Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

267. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson¹

Washington, April 21, 1965.

SUBJECT

• The Attached Memorandum

I am enclosing the memorandum regarding a possible approach to Vietnamese settlement which we discussed this morning.² I have dictated it hurriedly this afternoon in order to meet the schedule we agreed upon. For that reason, there are loose ends.

The memorandum suggests some moves that we might make to take advantage of what may well be a diplomatic opening provided by the North Vietnamese. I believe that Hanoi, in its answer to the 17 nation declaration,³ has put out a feeler—in its peculiar Oriental way—that we should not ignore.

I believe further that, if we are to settle this matter short of a major war, we must be prepared for a settlement that falls somewhere short of the goals we have publicly stated, but that still meets our basic objectives.

I would like to see us move on this promptly—certainly before any final decision for a 150 percent increase in our troop deployment in South Viet-Nam that would multiply our dangers and responsibilities while limiting your freedom of maneuver.

George W. Ball

Attachment⁴

Washington, undated.

Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson

SUBJECT

• Should We Try to Move Toward a Vietnamese Settlement Now?

I

The proposed program for increasing our force deployments in South Viet-Nam to over 80,000 requires an important decision of policy. This would be a quantum jump of 150 percent. It could not help but have major consequences.

A. It would materially change the scale and character of United States involvement in the eyes of both Moscow and Peiping. (Whether it would compel them to increase their involvement is presently being considered by our intelligence community.)

B. It would transform the character of the war in world opinion. Our friends—as well as the non-aligned countries—would tend more and more to regard this as a war in which the United States was directly engaging North Viet-Nam.

C. It would substantially increase United States’ casualties. (Secretary McNamara has made clear that our own casualties will go up at a rate almost directly proportionate to the numbers deployed in South Viet-Nam.)

D. It would probably induce Hanoi substantially to step up the rate of infiltration. (This was the view expressed by Mr. McCone this morning.)

I recommend that you postpone the decision for a few days while we consider the possibilities of trying to move toward a settlement within the near future.

If we should decide to test the diplomatic water, you may still wish to commit the additional forces only provisionally—with the understanding that deployments might be changed at any time prior to actual landings in South Viet-Nam or that they might be stretched out over a longer time span.

II

Where We Are Now

We have now been bombing the North Vietnamese for ten weeks. We have mounted more than 2,800 sorties—increasing in intensity from 122 per week (February 7–13) to 604 per week (April 16–22). Our estimates show that we have damaged or destroyed 32 targets in Viet-Nam, including all the bridges on Route 1.

Deployment of additional United States personnel to date, and announcements of further deployments to follow, have amply shown our determination to assist Saigon.

There is evidence

• —that these actions have improved morale and increased stability in Saigon.
• —that the heavy air attacks in the South and air strikes against the North have—at least for the time being—somewhat impaired morale among the Viet Cong and decreased their efficiency.

There is no hard evidence that our air strikes have yet halted or slowed down the infiltration efforts of the North Vietnamese.

We are on the threshold of a new military situation. From mid-May to mid-September is the rainy season in South Viet-Nam. During that time our air operations against the Viet Cong will be impaired. The free movement of our forces in the interior of the country—whether by air or road transport—will be restricted.

Experience shows that this will benefit the Viet Cong, who are far less dependent than the United States and South Viet-Nam on motorized ground and air transport. For example, during the rainy season last July, Viet Cong activity reached record intensity (21 battalion-sized attacks).

There is evidence that substantial Viet Cong strength is being concentrated in South Viet-Nam so that it can be used during the rainy season against towns, airfields, etc.

III

Time to Reappraise Our Situation

Now is the time to take a hard look at where we are going. Specifically we should ask ourselves: should we try to set in train a possible diplomatic solution before the rainy season or should we wait until fall?

There are arguments each way.

On Hanoi’s side, the argument for waiting is that, before seriously facing negotiations, they may wish to see whether they can exploit their tactical advantage during the rainy season to achieve a Dien Bien Phu. If they should succeed in a spectacular way in attacking an isolated point of prominence in the interior (such as Pleiku or Kontum for example) their bargaining position would be substantially improved.

