are not trained, as were the civil servants formerly in charge, in a respect for laws and regulations and they are prone to taking arbitrary action. He referred back to the technically efficient administration under President Diem which, however, had its drawbacks also because of its arrogant style and preoccupation with building the record for Diem. Thai said that the civilians formerly in the Civil Service are many of them now working for American contractors or for the U.S. Government and others who are still civil servants have lost much of their earlier zeal.

7. In answer to Governor Harrimanʼs question the Ambassador said that the ten new civilian members of the Directorate were weak personalities and not likely to have much influence on decisions. He felt that the Constituent Assembly will have stronger figures elected and that even though the Assembly does not have legislative powers it nevertheless will serve as something of a deterrent to arbitrary action by the GVN. Returning to the matter of a government with more appeal for the people, Thai regretted the split that developed between Generals Ky and Thi. He identified them both as honest men who have some grasp of the aspirations of the people. He was hesitant to answer the Governorʼs question about General Thieu and only said that the latter played a “moderating” role.

8. The conversation turned once more to the question of how to end the war and whether the South Vietnamese could not find a way to work this out between themselves. Could not the Government, once the VC have accepted the fact that they are bound to lose, either bring them over to its side or divide them so that they no longer have any effective power? Ambassador Thai kept returning to his conviction that the key is in Hanoi and that Russian-Chinese relations are crucial in Hanoiʼs decision. He also referred to the bombing of North Viet-Nam and urged a pattern which would make the North more dependent on the Soviet Union. The Ambassador emphasized that the mining of Haiphong could increase the Chinese role. With regard to bombing, he advocated an irregular program with various starts and stops. This would serve to confuse but also bring North Vietnamese energies to bear on reconstruction with the threat of repeated destruction if they do not finally come to terms.

1. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III. Secret. Drafted by Unger.