Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

187. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, March 8, 1965, 1 p.m.

2889. Deptel 1925.² I am concerned from standpoint our overall posture vis-a-vis Hanoi and Communist Bloc that current feverish diplomatic activity particularly by French and British tends to undercut our ability to convey any meaningful signal to Hanoi of USG determination to stick it out here and progressively turn the screws on DRV. Seaborn’s estimate of mood of confidence characterizing DRV leadership despite our joint air strikes to date (Embtel 2880)³ almost identical our estimate contained Embtel 2861.⁴ It appears to me evident that to date DRV leaders believe air strikes at present levels on their territory are meaningless and that we are more susceptible to international pressure for negotiations than are they. Their estimate may be based in part on activities of “our friends” to which we seem to be active party.

In my view current developments strongly suggest that we follow simultaneously two courses of action: (1) attempt to apply brakes to British and others in their headlong dash to conference table and leave no doubt in their minds that we do not intend to go to conference table until there is clear evidence Hanoi (and Peking) prepared to leave neighbors alone; and (2) step up our air strikes in southern part of DRV in order convince Hanoi authorities they face prospect of progressively severe punishment. I fear that to date Rolling Thunder in their eyes has been merely a few isolated thunderclaps.

The same general considerations apply re our urging British to undertake further early soundings re Article 19 Laos Accords as Ambassador Martin so cogently states in his Exdis 2178 to Dept.⁵ Many of problems which worry him are also applicable to Vietnamese here and I share his reasoning and concern.

It seems to me that we may be in for a tough period ahead but I would hope we will continue to do whatever is required and that we try to keep fundamental [omission in the source text] vis-à-vis Hanoi clear and simple. My specific recommendations concerning increasing tempo and intensity of our air strikes against DRV follows by separate telegram.⁶

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis.
2. In telegram 1925, March 6, the Department of State reported on its discussions with British Foreign Secretary Stewart regarding peace negotiations. (Ibid.)
3. March 7. (Ibid., Vietnam Negotiating Files: Lot 69 D 412, Seaborn)
4. March 5. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
5. Apparently a reference to telegram 1278 from Bangkok, March 6. (Ibid., POL 27–14 LAOS)
6. In telegram 2888, March 8, Taylor stated that the pace of attacks proposed in telegram 1718 (Document 115) was reasonable, but he favored “a progression of U.S. strikes north of 19th parallel in a slow but steadily ascending movement.” (Department of State, Central Files,POL 27 VIET S)