Attachment3
Washington,
March 8,
1965.
Memorandum by the Presidential
Consultant on Vietnam (Lodge)
SUBJECT
- Recommendations Regarding Vietnam
The following would be in addition to the wise decisions and
effective actions which have already been taken:
A. Pacification
Communist subversion-terrorism is the great unsolved problem in South
Vietnam. It is also the greatest single foreign danger to the U.S.
and the Free World, actually threatening a Communist takeover of
many underdeveloped countries. It is, in a sense, a bigger threat
than the nuclear, where we have superiority and a well understood
procedure.
In South Vietnam our military, economic, social and informational
programs are individually good. But none of these tools accurately
fits the puzzle of subversion-terrorism. The political and executive
“glue” to hold them together and bring them to sharp focus is
lacking. Until we do this, we cannot win—nor can we convince Hanoi
that its aggression is unprofitable.
The only overall executive or “generalist” in Vietnam for all these
“special” American programs is, as regards
counter-subversion-terrorism, the Ambassador. This is not good
organization. In Malaya there were “generalists” at every level of
government.
There is no time for further elaborate studies in the theory of
subversion-terrorism. The subject has already been over-analyzed and
over-intellectualized. Workable methods are well known. The need is
for quick action.
Recommendation No. 1
Some one man in the U.S. Government should now be
made responsible for subversion-terrorism; given enough
authority; rewarded if he gets results; and relieved if he
fails. His representative in Saigon would, under the Ambassador,
pull our separate programs together throughout the country to
wipe out subversion and terrorism and train the Vietnamese to do
the same.
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Instead of giving this new official a name connected with
“counter-subversion-terrorism”, a positive note might be struck
calling it the “Agency for Support of National Independence”.
The head of the agency would recruit personnel—less than 50
persons—for whom counter-subversion-terrorism would be a career, for
whom it would be the primary interest, and on the basis of which
they would get promoted. This does not exist today.
This is not said in criticism of anyone; and individual agencies have
done good work. But the organization of the whole has obviously not
produced the needed result. Neither we nor the Vietnamese are
organized so as to give counter-subversion-terrorism the unified
thrust which it needs.
Counter-subversion-terrorism in its first stage involves military,
propaganda, police and political personnel, who carry out:
saturation of the popular mind; strict resources and population
control (including a curfew); national registration of everyone over
12; detention of suspects; and search without warrant. (In the
second stage, at utmost speed, come economic and social
measures.)
In addition to the existing military and propaganda programs, which
are adequate in size, and to the proposed political program, I make
the following:
Recommendation No. 2
Maximum increase in police forces, which is the
basic long-term answer to terrorism. (In Malaya the police force
was almost tripled.)
Recommendation No. 3
There should be a greater degree of
decentralization of the U.S. political effort in
Vietnam.
As an example, I suggest naming a politically-minded representative
of the Ambassador who would be in touch with the Cao Dai, a
religious sect numbering some 3 million people and another, who
would keep in touch with the Hoa Haos, a religious sect numbering 2
million people. There might also be political advisers in the corps
area headquarters. These persons could also be “generalists” who
would coordinate our present inadequately organized effort
locally.
The operative concepts should be flexibility and adaptation to local
circumstances and problems rather than national programs,
centralized direction and control from the center. Every region is
different from every other. The program therefore should flow from
the bottom (i.e. the people) up, rather than from the top (i.e.
Saigon) down.
The Vietnamese have no tradition of national government. They do not
do it well. Until the advent of Chinese Communist imperialism, it
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never seemed necessary
to have a national government. On the other hand, there is
considerable vitality in regional, tribal and religious groupings.
These local people have shown that they know how to get the word
around. We should work more on them, and not hamper ourselves by the
classic, diplomatic idea that for us to deal with anything below the
national level is interference in internal affairs.
The Vietnamese lack of a sense of nationhood (in spite of a real
sense of peoplehood) makes coups easy, including a “neutralist”
pro-Communist coup, the winners of which would ask us to leave—an
invitation to be rejected out of hand as specious, spurious and not
representing the true interests or desire of the Vietnamese people.
The reasons which prompt us to be there now obviously prompt us to
stay there until the Vietnamese can stand on their own feet.
Recommendation No. 4
We should study a situation in which we and the
Free Vietnamese hold only the area around Saigon and such places
as the coastal cities of Nha Trang, Da Nang and Hue.
In the early days of French colonialism there were no major roads and
travel was largely along the coast. As part of such a situation we
should consider recognition of a de facto government or perhaps
working locally without even a semblance of a national government.
This is another reason for having a U.S. presence at Cam Ranh Bay.
