Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

289. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, May 11, 1965.

3731. For the President from Ambassador Taylor. Deptel 2553.²

Part I

Alex Johnson and I called on Quat this afternoon to take up matter raised in reftel. We explained feeling in Washington that there was need to vary pattern of our activity vis-à-vis Hanoi and give more flexibility to our operations. To this end, consideration was being given to pause of several days duration in air attacks against DRV which, it seemed to us, would offer several advantages. Such action would be viewed favorably by world opinion as an indication of our reluctance to proceed too rapidly in applying military pressures. It would also provide an opportunity to observe reaction of Hanoi leaders who are unlikely to respond other than with defiance while attacks are in process. Finally, we could anticipate some psychological effect deriving from quiet of several days of suspended action followed, if required, by resumption of attacks.

After pointing out advantages, we noted danger of misinterpretation and need for plausible reason for timing of our action. We said that observance of Buddha’s birthday offered convenient peg upon which to hang our proposed action. We knew that from previous discussions Quat had not favored anything resembling cease-fire related to this period but we were raising matter again in an entirely different context.

Quat did not take issue with arguments in favor of pause of limited duration. He did suggest, however, that pause be introduced progressively, one day of air activity followed by another of quiet. I objected that this kind of pattern would not fully meet any of three purposes which we considered to justify suspension of air activity. He abandoned argument without much reluctance and indicated general agreement with pause concept (four or five days only) except for linkage with Buddha’s birthday. He feels strongly that we should not publicly advance this occasion as reason for our action. To do so would cause him difficulty with local Catholics and would be embarrassing in other respects since his govt has declined to give official recognition and support to birthday period. Finally, he pointed out that Ambassador Lodge was alleged to have pursued pro-Buddhist policy and that he felt Americans would give support to this allegation if we justified pause on Buddha’s birthday.

Without such pretext, we asked him how we could respond to inevitable press queries as to reason for lack of air activity. He said that this would cause him no difficulty as he and his spokesmen would simply respond that this matter of strategy about which they would make no comment.

While I did not mention plan to call suspension of air activities privately to attention of Moscow and Hanoi, I did comment on need of clear understanding of our motives on part of Communists and mentioned that it may be necessary to enter into some kind of communication with them on subject. Quat accepted this remark without comment.

In summary, Quat concurs in concept of pause from four to not more than five days provided there is no public linking of this action with Buddha’s birthday. If speculation assumes this linkage, he would not try to dispel impression but would give no verification. Johnson and I recommend that we respect his objections and adjust our plans in consonance with them.

Part II

If decision is made to proceed with pause, we shall need additional guidance with regard to our public relations attitude. The following are some of factors which will have to be taken into account. (Some do not apply if we follow Quat’s views with regard to Buddha’s birthday.)

1. As pattern of daily announcements and briefings on air actions against North now established here and elsewhere, absence of announcement will immediately be noted and queries made as to reason.

2. Bonze Khiet’s request for “cessation of attacks” is only for period 0000 hours to 2400 hours May 15. If we use birthday as pretext for pause of several days, we appear more Buddhist than venerable.

3. Quat will have to give some reasons for pause to his generals and something as to true motives can be expected to leak fairly promptly to press.

4. Press can be expected to probe hard to learn whether initiative for pause came from GVN or USG and, if latter, whether from Saigon or Washington.

Initially, press can be expected to perceive connection between pause and Buddha’s birthday but to extent that pause extends beyond May 15 speculation as to other reasons can be expected to become intense both in local and international press, and correspondents will hound every possible source. Our refusal to answer questions here and well-known fact that Washington issues instructions on strikes can be expected to divert much of press pressure to Washington. We hope that as situation develops we can be kept fully informed on how matter being handled Washington, including all backgrounders, so that we and GVN can keep in step.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. No time of transmission is on the source text, but it was received in the Department of State at 11:45 a.m.
2. Document 288.