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  4. Document 258

258. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1

Saigon, April 17, 1965, 3:33 p.m.

3421. For McGeorge Bundy from Ambassador Taylor—Eyes Only. Info Secretary Rusk—Eyes Only. Please deliver during opening business Saturday morning. Ref. Deptel 232 [2332].2 I am greatly troubled by DOD 152339Z April 15.3 First, it shows no consideration for the fact that, as a result of decisions taken in Washington during my visit, this mission is charged with securing implementation by the two month old Quat govt of a 21-point military program, a 41-point non-military program, a 16-point Rowan USIS program and a 12-point CIA program. Now this new cable opens up new vistas of further points as if we can win here somehow on a point score. We are going to stall the machine of govt if we do not declare a moratorium on new programs for at least six months.

Next, it shows a far greater willingness to get into the ground war than I had discerned in Washington during my recent trip. Although some additional U.S. forces should probably be introduced after we see how the Marines do in counterinsurgency operations, my own attitude is reflected in Embtel 3384,4 which I hope was called to the attention of the President.

[Page 564]

My greatest concern arises over para 6 reftel which frankly bewilders me. What do the authors of this cable think the mission has been doing over the months and years? We have presumably the best qualified personnel the Washington agencies (State, AID,DOD, USIA and CIA) can find working in the provinces seven days a week at precisely the tasks described in para 6. Is it proposed to withdraw these people and replace them by Army civil affairs types operating on the pattern of military occupation? If this is the thought, I would regard such a change in policy (which will gain wide publicity) as disastrous in its likely effects upon pacification in general and on US/GVN relations in particular.

Mac, can’t we be better protected from our friends? I know that everyone wants to help but there’s such a thing as killing with kindness. In particular, we want to stay alive here because we think we’re winning—and will continue to win unless helped to death.

Taylor
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 3:10 a.m.↩
  2. Document 257.↩
  3. Document 256.↩
  4. Document 252.↩