On our side the argument for waiting is that, if we can get by the rainy season without permitting the Viet Cong a substantial victory, Hanoi may grow discouraged and be more amenable to a diplomatic solution on terms we could accept.

Risks of Waiting

But the risks for us in delaying a settlement are very high.

1. We cannot continue to bomb the North and use napalm against South Vietnamese villages without a progressive erosion of our world position. This erosion will be limited if we appear to be moving toward some kind of political solution. But that will take more than words. We have, in my view, passed the point where we can improve our world position more than temporarily by further public statements unless there is evidence of movement towards a political settlement.

For, even though we have a good answer, most of the world believes that Hanoi, in its recent statement to the Seventeen Nation Delegation, has substantially caught up with your offer of unconditional discussions. The general world opinion is that we and they have each stated objectives that appear to call for unconditional surrender by the other side.

2. I doubt that the American people will be willing to accept substantially increased casualties if the war continues over a substantial period of time and there are no signs of active diplomacy. Distasteful as it is, we must face the hard fact that large and articulate elements in the intellectual community and other segments of United States opinion do not believe in our South Vietnamese policy. In fact, to many Americans our position appears far more ambiguous—and hence far more dubious—than in the Korean War. Until now, the American people have gone along out of their great confidence in you and because United States casualties have been less than a weekend’s traffic accidents.

But even a doubling of the casualties would begin to make a difference.

3. We cannot expect Peiping and Moscow to sit still over a long period while we bomb North Viet-Nam on a systematic basis. Even though we do not escalate our attacks, the pressures within the Communist world for intervention by Peiping and Moscow will almost certainly mount. I do not believe in George Kennan’s thesis that our military actions in Viet-Nam will draw the ChiComs and Russians together, but they can generate pressures that will compel each separately to increase its commitments against the United States.

IV

Present State of Diplomatic Manuevering

Our Diplomatic Position

We have advised the 17 non-aligned nations that we are prepared for “unconditional discussions” with the “governments concerned.”

At the same time, we have made it clear that the basis for an ultimate settlement must be “an independent South Viet-Nam—securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country.”

Hanoi Position

Hanoi has advised the non-aligned nations that it will consider an international conference “in the pattern of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam” provided its four-point proposal is recognized as “the basis for the soundest political settlement…” These four points are:

• “1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva Agreements, the United States Government must withdraw from South Viet-Nam all United States troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all United States military bases there, and cancel its military alliance with South Viet-Nam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Viet-Nam. According to the Geneva Agreements, the United States Government must stop its acts of war against North Viet-Nam, completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the DRV.
• “2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam, while Viet-Nam is still temporarily divided into two zones, the military provisions of the 1959 Geneva Agreements on Viet-Nam must be strictly respected: the two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries; there must be no foreign military bases, troops, and military personnel in their respective territory.
• “3. The internal affairs of South Viet-Nam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the NFLSV Program, without any foreign interference.
• “4. The peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.”

V

Do the Hanoi Points Provide a Starting Point for Further Exchanges?

Hanoi has set forth these four points for the purpose of staking out a beginning bargaining position just as we have staked out our objective of a completely independent South Viet-Nam.

We cannot realistically expect Hanoi and the other Communist governments to accept our formally stated objective as a pre-condition to beginning negotiations. They consider it instead as the result we would like to achieve through the negotiating process.

By the same token Hanoi obviously does not expect us to accept its four points as a pre-condition to negotiation.

The present posture is thus that each side has stated an objective that would represent total capitulation by the other side.

If we are to move off dead center we must define for ourselves what we really can accept. In other words, we must separate what we publicly state as our objectives from a realistic definition of the achievable and acceptable.

The best approach, it seems to me, is to try to find some common ground that would save face for Hanoi and permit it to pull back even though that action were only tactical and Hanoi hoped to prevail at some later date. In my view such a tactical withdrawal is probably the most we can realistically try to achieve short of totally destroying North Viet-Nam.

