Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

128. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, April 29, 1966.

1. In considering the role of CIA in the elections to be held for the Constituent Assembly,² we started from the following premises:

a. It will be unwise to attempt either the creation of a broadly based political party or to give support to the Directorate, to the exclusion of others, before the Constituent Assembly elections: time is against one and the danger of driving the Buddhists again into the streets is against the other.

b. It would be impossible to engage in a truly covert operation of large-scale support to a political movement. In the goldfish bowl atmosphere inherent in the present situation and under constant examination by the large press corps present, any large campaign support effort would probably be exposed with resulting damage to the U.S. Government and particularly the CIA, exceeding any hoped-for benefits.

c. The best action for the U.S. is in the direction of selecting a limited number (perhaps five or six) Vietnamese to run for the Assembly, assisting their individual campaign efforts on a limited and clandestine basis, as and if necessary.³ The selection would be made on the basis of (1) the individualʼs known following and ability to organize and (2) his stated or known willingness to cooperate in the Constituent Assembly after it is convened. During the course of the Assembly the five or six could commence the organization of a broadly based national political movement activated by close cooperation in the Constituent Assembly and leading to the presentation of candidates in the elections to be held after the new constitution is promulgated.

2. The CIA role under Ambassador Lodgeʼs direct supervision would be limited to:

a. Providing immediately an expert on election laws to advise the Embassy and Station, said expert to visit Saigon under natural cover as a community development specialist who can consult with Embassy officers without arousing press interest.

b. Making a concerted effort to provide soundings and assessments on individuals under consideration for selection to the group of five or six (1 c, above), and providing limited financial and other support to those selected as candidates.

c. Providing soundings and assessments on all or most other candidates.

d. Providing such other limited assistance as the Ambassador may direct.

3. In support of the over-all effort it is suggested that during the campaign for the Constituent Assembly:

a. MACVʼs cooperation be sought to concentrate on providing security for as many places as possible in order to permit the largest possible number of Vietnamese to vote free from coercion.

b. A behind-the-scene election advisor such as Mr. Richard Scammon be made available to Ambassador Lodge, and through him to such Vietnamese as may be desirable.⁴

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret. Prepared in the CIA at Desmond FitzGeraldʼs request and forwarded to Rostow on April 30.
2. In an 8-page memorandum to Rostow, dated April 25, Ropa analyzed the upcoming electoral process and projected the following timetable: “May 1: Electoral commission convenes; May 20: Electoral law completed; May 30: GVN promulgates electoral law; Aug 1: Electoral campaign begins; Aug 15: Voting; Sept 1: Convening of constituent assembly.” (Ibid.)
3. In an April 26 memorandum to Rostow, Ropa recounted the first meeting on April 25 of the Political Development Working Group, chaired by Unger, at which Colby suggested supporting “individual prominent persons” for election to the constituent assembly rather than working through “a broad political front.” Ropa faulted Colbyʼs view and expressed support for Rostowʼs position that the electoral process be used to “further the coalescence of a broad political front to include significant elements of the Buddhists.” (Ibid.) Summary records of several Political Development Working Group meetings during 1966 are in Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 70 D 102, Political Development Working Group.
4. In telegram 3268 to Saigon, April 30, the Department of State transmitted guidelines that restricted the U.S. role to non-partisan advice on political processes but did not rule out “special covert support.” (Ibid., Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) In telegram 4352 from Saigon, May 3, Lodge responded that the proposed guidelines were “so restrictive as to inhibit effective exercise of U.S. influence on political development process.” (Ibid., POL US VIET S)