Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

99. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, February 10, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Meeting at the White House, 10 February 1965–1:30 to 4:30 p.m.²

ATTENDING

• President, Vice President, McNamara, Vance, McNaughton, Adm. McDonald for the JCS, Secty. Dillon, Carl Rowan, Ball, William Bundy, Unger, Thompson, McGeorge Bundy, Chet Cooper and McCone. Also Bill Moyers, Jack Valenti, Reedy and Watson (White House staff were in and out)³

1. McNamara explained the recent reported events in South Vietnam including the bombing of the enlisted quarters at Qui Nhon, the SVN/VC battle near Danang and a number of other incidents. McCone distributed the CIA summary of events of February 7–8–9, copy attached.⁴

2. McNamara then raised the question:

a. Should we retaliate?

b. When?

c. What targets?

His recommendation was immediate retaliation on specified targets, including a bridge (Target 14) within 75 miles of Hanoi.

Secretary Ball took exception to timing. He and Thompson placed great importance on the presence of Kosygin in the Far East. He felt that action by us during Kosygin’s stay would prompt a greater Soviet reaction than would be the case if we waited until Kosygin returned to Moscow. Thompson supported this view; he laid particular emphasis on the visit of Kosygin to North Korea, stating that this would widen the Sino-Soviet schism; furthermore he noted the complications and the competition between the Soviets and the ChiCom over the forthcoming March 1st meeting.⁵ Ball, or more particularly Thompson, seemed anxious to tamp down any reaction on our part, deferring it at least until Kosygin’s return to Moscow, and very possibly until March 1st.

3. The Vice President expressed support of the Ball/Thompson position. He also made the point that the South Vietnamese have to fight. He raised the question as to whether the South Vietnamese should not conduct these attacks, rather than the Americans. He questioned why the NVN police state was so good and SVN in such turmoil and ineffective. McNamara noted that even in a “South Vietnamese attack,” U.S. planes provide the cover, flak suppression and the navigation. Therefore, there is a presence of half or more U.S. planes in a SVN strike.

4. I expressed and advocated very strongly an immediate U.S./SVN strike of substantial proportions and urged that this be done promptly. I took issue with the arguments that we should defer action because of the Sino-Soviet split, the March 1st meeting and the totality of the political relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. I stated that the Sino-Soviet split, the issues and depths of the quarrel, was not wholly understood by us; that I did not think our actions would necessarily control it or its depth. Moreover, the March 1st meeting was an uncertainty and I did not think our actions would have a great deal of bearing on it. I said we must not lose sight of our purpose, which was to help South Vietnamese win freedom from Communist aggression and this could only be done by dynamic and positive action on our part which should not be compromised for collateral reasons. I pointed out the attack of Monday⁶ had already had salutary effects on the political situation in Saigon and that if we did not move in this instance, there would be serious disappointment and disillusionment. I therefore urged not only prompt retaliation but a program of sustained action against the North, selecting targets in the southern part of NVN, and predicted that this would cause Hanoi to reappraise and very probably modify their VC and PL support policies.

5. McNamara and Bundy exchanged views on whether we had turned the corner and had moved in the direction of sustained and repeated strikes, rather than occasional retaliations. McNamara took the view that retaliation was for all the actions of the NVN/VC in the South and not for any single specific VC operation; therefore we should keep going.

6. The President asked [for] the field recommendations. McNamara read the latest cable which supported his earlier recommendations. The President asked the JCS—Admiral McDonald said there was unanimity that we should go right now.

7. Dillon, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, Unger, Carl Rowan, all expressed support of immediate action, with statements concerning how it should be kept in a low key, announced out of Saigon, etc., etc.

8. Thompson then suggested that we might defer action for a few days but announce that we were going to take retaliatory moves at a time of our choosing. This would permit Kosygin to get out of the Far East. This idea was vetoed. Thompson then suggested we work out communications to Hanoi, Peiping and Moscow concerning our purposes and see if they were not prepared to modify their tactics. It was agreed that we should keep open channels, which would probably be meaningless, as discussions would be on their terms, not ours.

9. The President then raised the question of VC targets in South Vietnam. He seemed to feel that with all the Viet Cong and their irregulars, totaling in excess of 100,000, there should be some lucrative camps as targets. McNamara explained that there weren’t.

10. Ball than raised the question of what would happen when the MIG’s came in. He developed a scenario of MIG opposition, followed by the need to take out the MIG bases in North Vietnam. This then would be followed by ChiComs introducing MIG’s from bases across the NVN border; then this would escalate into the necessity to take out those bases. Hence, he could see we were starting on a course that would escalate into all-out conflict with China.

