Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

343. Personal Notes of a Meeting With President Johnson¹

Washington, June 10, 1965, 10:35 a.m.-1:05 p.m.

Problem of Public Information—People feel we are withholding information. President to tell 1) numbers 2) Mission—We ought to draft a speech. What are we trying to accomplish—how do we go about it. Russell joins us at 10:40 a.m. McN reviews Westmoreland recommendation—Points out the area of disagreement with—instead of 32 B[attalio]ns, 18. Would have cut out 14 Bns. to avoid too large an escalation &²

Max [Taylor]: We should get in rapidly the forces that can be effective in Monsoon season.

RSM[cNamara]: A plan to cover us to end of year.

Johnson³ favors Westy-Sharp questions division.

MDT[aylor]: distinguishes between territorial clear-and-hold as against strategic strike.

LBJ: Why must we do it.

MDT: If we don’t, we may lose some territory. Don’t you think it will be read as “land war in Asia.” We have to explain this is not that—not a Korean War.

LBJ: reviews needs & what we have.

RSM: not so much territory as military losses.

LBJ: How many are fighting people & how many supporting people.

DR: 35,000 fighters—55,000 non-fighters

President wants to know what GVN is doing.

LBJ: Is there any question about our authority.

DR[usk]: None: powers of C-in-C., SEATO, SEA Res.⁴—the

LBJ: Have we kept ‘em informed?

DR: Yes we have—i.e. Congress⁵

LBJ: Has Quat been informed? What does he think?

MDT: He has up to 80,000—but not, on the

LBJ: Anti-Americanism—a slackening off—

MDT: We watch for “take over” charge.

MDT: strike reserve role helping—gives Westy a lever.

LBJ: DR: get Meeker. Justice⁶

Raborn on CIA troop deployment. VC estimates.⁷

[International impact?]⁸

LBJ: What if we don’t do this? Would we get losses of what we’ve got.

MDT: We could lose a province—lose territory—lose towns.

LBJ: will this lead to more? How do we extricate ourselves?

MDT: If we can stalemate monsoon & go back in strong?

LBJ: What kind of losses? 400–4000?

RSM: another 400 between now & 1 October.

LBJ: More help from others? Australians no—ROKs only. UK: their govt could not survive—

DR: The Thais are helping.

(But this is a U.S.-GVN commitment.)⁹

LBJ: Paks?

DR: No.

LBJ: Have we had any DRV responses.

DR: No—& we don’t expect ‘em.

LBJ: What is the answer to the argument that the bombing has had no results?

DR: We never thought it would bring them running—it has had good military effect—the effect on mil. & civ. effort.

MDT: Effect on civilians in North.

Raborn: Reinforces it: fully agrees.

LBJ: The Pause?

MDT: Tho[ught ?] it was a neutral effect there.

LBJ: What do they want now?

RSM: Where are you taking us, is the question.

LBJ: Therefore?

Bob [McNamara]: I’d recommend more explanation.¹⁰

LBJ: His reason for going North was to save morale in South.

LBJ: Sums up the critics—no policy—negotiate—economic—McGovern wants to talk to the Viet Cong.

LBJ: Reads a Mansfield memo.¹¹ And gets it answered line by line.

DR: Spells out ABC of—efforts in last 20 years—& of “Kindergarten” of our present position

LBJ: They think they’re winning—we think they’re winning.

(President can keep the pressure on and ought to prove that he is steering carefully)

George Ball: We need to be careful not to regard this decision as defining or pre-deciding what we do after we see what happens in monsoon.

LBJ: McGB[undy]: What relation to bombing.

MDT: Two complementary programs.

LBJ: The Phuc Yen complex?

RSM argues against need for crash attack on it.

LBJ reviews parts of Saigon 4134.¹²

LBJ: What are we doing this summer then with 95,000!

RSM: Not too much—general need—

LBJ: How fast?

RSM: Aim at 1 August—no commitment.

Raborn: We believe in build-up—faster the better.

Senator Russell: How to get us out and save face? Little knowledge I have, I’d send division in &¹³

Jack McCloy for India?¹⁴

Quat content

How effective our people are in combat—this is a really serious matter.¹⁵

DR on danger of full-fledged debate—the Commies would use their whole apparatus to stir up trouble which might have serious international results.

LBJ: Fulbright & Stennis say we [illegible].¹⁶

We owe P[resident] a draft of argument.¹⁷

1. Source: Johnson Library, Papers of McGeorge Bundy. No classification marking. The notes were handwritten by McGeorge Bundy for his personal use and were not an official record of the meeting. Bundy’s attendance list includes the President, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Vance, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, Raborn, Taylor, Reedy, Moyers, and Russell. The President’s Daily Diary at the Johnson Library also lists Wheeler as attending. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Daily Diary.

   William Bundy also took notes at the meeting and used them several years later to prepare a 5-page summary of the discussion, which is cited in several footnotes below. (Johnson Library, Papers of William Bundy, chap. 26, pp. 10–15)

2. According to William Bundy, “McNamara led off with his own view—the 95,000 level, or half Westmoreland’s first add-on, and nothing at all on his second. Rusk concurred, and Taylor made the case that this appeared to be about right to prevent serious losses of territory and lead in the direction of a stalemate in the South.”
3. Presumably a reference to Harold Johnson, Army Chief of Staff.
4. Southeast Asia Resolution; see footnote 2, Document 347.
5. According to William Bundy, Rusk stated that the administration had made it clear to Congress that “forces were being committed in situations where combat was likely if not inevitable” but that “combat divisions with territorial responsibility would be different.”
6. Presumably a reference to securing legal opinions on the war. See Document 345 and Meeker’s Memorandum of Law, June 11. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History, Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam)
7. According to William Bundy, Raborn provided the following CIA estimate of Viet Cong strength: 64,500 hardcore professional soldiers, of which 47,000 were in combat units; another 80,000 to 100,000 guerrillas, militia, and part-time forces; and 30,000 administrative personnel.
8. It is not clear from the notes who said this or whether it is a note Bundy made to himself. Brackets in the source text.
9. It is not clear from the notes who said this or whether it is a note Bundy made to himself.
10. According to William Bundy, McNamara recommended a major Presidential speech.
11. Apparently a reference to Document 341.
12. Telegram 3134, June 10, from U. Alexis Johnson to Rusk discussed the pros and cons of air strikes against SAM sites and IL-28 bombers in North Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files,POL 27 VIET S)
13. According to William Bundy, Russell “spoke only briefly and drily. Driblets were not the answer; if a division in the highlands would help, or bombing the SAM sites, these things should be done. He would like a way out, but did not see one that would keep our word.”
14. This and the following line are apparently notes Bundy made to himself.
15. It is not clear from the notes who said this or whether it is a note Bundy made to himself.
16. According to William Bundy, the meeting concluded with a “discussion of how the situation and new programs should be put to Congress,” with the President debating “out loud the pros and cons of a new Congressional Resolution.”
17. Apparently a note Bundy made to himself.