190. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central
Intelligence Agency (Cline) to the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy)1
Washington,
March 8,
1965.
SUBJECT
- 1.
- Herewith my own capsule appreciation of the unfolding of the
scenario in Vietnam so far. It is in accord with the views of most
of my Southeast Asia experts but is far too clear-cut a statement to
be coordinated easily as an official intelligence community
view.
- 2.
- For your noting, not necessarily for reading, are two of my
earlier memos2 on the
situation in Vietnam and what to do about it. You will see I am at
least consistent. My only fear now is that we may have waited too
long to reduce the pressure on the political and internal security
fabric in South Vietnam. It is pretty threadbare, as you know. If it
holds, then I believe the course we are on will pay dividends as
time goes on.
[Page 421]
Attachment
Memorandum Prepared by the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
(Cline)
SUBJECT
- Status Report on Vietnam after Seven Days in March
It is too soon to tally up the returns from U.S. military pressure on
North Vietnam of the systematic kind implicit in the March air
strikes. It is clear, however, at the end of this first week that
the reactions and results all around are running according to the
scenario envisaged beforehand in planning papers and intelligence
estimates.
- 1.
- The first series of air strikes in North Vietnam (7, 8, 11
February and 2 March) inflicted limited damage on military
installations associated with infiltration but, of course, as
anticipated, constituted more of a political and psychological
signal than a major military interdiction of the North
Vietnamese effort in the South.
- 2.
- The 2 March signal seemed to register in Hanoi, Peking and
Moscow, causing perhaps more noise and flutter than might have
been expected from one raid. The unexpected propaganda barrage
was laid down by all three Communist governments condemning the
U.S. and trying to deter it from pursuing this campaign of
military pressure.
- 3.
- Hanoi has reacted otherwise by sitting tight, activating the
Viet Cong to try to win as much of South Vietnam as possible,
hopefully from their point of view all of it, by guerrilla
tactics and terror before it is too late. Gains thus won would,
of course, be useful at the bargaining table if Hanoi was later
obliged to negotiate some sort of settlement. For the present,
though, North Vietnamese leaders are, as we estimated they
would, decrying any talk of negotiations prior to U.S. complete
withdrawal from Vietnam as a way of snatching the fruits of
victory from Communist hands.
- 4.
- There are no signs of open military moves to change the
character of the war through the intervention of large-scale
regular forces not now engaged, either North Vietnamese or
Chinese. Peking has talked very tough, and there are some
Chinese Communist precautionary movements and activities which
could, of course, presage later military intervention, but this
was expected.
- 5.
- The Soviet Union seems to be about to re-enter the arena with
military aid of some kind. This was not specifically anticipated
but so far seems to be a minimum military commitment if it is
one at all. On the whole, Moscow seems more worried about the
dangers of escalation and
[Page 422]
anxious to reassure itself of the limited
character of U.S. military action than to intervene in any way
except purely defensive or political.
- 6.
- Most observers report that the U.S. air strikes have given a
substantial boost to morale in South Vietnam. Unfortunately, as
yet there is no appreciable diminution of divisive sparring
among political cliques in Saigon. This fact is disappointing,
although it should be recognized that strengthening of the
national political fabric in South Vietnam is a long-term
task.
- 7.
- The truly discouraging phenomenon is the ability the Viet Cong
now demonstrate to dominate large areas of the country
previously under Saigon’s control and to mount tremendous
harassing campaigns against internal security almost everywhere.
We are seeing the results of long years of careful Communist
preparation, and we estimated that an aggressive,
no-holds-barred guerrilla attack would be the Communist response
at this stage.
- 8.
- The crucial question is whether the political and internal
security fabric in South Vietnam will hold together under this
strain while military pressures on North Vietnam build up over a
long enough time to have some effect on Viet Cong instructions
from Hanoi, will to fight, or capabilities. This we cannot
predict with any certainty so soon after all of the factors in
the situation have been stirred up as a result of the 2 March
strikes. About all that can be said is that for the first time
in many months the U.S. has some initiative and the Communist
nations are watching Vietnam with some agitation and
concern.
