Office of the Historian

248. Letter From President Johnson to Senator Mike Mansfield1

Washington, April 12, 1965.

Dear Mike:

I have been slow in answering your memorandum of March 182 and your letter of March 24.3 They arrived just at the time when I was getting my thoughts in order for the speech on Vietnam which I delivered on April 7. Your memoranda were helpful in that process, just as your eloquent statement of support on the day after the speech was a great help.4 I know how deeply troubled you have been about the situation in Vietnam, and for that reason your support is all the more welcome.

As I read your letter and memorandum, I think there is more agreement than difference between us. Let me comment on a few points where your letter seems to overstate any differences we may have.

We have no desire to exercise “a primacy” over what transpires in South Vietnam. Our purpose is rather to prevent the Communists from doing exactly that. Our present limited actions in North Vietnam are caused by the actions of the North Vietnamese and not by any aggressive purpose on our side, in any way, shape, or form.

I do not think that I have ever spoken of “unconditional capitulation” of anyone. The exact shape of a settlement that would allow the [Page 548] South Vietnamese to work out their own destiny is a matter which cannot be decided at this stage, but I do not think your second paragraph is a precisely accurate description of the terms and conditions set forth in my speech and in our answer to the 17-Nation declaration.

I think that the implied criticism of “targets of convenience” in your third paragraph is somewhat unfair. This military phrase is not a perfect one, but all that it means is that along certain carefully defined communication routes, pilots are authorized to attack whatever military targets they encounter.

Contrary to what is suggested in your fourth paragraph, we are not opposed to the kind of situation which exists in Burma and Cambodia. Our position is rather that the decision on alignment or non-alignment is one which individual countries should be free to make in the light of their own interests and needs.

Finally, I do not agree with the suggestion that the military authorities in Vietnam should have sought my personal approval before making the limited, specific use of riot-control gases which they authorized in an effort to save lives. These episodes have been blown up out of all proportion by critics who do not seem to be troubled by the killing of civilians in city streets by terrorist bombs.

You will agree that I should be careful in responding to your specific proposals for future action, simply because of my obligation to maintain freedom of choice as the situation develops. But I want you to know that I am fully alert to the importance of maintaining effective access to American troops in Vietnam, and that by my direction the terms and conditions for discussions leading toward an eventual settlement are under careful and continuous review.

For the rest, I will stand on what I said last Wednesday, and I thank you again for your prompt and effective support for that statement.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IX. No classification marking.↩
  2. Not printed. (Ibid., White House Central Files, Ex ND 19/CO 312, filed under April 12)↩
  3. Document 215.↩
  4. Regarding the President’s speech on April 7 and Senator Mansfield’s statement on April 8, see Document 245.↩