VI

Common Ground in Hanoi’s Four Points

There is, in fact, much in Hanoi’s four points that we could accept. I think it possible that these four points were deliberately drawn to test the possibility of beginning a dialogue—and we would do well to examine them in that light.

Analysis of the Four Points

Point One

Except for “unity”, we can certainly agree to recognize “the basic initial rights of the Vietnamese people—peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity.” We cannot, of course, accept “unity” as a basic right—except as it may be brought about by the free act of a South Vietnamese Government once the independence of South Viet-Nam is secure.

We have already stated that we will be prepared to withdraw our forces and return to the conditions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements—but only after Hanoi and the Viet Cong have stopped infiltration and aggression.

Point Two

We can certainly agree to return to the military provisions of the 1954 Agreements pending the peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam. (We must insist, of course, that reunification can be achieved only by the free act of an independent South Vietnamese Government.)

But North Viet-Nam must abide by the same military provisions.

We have already made clear that we would not expect South Viet-Nam to enter into any military alliances or to maintain any foreign military bases.

Point Three

We can certainly agree that the internal affairs of South Viet-Nam must “be settled by the South Vietnamese people” themselves.

But where Point Three sharply diverges from our position is by providing that the political settlement must be “in accordance with the program of the NFLSV” or that it must be achieved without United States assistance.

The NFLSV program, published in 1961,⁵

(a) calls for the establishment of a national coalition government after the overthrow of the government of South Viet-Nam. Elections are to be held only after this coalition is established.

(b) provides that, once the coalition is created, the present constitution of South Viet-Nam would be abolished. A new National Assembly would then be elected through universal suffrage.

Point Four

We can certainly agree that “the peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones”, provided it is understood that reunification can come about only by the freely expressed decision of an independent and secure Viet-Nam.

VII

What are the Common Objectives?

From this analysis, it is possible to distill the following common objectives on which we should be able to reach at least verbal agreement with North Viet-Nam:

a. Peace

b. Independence

c. Sovereignty

d. Territorial integrity

e. Withdrawal at later stage

f. Mutual return to military provisions of 1954 Agreements

g. No military alliance or bases

h. South Viet-Nam control of internal affairs

i. Reunification under appropriate conditions of self-determination.

VIII

What are the Irreducible Differences?

In considering the basic differences between our objectives and those of Hanoi we must face up to a fundamental question that could furnish the key to a possible solution:

Would we be prepared under proper conditions to accept the continued presence in South Viet-Nam of native-born Viet Cong and accept their participation in the political processes of the country?

Obviously, we would not accept a coalition government of the Russian type. But should we reject an arrangement under which the Front would be given the opportunity—along with all other political parties—to campaign freely but without the use of terror or intimidation for political support among the South Vietnamese people?

In my judgment we will ultimately have to settle for something like this unless we are prepared to fight a very big war. I do not believe that we can ever compel the North Vietnamese to agree to the withdrawal of South Vietnamese-born Viet Cong unless we are prepared to go through with the total destruction of North Viet-Nam. Nor do I believe that we can realistically expect to exterminate the Viet Cong in the South without prolonging the struggle over a time span that would be unacceptable to the American people and the rest of the world.

What might possibly be achieved within the fairly near future is something substantially less but nevertheless good enough—an agreement by Hanoi to what it regards as a tactical pull-back. By this I mean that the North Vietnamese might be prepared to stop the infiltration and the fighting if they could be assured of the continual existence of a Viet Cong party in the South—which, in their view, could ultimately prevail.

We could not, of course, agree to any arrangement worked out on these terms without insisting that the Viet Cong units in the South be broken up and that the Viet Cong be absorbed into the national life of the country.

I do not think we should assume a priori that an arrangement of this kind would be impossible to achieve.

Those who know much more about South Viet-Nam than I advise me that if a free election could be conducted in South Viet-Nam today the non-Communists would win. If that is not the case then clearly our moral position is not what we claim it to be. Under those circumstances we could not honestly say that we were trying to help the majority of the South Vietnamese achieve their heart’s desire but merely that we were trying to stop the Communists.