11. The question of China participation was raised. I stated that there was a possibility of Chinese volunteers coming in at any time and a capability to introduce them. They might do so. However, we did not believe they would introduce organized units now. At this point I said that the introduction of Chinese at this point was not considered a probable event, however, it was very definitely a possibility and in the consideration of our actions, we had to plan to take care of every single possibility, irrespective of how remote, and to be prepared to commit the forces, the resources, the money, etc., to this end. The President was in agreement with this point. Note: This was a repetition of what I had told him privately a week ago.⁷

12. The President then raised the question of how we can prove that the support and direction of the VC was coming from Hanoi. McNamara and Ball quickly responded that this could be proven in the most positive and undeniable way and that State, Defense and CIA were working on papers which would convince even the most doubting people that this was true.⁸ (I did not enter into this discussion as I am not familiar with this effort, and I am not sure that the case can be undeniably proven, although I am convinced that this whole operation is directed out of Hanoi.) (Carter follow this up.)

13. The President then invited a general discussion of the protection of our bases. McNamara repeated his position that it is impossible. It would take at least 100,000 men, 44 battalions, and the presence of such large forces in South Vietnam would be unacceptable for a variety of reasons. (I did not engage in this discussion as I don’t believe this to be the case. I think that we can, and must, figure out some way to protect our bases and believe that a net of clandestine operations can be created by the intelligence community which would serve as “Paul Revere’s” to furnish warning. (CIA follow this up.)

14. Finally, there was a general agreement that the strike should take place at first light or as soon as command in the field could organize the operation. The Target 14 bridge was withdrawn, also the strike should be conducted by both the South Vietnamese and the U.S. Ball concurred, Thompson continued his reservations, and William Bundy interposed no objection.

15. Following this meeting, McNamara, Ball, Bundy, Dillon, and I remained to work out a press release. Bundy stated that the President had “turned the corner” and we were on the track of sustained and continuing operations against the North. I said this was a change from Monday, because I got the impression on Monday that he was approving a retaliation for a particular event. All in the room, and most particularly Dillon, stated that I had misunderstood the President’s decision, that he did indeed turn the corner on Monday, and that a program of sustained operations, which was in effect the carrying out of “Phase II” was the order of the day. Despite this, I continue to feel that we are operating consciously or unconsciously on a “reprisal basis” and that if we were to run into a period of a lull for two weeks or three weeks in which no serious atrocities were conducted by the VC, our operations against the North would be automatically stood down. Despite all protestations to the contrary, I think this the frame of mind of State and McGeorge Bundy. It is my opinion that the only advocates of sustained phase of operations are the Joint Chiefs of Staff, McNamara, and myself. (Note my telephone conversation with McNamara on 2/11.)⁹

16. At 6:15 we met in the President’s lounge on the second floor of the Mansion with the Leadership and Principal Committee Chairmen, in addition to Mansfield, McCormack, and other leaders, Rivers and George Mahon, the President, the Vice President, McNamara, Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and McCone.¹⁰

17. The President opened the meeting by explaining the serious difficult situation that confronted us. He called on McNamara to give the details. McNamara repeated the reports from the field. Ball then expressed his views concerning the complications of Kosygin’s presence in the Far East. The President then stated that the decision has been made to conduct the strikes. He asked me for an opinion of Soviet-Chinese Communist reactions. I said that in all probability there would be no Chinese Communist reaction to these strikes, although there was a possibility of the introduction of ChiCom volunteers into Laos and North Vietnam. I did not think the ChiComs would come in in organized units. With respect to the Soviets, I felt that they would probably increase their supplies of defense material and armament for use by VC insurgents, but I did not expect any military action, nor did I support the possibility of confrontation with us in other areas, i.e., Berlin and Cuba, etc.

18. Bundy then reviewed at some length his observations in South Vietnam, dealing with the political situation.

19. The President then went around the room and there was no objection to the courses of action decided upon. Mansfield, who was present, made no comment whatsoever. The President pointedly avoided asking him for an opinion or for comment. The meeting adjourned about 8:15.

20. Note: Throughout this discussion the emphasis was laid on retaliation and reprisal for the events which had been described by McNamara. There was no intimation given that we were engulfed on a program of sustained and continuing strikes against the north.

21. Following the meeting I had a brief private discussion with the President and told him I was going to leave for the south and would be there for a few days to get over this cold, would be available to call, would keep a plane standing by. The President agreed this should be done, saw no immediate crisis requiring my staying on hand. I told him General Carter would be acting.

1. Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memoranda of Meetings with the President. Secret. Dictated by McCone and transcribed by his office.
2. The meeting was the 548th meeting of the NSC, which began at 2:10 p.m., and a meeting of principals that preceded the NSC meeting; see Documents 97 and 98.
3. Bromley Smith also attended. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary)
4. Not attached and not found.
5. See paragraph 8, Document 55.
6. February 8.
7. See Document 61.
8. See Document 171.
9. Not further identified.
10. See Document 100 for another record of this meeting.