Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

204. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, August 6, 1966.

2818. Absolutely no distribution except at direction of Secretary.

1. This is in further reply to State 21944.²

2. We have been impressed by growing number of indicators, buttressed by Rand/Goure report, that NLF-VC morale sinking. These have naturally led us to give intensive consideration to what might be done to stimulate decay in their organization. At present, we are endeavoring to set up test in a particular province (that of official now in charge of Chieu Hoi activity) with view to determining whether certain incentives can be provided, in the form of material and status rewards, which would induce high-level NLF-VC defections. By material and status awards, we mean (a) substantial cash awards to families to enable such high-level defectors to “reconstitute their lives” and (b) assurances that their status as officials will be recognized if they come over, that they will not be herded into ordinary Chieu Hoi centers or prisons, that they and their families will not be maltreated, and that they will be permitted to resume their professions if they have them, provided they maintain correct attitudes toward GVN.

3. It will probably not be easy to induce GVN to accept such approach, though their attitude toward returnees has improved considerably. Their objection stems from reluctance to “reward” NLF-VC, while patriotic elements are unrewarded. Their tendency has been to rely on rewards for NLF-VC taken “dead or alive.” To counter this, it is currently our idea that proposal be described as GVN rewarding families for performance of patriotic duty in persuading their relatives to return to GVN side. We are now developing format to propose to GVN on this. If we are blocked by bureaucracy from running test along general lines mentioned above, I will take matter to Ky with view convincing him that this is worthwhile effort, that it is better to induce NLF-VC by such means to walk in rather than have to go shoot them and get shot ourselves in the process. My talk with him yesterday will, I hope, have paved the way. We do not intend to confine awards to families of returnees, but will consider other devices calculated to minimize political resentment, such as donations to Vietnamese war veterans, etc. I will keep you informed as this matter develops.

4. A second effort we are making is at present closely held among very few of us here. On July 23, one of our most experienced American officials, a man with excellent reputation among Vietnamese, was approached and requested to meet with an uncle of Nguyen Huu Tho,³ chairman of the National Liberation Front. The uncle is head of the Tho family as now constituted, and has assumed responsibility for the welfare of Thoʼs wife and nine children, the tenth child, a boy, being with Tho in the Maquis. We approved meeting between the American and the uncle in presence of the intermediary. The uncle said he wished to induce Tho to come back, not only for patriotic but for family reasons. As Tho would turn himself over only to the Americans, they wished to know whether we would help, if he did so, and particularly whether we would put Tho beyond reach of VC.

5. Bill Porter, who is handling matter at my request, instructed American to give assurances that we would assist Tho and family in every possible way, including protection from VC. This assurance was given on July 26 and in return, Thoʼs uncle stated that plan would be implemented immediately by sending his (uncleʼs) wife to Cambodia (they declared no problem doing this) where she would meet with Thoʼs mother-in-law. The two women would then go either singly or together to meet with Tho or call Tho to see them, their purpose being to obtain from Tho statement of conditions under which he would come back. Uncleʼs wife would then return to Saigon with these conditions, which would then pass from her to uncle to intermediary to American contact. uncle believes Tho will insist on talking to authorized American before actually turning himself in. He insists Tho not real Communist.

6. Intermediary who arranged meeting with Thoʼs uncle expressed view that if Tho comes over, several other prominent NLF-VC officials would also come. He cited by name Nguyen Van Tri, alias Muoi Tri, VC political and military advisor, Zone D; Hbay Mon, VC chief of west; La Van Liem, special commissioner, for VC special missions in Saigon, Cholon and Gia Dinh (terror, sabotage). Thoʼs uncle said during meeting with American that if Tho comes over, he may arrange to free some American prisoners when he does. uncle said there no further need for direct contact between him and American, that further messages on subject would come through intermediary.

7. We have learned that uncleʼs wife left immediately as scheduled. No further word.

8. If and when matter progresses to point where arrangements are required, CAS will be brought in to effect them.

9. Cannot forecast what will come of this, but it is interesting family initiative. We will look for others.⁴ I assume I have authority to make any arrangements required to get Tho or any other top-ranking NLF-VC to come over and that if they wish to do so to us instead of to GVN, we should accept and leave problems to be cleared up with GVN later.⁵

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:14 a.m. Rostow forwarded the text of telegram 2818 to the President on August 9, together with the text of telegram 3038, August 9, in which Lodge provided a progress report on contact with Tho. In his covering memorandum Rostow stated: “Here is the first attempted major operation to go to work on the political orientation of the NLF. The case itself is attractive, if it works out; but it is equally important that Lodge is now aboard and interested.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 10)
2. Document 202.
3. In a September 27 memorandum to Helms, Carver identified the uncle as Nguyen Huu An, Permanent Secretary of the (South) Vietnam Red Cross. (Central Intelligence Agency, GAC Chron, Job 80–R01720R) Although Nguyen Huu An is referred to as “uncle” in most White House, State Department, and CIA documents dealing with him, Carver notified Helms in an October 17 memorandum that it had been revealed that An was not actually Nguyen Huu Thoʼs uncle but a cousin of Thoʼs father. (Ibid.)
4. In telegram 27768 to Saigon, August 13, the Department of State notified the Embassy that messages referring to the possible defection of Tho and other key NLF leaders should be slugged Thrush. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH)
5. In telegram 23352, August 7, the Department indicated that Lodge assumed correctly that he had such authority. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)