73. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
2409. Following are highlights of one and one-half hour conversation Bundy and I had with Khanh noon February 5. Also present were Admiral Cang, who appeared to be taking detailed notes, and Ambassador Unger, Generals Westmoreland and Goodpaster, Messrs. McNaughton and Flott.
Khanh said he was having difficulties in forming promised 20-man Military-Civil Council (MCC). Explained his difficulties in getting Catholics to serve, and seemed to be trying to convey impression that these difficulties had no deeper roots than usual reluctance of Catholic hierarchy to designate members of political or governmental bodies. Also remarked that notables, of whom there were to be six, tended also to be prima donnas, and would not accept permanent assignments. As a result, he hopes now that each of 4 religions would sponsor one lay notable and armed forces would sponsor two more, thus giving twenty members. After the formation of the Council, it would choose a Chief of State (probably Suu) and approve a Prime Minister and cabinet. All this he hoped to accomplish by February 13.
Khanh asked Bundy three main questions. After Bundy had explained determination of President,USG, and American people to support SVN as long as necessary and in any way necessary, Khanh asked what about going North. Bundy replied that USG was willing to consider appropriate means for bringing pressure on North Vietnam, but this would be feasible only if it involved frank and loyal partnership with a stable and reasonably popular GVN. In discussing this, Khanh several times referred to U.S. assistance in “liberating the North”. Bundy set the record straight in a very deliberate manner. He explained that while it was U.S. policy to assist SVN, it was not U.S. policy to liberate the North. Measures would be taken against the North only insofar as they support the above-stated U.S. policy objective of winning the war in the South.
Khanh’s second question was whether USG would object if National Council designated a military man as chief of government. Would USG insist on a civilian chief? Bundy avoided a direct answer, indicating USG would be [looking 0183?] only for quality and results and for indications that the person chosen enjoyed sufficient popular support to stay in power for a reasonably long time. Bundy reiterated, as he did on [Page 154] several other occasions as well, the importance USG attaches to governmental stability in SVN.
Khanh’s third question was to ask for an explanation of “U.S. strategy”, by which he appeared to mean our policy objectives. Bundy replied appropriately, emphasizing that we are here to assist GVN maintain Vietnamese independence and freedom, but that we only advise and assist; main burden inevitably falls on Vietnamese, who must learn to work together more cohesively and effectively.
After meeting had gone on well beyond scheduled time and as we were about to leave, Khanh announced that some twenty generals were in adjoining room and would like to meet Mr. Bundy. Although this was hardly fair play toward an unwarned guest, the meeting turned out to be a good thing, allowing Bundy on invitation from Khanh to make a few graceful remarks to the generals. Bundy emphasized President’s determination to continue to assist Vietnam and his full support for his representatives out here. In praising Vietnamese armed forces and generals present, Bundy avoided any reference to General Khanh.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.↩