176. Draft Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton)1

POSSIBLE ACTIONS WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM

A. General

1. Send General Johnson to Vietnam for as long as necessary to review thoroughly with Westmoreland the present use of all DOD assets and to determine what additional forces and techniques, if any, can be of value.

B. Air Strike Operations

2. Remove all restrictions on use within South Vietnam of any US land-or sea-based aircraft, including the restrictions requiring Vietnamese personnel in Farmgate aircraft.

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3. Organize large-scale air attacks on Viet Cong base areas, including night and day pattern bombing in such areas as the VC Do Xa base area. B–52s based on Guam could be used to supplement other aircraft.

4. Increase the frequency and effectiveness of Barrel Roll operations in Laos.

5. Increase night aerial activity over known infiltration routes in South Vietnam. Include use of infra-red and night photos.

C. Ground Operations

6. Organize massive use of all surveillance-type aircraft on a grid basis to cover VC movements in selected areas of Vietnam, with a capability to call for rapid ground and air attacks.

7. Employ ranger-type ARVN and/or US Special Force-controlled CIDG units in extended offensive guerrilla operations in VC-controlled areas.

8. Support ARVN with US mortar units to increase accuracy of mortar fire.

9. Use small patrols with long-range radios to report on VC movements and locations.

10. Use up to a division of Korean combat units.

D. Naval Operations

11. Immediately send out additional small Navy craft for operation by US and/or Vietnamese crews for coastal patrol and other duties.

12. Implement promptly the recommendations of the Navy team now considering methods of creating US-GVN sea and air patrols for coastal-and river-security as near watertight as possible.

E. Tailored Incentives and Actions

13. To increase the numbers and to improve the morale of South Vietnamese forces, provide a subsistence allowance “in kind” to the regular and irregular troops and to their dependents in such a way as to provide a massive increase in compensation (for example, 50%).

14. Put teeth in the draft law.

15. Make it profitable to be on the side of the government—for example, reward and publicize heroes, businesses, villages, etc., who contribute to the war effort.

16. Send assassination squads after VC leaders.

17. Establish a program of substantial bounties payable for turning in Viet Cong, particularly their leaders.

18. On a selective basis use rewards to top leaders to induce them to accept US instructions regarding actions required to unify leadership in [Page 392] the country and regarding the timing of and attitude toward negotiations.

19. Carry out expeditiously reforms required among Montagnards.

F. Psychological Operations

20. Send Carl Rowan to Vietnam to review the information and propaganda program for influencing the South Vietnamese.

21. Give Zorthian and the USIA a blank check on funds and equipment for operations within South Vietnam.

22. Develop and promote a simple and multi-point positive program to propagandize.

23. Improve methods of reporting combat operations and contacts.

G. US Organization

24. Increase tours of duty of US key personnel now in South Vietnam by 3–6 months.

25. Shift the police responsibility to MACV.

26. Place USOM and CAS under MACV.

27. Immediately fill all USOM shortages with military personnel.

28. Substantially expand USOM staff, especially in the provinces and districts, with military personnel wherever required.

29. Shift AID emphasis from long-to short-term objectives with quick payoffs—for example, more housing, more junks, higher pay, more “pigs and fertilizer” programs.

30. Assign the “Lansdale Irregulars” to Vietnam, perhaps assigning them to a specific section of the country.2

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXX. Top Secret. The source text is labeled “2nd draft.” No copy of the first draft has been found. For William Bundy’s point-by-point reaction to these proposals, see his March 2 memorandum to McNaughton. (Ibid.)
  2. In a letter of February 23 to the President, Senator Thomas Dodd (D-Conn.) suggested that a special team headed by General Lansdale be sent to Vietnam to establish better liaison with the leaders “of various sectors of the Vietnamese community.” Dodd’s letter, along with the President’s brief acknowledgment of receipt dated February 24 and Cooper’s March 1 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy commenting on Dodd’s suggestion, are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XXX.