(See Recommendation No. 12)
Note: While the pacification record in North
and South Vietnam is bad, progress in the key (so-called “Hop Tac”)
area surrounding Saigon appears encouraging. According to the weekly
CIA report of February 24,4 ten more hamlets were
pacified during the week, bringing the total to 309 (out of a total
of 1,146 hamlets in this area) in two and half months and leading to
“positive actions by hamlet chiefs to help the people”, which “has
rapidly motivated the people to supply the Government with
information”. In the report for March 3,5 the figure was raised to 322 hamlets, meaning that
some 870,000 people are now reckoned to be living in secure areas
and some 448,000 in areas in the process of being secured. All this
could be fundamental. It is the way to accomplish something durable
in Vietnam which, if done, will surely destroy the VC as we have always known it.
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Recommendation No. 5
This success, if true, should be intensively used
as a laboratory to train the people to speed pacification into
the rest of the country. The area now being pacified should be a
showcase.
The seven provinces around Saigon, of which the Hop Tac area is the first phase,
cover 40% of the population of Vietnam—and the most important 40%.
If this gets dependably pacified, the pacification of the rest of
Vietnam should be easier.
Recommendation No. 6
The above appears to be a real success, which, if
confirmed by later reports, should be publicized in the U.S. and
world press.
B. Buddhists
The Buddhists are crucial in Vietnam. Among the Buddhist clergy are
the only Vietnamese with genuine political talent. Weak though the
Buddhist clergy’s sense of nationalism is, they do not want to be
engulfed by Communism. They can be reasoned with. I know of
instances when they have been persuaded to change plans which would
have caused violence and bloodshed. The outlook is not hopeless. A
greater assumption of responsibility by Vietnamese Buddhists could
lead to big things within Vietnam; and a greater participation by
Buddhist leaders outside of Vietnam might one day be useful in
connection with possible future international aspects of the
Vietnamese problem.
Recommendation No. 7
We should favor distribution of surplus foods
through the Buddhist clergy, thus giving them a responsible
stake in the preservation of law and order. But this must not be
done so as to appear as a bribe. It must appear as a mark of
friendship and regard.
By doing this, we should facilitate contacts between Americans and
Buddhists, which should in turn lead to further friendships.
The Communists are actively trying to infiltrate the Buddhist
movement. If they succeed, it will be disastrous, not only in
Vietnam, but in Ceylon, India, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and
Japan. It is through friendship, respect and warm personal relations
that we can best work to prevent this.
Recommendation No. 8
There should also be support of Buddhist
educational, cultural and religious activities, not only by the
Government, but also through foundations and religious groups,
including funds for hospitals and schools.
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Recommendation No. 9
It would also be very constructive if the
Ecumenical leaders meeting in Rome should strive to bring
Catholics and Buddhists together.
There is an outstanding priest in Japan, Rev. Riri Nakayama, with
whom I am on excellent and friendly terms; who considers that I did
him a favor when I first met him in Japan en route as Ambassador to
Vietnam; who is highly respected and well known by the Vietnamese
Buddhist clergy; and who is well thought of at the Vatican because
of his work to protect the Catholic Church in Japan during World War
II. Rev. Nakayama is devoting his life to improving relations
between Buddhists and Christians; and if you approve the
recommendation to help the Buddhist movement generally as regards
surplus foods, schools and hospitals, this decision could be
tactfully communicated to Rev. Nakayama, which would protect us from
being accused of making an attempt to bribe the Vietnamese clergy.
Rev. Nakayama is also in a particularly good position to work for
good Catholic-Buddhist relations.
Recommendation No. 10
The Dalai Lama should be brought to Saigon as an
object lesson of the dreadful things Communism does to high
ranking Buddhist clergy.
C. Plan for Development of
Southeast Asia
Recommendation No. 11
There should be a Plan for the Development of
Southeast Asia, comparable in scope to the
Marshall Plan and in addition to what
we are doing already.
The inter-action of the Marshall Plan and NATO on each other was dynamic and
spectacular in Europe; so can the inter-action of a Plan for the
Development of Southeast Asia on our effort in Vietnam. This plan
should include the Mekong River, as suggested by the American
Friends of Vietnam. But it should also aim at Southeast Asia as a
whole, including Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia and
New Zealand. It should involve the wealth and energy of Japan. It
should aim at eliminating illness and widening the area in which
justice prevails.
D. Miscellaneous
Recommendations No. 12, 13 and 14
12. Intensive study should be given to establishing
a U.S. “beachhead” at Cam Ranh Bay. It is easy to conceive of a
situation in which travel up the 60-mile length of the Saigon
River to Saigon would become extremely dangerous. Cam Ranh Bay
is a deep-water anchorage—with few people. Without constructing
anything permanent or expensive, it should be possible to
establish a U.S. Naval
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presence which could be of tremendous value—politically,
militarily and at a conference table.
13. Renewed study and drive should be put behind
forming an international consortium, under whose auspices the
Vietnam operation could be conducted. This could give the
Vietnam operation a better international appearance and ought to
lead to some increase in third-country support.
14. The U.S. Navy, with the Vietnamese Navy, should
take intensive measures to prevent the landing of supplies and
personnel on the coast of South Vietnam.
