342. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
2847. Eyes only Ambassador Johnson from Secretary. We are considering here proposal to knock out IL-28’s and SAM sites nearest completion through major single air strike including use of SAC B-52’s. We would like your personal reaction, in consultation with Westmoreland only, if he is available, concerning such a course of action.
Intelligence community estimates that such attack would cause DRV to believe future attacks on urban centers much more likely and that general US actions might be stepped up. However, conclusion is that Hanoi would accept punishment as long as it believes it is winning in SVN and would not be led to make conciliatory gestures. Retaliatory VC raids and even possibly air strikes would be considered by Hanoi, but intelligence community does not believe DRV would react by overt invasion of SVN although it might step up VC support and increase DRV line units in SVN.
Estimate is that ChiComs would furnish additional support, which DRV would probably request, including additional fighter aircraft. Majority believe ChiComs would not engage in air combat over DRV from ChiCom bases but minority thinks this probable. Sovs would be put on major spot but would probably react initially by replacing most of destroyed equipment, though perhaps not IL-28’s themselves at once. Sovs would probably reach general conclusion they had little choice but to increase aid to DRV.
On other hand, intelligence community estimates that not attacking these targets might lead to Communist conclusion US, at least for time being, has accepted certain limitations and ground rules in bombing of [Page 745] DRV. Sovs might take somewhat more rigid position though still hoping for negotiated settlement and Hanoi might conclude it could press war in South at no greater risk to key DRV areas. Intelligence community does not believe Sovs would necessarily increase build-up of offensive weapons, although they might do so. Also conclude that it is unlikely DRV now intends to use IL-28’s in offensive operations with or without attack, although special circumstances might arise or Hanoi might conceivably try an individual raid with them.
Your comments should cover your general reaction and any comment you may have on above intelligence community estimates. I personally am not of course necessarily in agreement with the estimates but they are part of the material I must use in reaching my personal judgment. Request reply to reach here morning June 10 if possible.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy. Bundy initialed the source text to indicate that he had cleared the message in the Department of State with Rusk and in the Department of Defense with McNamara.↩
- Ambassador Johnson responded with telegram 4134 from Saigon, June 10, sent as a personal message to the Secretary. Johnson noted that he considered the IL-28s and SAMs to be differing problems, in that the bomber was an offensive weapon and the missiles had a strictly defensive capability. On balance, taking into account the danger of involving Chinese forces in the conflict, Johnson concluded that the purpose of demonstrating U.S. resolve without broadening the war could be achieved by limited, selective attacks on SAM missile sites. He noted that Westmoreland concurred in this recommendation. Johnson added: “This is going to be a long war and there are no shortcuts yet in sight. We should not let our natural frustrations and impatience mislead us into ill considered efforts to find shortcuts.” (Ibid.)↩