But, if I am correct in believing that we could win an election under fair and free conditions, then certainly the United States could improve its posture by making clear to the world that we would—under proper safeguards—accept a democratic test of strength.

IX

Outline of a Possible Settlement

The kind of settlement that we may have reason to hope for at the end of the road could contain the following elements:

1. All hostilities would be terminated. Hanoi would stop infiltrating men and equipment and the Viet Cong would stop their guerrilla activities.

The United States would halt its bombing and both the South Vietnamese and the United States would stop attacking the Viet Cong.

2. The Saigon Government would declare a general amnesty—subject to the faithful carrying out of paragraph 1 by Hanoi and the Viet Cong. As part of the amnesty all Viet Cong wishing to return to the North would be permitted to do so. Transportation would be provided and a regrouping encouraged—but not required—along the lines of that arranged in 1954.

3. An International Commission would undertake to police the cease-fire by the appropriate deployment of adequate inspection teams at key points throughout the country.

4. An agreed future date would be set for elections. The Liberation Front would be recognized as a political party and would be permitted to present candidates and conduct an election campaign by peaceable means.

5. An International Force would supervise the elections. Once the new Government was installed the United States would withdraw. However, the new Government would have the right to request assistance from the United States or any other country in the event that its independence were again threatened.

6. Reunification would be permitted at a specified future date if desired by the people of South Viet-Nam and their government.

X

How to take the First Step Toward Such a Settlement

There are various tracks that might be followed in order to sound out the North Vietnamese before the rainy season. Certain friendly nations have in the past been able to gain access to Hanoi—such as the Canadians. Alternatively we might try to use the channel of the Co-Chairmen.

We should ask our intermediary—whomever we may select—to approach Hanoi along the following lines:

1. An examination of the American and North Vietnamese statements disclose certain common objectives as set forth on pages 10 and 11 above.

2. In view of this course of apparent agreement on common objectives a political solution of the South Vietnamese problem ought to be possible—provided the North Vietnamese are sincere in what they say.

3. The principal elements of a solution would involve a stopping of the infiltration and a cessation of the fighting on both sides of the demarcation zone. Provided agreement could be reached with the U.S., would the North Vietnamese be prepared to phase down their infiltration for a test period of perhaps three weeks provided the U.S. agreed to scale down its bombing for the same period?

4. If all other provisions of the agreement were achieved would the North Vietnamese be prepared to call off the fighting in the South and disband the Viet Cong as a military force on the understanding that those South Vietnamese-born members would be permitted to remain in civilian life in South Viet-Nam and to participate peaceably in the political life of the country?

5. Would the North Vietnamese be prepared to take these actions provided free elections held in South Viet-Nam within an agreed period for the selection of a new government—such elections to be supervised by an appropriate international body? (While the issue of reunification could not be decided at that election it would be understood that the new government would have all the attributes of sovereignty—including the right to opt to join the North at some future point.)

6. These questions would be raised with the North Vietnamese on the ostensible authority of the intermediary nation which would make clear that the questions had not yet been raised with the United States but that the intermediary would be prepared to talk with the United States if Hanoi’s answers were at all encouraging.

These are obviously preliminary suggestions that have not had the benefit of staff work. I have not tried to deal in this paper with the refinements of any diplomatic approach that might be made or with the problems of clearance and agreement with the Government in Saigon.

The purpose of this paper is simply to raise a warning signal that we may be passing up an opportunity for getting negotiations under way. I think it important that we examine our position carefully before a decision is made that will greatly increase the American commitment in South Viet-Nam with all the dangers and responsibilities that entails.

George W. Ball⁶

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Political Track Papers. Top Secret.
2. Regarding this meeting, see Document 266.
3. North Vietnam formally rejected the 17-nation proposal in a statement issued on April 19. For text, see Recent Exchanges Concerning Attempts to Promote a Negotiated Settlement of the Conflict in Vietnam, Cmnd. 2756 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956), pp. 63–65.
4. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but Ball describes his drafting of the memorandum in The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 393.
5. For text of the manifesto issued by the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front at the time of its establishment in December 1960, see Gareth Porter, ed., Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions, vol. II, pp. 86–89.
6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.