Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

260. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, April 17, 1965, 4:21 p.m.

3424. Reference: DOD 152339Z April 15.²

1. The US Mission Council has reviewed reftel and submits the following comments.

2. As a general introductory observation, the Council would first call attention to the large number of programs which were approved for the consideration or implementation following Ambassador Taylor’s visit to Washington in early April. They include the so-called Johnson military program of 21 points, the 41-point non-military program, the Rowan program of 16 points and the CIA program of 12 points. In the aggregate, they represent far more than the GVN can digest for months to come and thus have required a thoughtful phasing based upon a consideration of priorities. Any additional programs will have to be fitted into this elaborate framework of activities at the expense of some of low priority which have been previously approved.

3. With regard to the urgency of the matters raised in reftel, the Council does not feel that there is a present deterioration in SVN which warrants taking measures which are not clearly sound and necessary. Rather than a deterioration, we feel that matters are going considerably better since early February when air attacks in the DRV began. Morale is up; ARVN performance is up; and Quat continues to do quite well. This is not to say that victory is in sight and the VC may not be preparing a new offensive. But we have no feeling of great crisis arising from present developments that requires us to cast aside our present carefully thought-out programs in favor of crash projects of doubtful value. As to specifics, the Council has grave doubts about the individual encadrement proposal raised in paragraph 1, reftel. There are both military and political objections which appear overwhelming, not the least of which is the likely repugnance of the proposal to GVN. However, we will reserve final comment until Gen Westmoreland prepares a specific plan. The other suggestion in paragraph 1—that US and GVN combat battalions be brigaded for combat operations—may have merit and has been under intensive study by MACV in the context of an international force.

With regard to the military measures of paragraphs 2 and 3, assuming that it is the decision of the USG that it is necessary to take a major part in the ground combat, the Council concurs in the experiments suggested, provided GVN acquiesces and after MACV has organized the necessary logistical support.

The Vietnam recruiting program is going well as result of months of effort expended on it. Accessions in March amounted to about 10,000, exceeding the goal of 8,000 which we had believed to be the highest feasible figure the GVN could attain. All the necessary recruiting goals have been worked out as well as plans for accomplishing them. US experts have collaborated in developing them. No further assistance is needed at the moment.

The Council favors any practical program of expanded medical services and welcomes the collaboration of the Surgeon General of the Army in its development. In this connection, USOM several weeks ago enthusiastically accepted informal nomination Brigadier General Humphrey of USAF as Chief, USOM Public Health Division. In view priority assigned health effort, we request earliest arrival Humphrey.

We do not understand the proposal contained in para 6. We have in every province teams of US military and civilians who are the best qualified people the USG has been able to send and who are deeply engaged in “the establishment of stable govt in the provinces and the initiation and direction of necessary political, economic and security programs”. This quoted language describes the pacification mission which is the main business of entire US Mission. The Council sees no need for a large Dept of the Army planning team to work with COMUSMACV, particularly since other agencies of the mission have important parts of this problem and our current plans are being [garble] to be adequate.

As to para 7, we are not aware of any special problem in the feeding of regular and paramilitary personnel; as a matter of fact, the sole program for distribution of subsistence in kind to dependents has recently been abandoned since it was administratively unmanageable and a monetary supplement substituted therefore. Hence, there is no requirement for sending General Timmes on a planning mission.

In general, the Council feels that there is no deficiency in our mission planning. The weakness is in field of execution which will never be better than the level of performance of GVN. New programs will not of necessity raise that level; unless carefully selected, they may have the opposite effect.

Council is deeply concerned that combination of measures proposed reftel will be regarded by Vietnamese as a sharp change in policy and basis for our joint effort with Vietnamese as indeed it appears to us. If we are to build a viable independent nation here, we must continue to press and pro [prod?] Vietnamese on all fronts but realize that in final analysis it is Vietnamese who must run their own affairs. Council foresees many adverse political and psychological repercussions from embarking on many of the actions outlined in reftel. When they become known, our behavior will be widely interpreted as a vote of no confidence in Quat govt and will confirm the fears sometimes voiced that the Americans want to take over and run the affairs of the country without reference to the Vietnamese.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. Document 256.