311. Editorial Note

On May 20 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent an instruction to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) ordering his staff to prepare a plan of implementation for the establishment of a small combined coordinating staff in South Vietnam to be headed jointly by the Commander of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam (CINCRVNAF). The instruction indicated that the Secretary of Defense had approved the establishment of the joint staff, and noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had informed the Secretary that COMUSMACV [Page 680] was preparing a plan for a more formal combined command authority to be implemented upon the introduction of a significant number of additional US combat troops. (JCS telegram 122 to CINCPAC; Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5612, DEF 1) On May 24 Ambassador Taylor commented on this instruction in telegram 3855 to the Department of State. Taylor stated that while a small, joint coordinating staff might be a useful device, it would not be a good idea to put such a plan forward in the climate of opinion that existed in South Vietnam. “Joint command to the public here means subordination of Vietnamese forces to US command and is obnoxious to national pride.” Taylor noted that the Embassy was far from ready to propose anything like the type of plan for a more formal combined command authority noted in the JCS instruction. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) On May 26 Admiral Sharp concurred with Taylor’s assessment and concluded that “Premature experimentation with new command arrangements would be counter-productive should it weaken national unity within the RVNAF or promote a feeling of apathy in the countryside.” (CINCPAC telegram 260332Z to the JCS; ibid.) The Departments of State and Defense agreed in a combined message sent to the Embassy in Saigon on May 27, that no action should be taken to approach the South Vietnamese Government on the question of a combined coordinating staff until it was politically feasible to do so. Any planning for a combined command authority was to be done unilaterally and in “a discreet manner.” (Telegram 2730 to Saigon; ibid.)