Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

127. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson¹

Washington, April 27, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Assessment and Use of Negotiation Blue Chips

While favoring all efforts to open discussions on Viet-Nam with the Communist leadership, I have always been afraid of certain pitfalls which will beset the path of negotiations. For example, there is the danger that, from all the public discussion of our desire for negotiations, our people will assume that the initiation of negotiations is the advent of peace and will expect a cessation of all hostilities as soon as talks begin. You will remember that, during the long negotiations at Panmunjom, we remained on a passive defensive to avoid casualties with peace just around the corner, while the enemy attacked us at will and probably inflicted more U.S. and allied casualties than would have been lost had we retained the military initiative.

One of the reasons that the Panmunjom negotiations dragged was that our adversary had no incentive to come to a prompt settlement. If we are to avoid this pitfall under present conditions, it will be essential to bring the Communists to the peace table this time convinced of the need for a prompt, negotiated settlement and, furthermore, to keep the military pressure on them until a settlement is reached.

Another pitfall is one which is always an imminent danger. Any day, Hanoi may indicate a willingness to negotiate provided we stop permanently our bombing attacks against the north. In this case, our Government would be under great pressure at home and abroad to accept this precondition whereas to do so would seriously prejudice the success of subsequent negotiations.

A somewhat similar pitfall is the appealing quality of a “cease-fire” to all peace-lovers and the attraction of a slogan such as: “Stop shooting and start talking.” Some of our best friends indulge in this kind of language and need to be put straight as to the significance of a cease-fire in a situation of guerrilla war such as we have in South Viet-Nam.

Obviously under such conditions, a cease-fire can not mean literally a cessation of the use of fire-arms by both sides. The principal activities of the Viet Cong—sabotage, terrorism, propaganda, impressment of recruits, collection of taxes, infiltration from the north, etc.—do not depend on the use of fire-arms and could go on to the great advantage of the guerrillas if the government forces were deprived of the use of their weapons. While it might be possible to agree to a cessation of military activities by formed bodies of Viet Cong and by government units, we can never accept an unqualified cease-fire which would prevent the use of weapons by the forces of law and order and allow Viet Cong depredations to go unchecked and unpunished.

To avoid such pitfalls, we need to consider what we will want from the Communist side and what they will want from us in the course of negotiating a cease-fire or a final settlement. What are our negotiating assets, what is their value, and how should they be employed? As I see them, the following are the blue chips in our pile representing what Hanoi would or could like from us and what we might consider giving under certain conditions:

a. Cessation of bombing North Viet-Nam.

b. Cessation of military operations against Viet Cong units.

c. Cessation of increase of U.S. forces in South Viet-Nam.

d. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Viet-Nam.

e. Amnesty and civic rights for Viet Cong.

f. Economic aid to North Viet-Nam.

The Viet Cong/Hanoi have a similar stack of chips representing actions we would like from them:

a. Cessation of Viet Cong incidents in South Viet-Nam.

b. Cessation of guerrilla military operations.

c. Cessation of further infiltration of men and supplies from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam.

d. Withdrawal of infiltrated North Vietnamese Army units and cadres.

e. Dissolution or repatriation of Viet Cong.

If these are the chips, how should we play ours to get theirs at minimum cost? Our big chips are a and d, the cessation of bombing and the withdrawal of U.S. forces; their big ones are c and e, the stopping of infiltration and dissolution of the Viet Cong. We might consider trading even, our a and d for their c and e except for the fact that all will require a certain amount of verification and inspection except our bombing which is an overt, visible fact. Even if Hanoi would accept inspection, infiltration is so elusive that I would doubt the feasibility of an effective detection system. Troop withdrawals, on the other hand, are comparatively easy to check. Hence, I would be inclined to accept as an absolute minimum a cessation of Viet Cong incidents and military operations (Hanoi a and b) which are readily verifiable in exchange for the stopping of our bombing and of offensive military operations against Viet Cong units (our a and b). If Viet Cong performance under the agreement were less than perfect, we can resume our activities on a scale related to the volume of enemy action. This is not a particularly good deal since we give up one of our big chips, bombing, and get neither of Hanoiʼs two big ones. However, it would achieve a cease-fire under conditions which are subject to verification and, on the whole, acceptable. We would not have surrendered the right to use our weapons in protection of the civil population outside of Viet Cong-controlled territory.

After a cease-fire on the foregoing basis, we should seek the necessary additional agreements for a final settlement, undertaking to stop increasing U.S. forces (our c) for a cessation of infiltration (Hanoi c) and, thereafter, to withdraw our forces (our d) in phase with a similar, inspected withdrawal of infiltrated North Vietnamese Army units and cadres (Hanoi d). The final step (and perhaps the most important) would be to obtain the dissolution or repatriation of the remaining Viet Cong (Hanoi e) in exchange for some combination of our e (amnesty and civic rights for the Viet Cong) and f (economic aid to North Viet-Nam). The latter is an overall “sweetener” which can be used to facilitate any step in the negotiations.

Such a tabulation of negotiating blue chips and their purchasing power emphasizes the folly of giving up any one in advance as a precondition for negotiations. Thus, if we gave up bombing in order to start discussions, we would not have the coins necessary to pay for all the concessions required for a satisfactory terminal settlement. My estimate of assets and values may be challenged, but I feel that it is important for us to go through some such exercise and make up our collective minds as to the value of our holdings and how to play them. We need such an analysis to guide our own thoughts and actions and possibly for communication to some of the third parties who, from time to time, try to get negotiations started. Some day we may be embarrassed if some country like India should express the view to Hanoi that the Americans would probably stop their bombing to get discussions started and then have Hanoi pick up the proposal as a formal offer. To prepare our own people as well as to guide our friends, we need to make public explanation of some of the points discussed above. Particularly, we need to make clear that, to the Communists, the negotiating table is simply an extension of the battlefield and the start of negotiations does not mean by any means that peace is at hand.

I would suggest that a discussion of the foregoing matters be put on the agenda of the meetings with Cabot Lodge when he returns next month.

Maxwell D. Taylor

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1. Secret. Rostow forwarded this memorandum to President Johnson on April 27 under a covering memorandum asking whether he could pass the memorandum to William Bundy and urge that the Department of State be prepared to present its views during the Lodge discussions in May. The President gave his approval and wrote on Rostowʼs memorandum: “I think we should have public statement if all agree.” (Ibid.) On April 28 Rostow forwarded Taylorʼs memorandum to Rusk, highlighting in his covering memorandum “one critical question” raised by Taylor: “do you trade a cessation of bombing in the north for a cessation of infiltration or for an end to terrorism in the south. It hinges substantially on whether a cessation of infiltration could be monitored.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET) For William Bundyʼs response, see Document 129. For Lodgeʼs comments, see Document 158.