Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

165. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, February 25, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Discussion with President Johnson, Thursday evening, from 6:15 p.m. for about 10 minutes

1. I handed President Johnson and briefly discussed the following:

a. Memorandum dated February 25th concerning attitude of Hanoi and Peiping towards negotiations.² I stated our opinion was that both Communist China and NVN would, under current circumstances and conditions, enter negotiations only on their terms. Moscow on the other hand seemed to have a more lenient approach, as reported by the French, largely through the press.

b. Watch Report of February 25th³ pointing out the numbered paragraphs concerning indications of Communist movements southward in NVN, movement in Laos, high level of communications, and other indicators. I stated there was a high probability that the NVN, with the VC, were assembling sufficient military strength to cut off the four Northern provinces of SVN. I stated that in June of 1962 Diem and Nhu told me that this was an objective of Hanoi, and for that reason they maintained large forces in the Northern provinces. However, these forces had since been removed because of deterioration in the Delta and other areas of SVN. The President agreed that this seemed to be the objective of the VC and the NVN.

c. Report of February 25th³ giving the background of military and political characters remaining in SVN and the status of the various religious sects, political groups, etc. I mentioned considerable suspicion and distrust in Generals Thi and Ky, noting that the former participated in the 1960 coup, fled to Phnom Penh, lived there for three years in close consultation with neutralists and possibly unfriendly forces and, as Commander of the 1st Corps, he was in a most strategic position to collaborate with the VC and NVN in establishing an independent country composed of the four Northern provinces.

2. The President asked if Amb. Taylor was fully aware of all of this and I responded that in all probability he was, but I questioned whether he held Ky and Thi in the same suspicion as did I. He then said that it was too bad that Taylor could not “have his own man” running the place.

Action: I would like consideration of a summary of all of the above transmitted to Saigon station with instructions to discuss with Taylor, Johnson and the Country Team. Also, I wish to call attention of McNamara, Vance and Wheeler to all of the above.

3. Prior to this meeting I met privately with Secretary Rusk who was waiting to see the President⁴ and outlined all of the above to him. Rusk took no exception, noted the three documents, and said that he would review them personally with his staff when he returned to his office.

Action: I should call McNamara, Vance and Wheeler concerning the above.

1. Source: Johnson Library, John McCone Memorandum of Meetings with the President. Secret. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office.
2. Apparently a reference to Document 158.
3. Not found.
3. Not found.
4. Rusk met with the President at 6:25 p.m. for ten minutes. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary)