Office of the Historian

270. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

Saigon, April 23, 1965, 9:44 a.m.

3491. Alex Johnson and I called on PriMin Quat 22 April to report in general terms on my visit to Honolulu. I explained that the purpose had been to continue the discussions of certain matters begun during my visit to Washington early in April. These matters related primarily to ways and means of improving the effectiveness of the in-country campaign against the Viet Cong as well as to the improvement of coastal surveillance of infiltration.

I reported the concern which was felt over the possibility of a new Viet Cong offensive growing out of the present period of relative quiet. US Chiefs of Staff considered it entirely possible that the in-country Viet Cong might be joined by units of the PAVN and take the initiative in the North. Also, we saw some signs of possible Viet Cong offensive intentions north of Saigon. Our chiefs considered that in order to reverse the trend in SVN the ARVN needed as many as 20 additional battalions. The question was how to obtain this added strength. I asked Quat whether he cared to comment on these matters.

Pointedly avoiding any discussion of the possible introduction of US troops to remedy this situation, Quat held forth at length on internal improvements which he hoped to make. He is not satisfied with the [Page 601] aggressiveness of many of his officers. He thinks that many commanders do not pay attention to the needs of their men and thus provide a cause for desertion. He has given thought to raising Nung contingents which he believes are available up to 30,000 men. Likewise, he wants to root out the officers working at non-military tasks in the Saigon ministries and send them to the field.

I told him that all these measures were excellent and that we should exploit all means to increase ARVN strength. However, there were limits to what could be achieved. For example, the shortage of leaders would always be a controlling factor. I also suggested that he discuss with Generals Thieu and Minh the reduced strength of the general reserve of which five battalions are now pinned down in Binh Dinh province.

We mentioned the two documents bearing on sea surveillance which Amb Johnson had left with him on April 19 (Embtel 3442).2 He said they were now being studied by his staff and that he would respond to them shortly.

I informed him of Ambassador Lodge’s visit on 28–29 April,3 mentioning that it was confidential for the moment. He expressed pleasure and anticipation at prospect of seeing Lodge soon.

In response to a query, he indicated that he had no additional word on General Khanh but promised to clarify his future for us soon.4

Taylor
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC and received in the Department of State at 9:51 p.m. on April 22.↩
  2. Dated April 19. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Regarding Lodge’s visit, as the President’s Special Representative, to Seoul, Tokyo, Manila, Taipei, Canberra, Auckland, Saigon, and New Delhi, with a stopover in Rome on the return to Washington, April 19–May 1, see Lodge’s memorandum to President Johnson, May 4, scheduled for publication in volume XXVI.↩
  4. In telegram, 3496 from Saigon, April 23, Taylor indicated that he had given Quat a general report on the Honolulu Conference, as described in telegram 3491 from Saigon, and warned the President there might be “serious difficulties” in obtaining Quat’s approval of some of the projects under consideration. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)↩