154. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
2720. For the President.2 This has been the most topsy-turvy week since I came to this post: A new government installed, a coup attempted against the Commander-in-Chief, the coup suppressed, the Commander-in-Chief deposed by those who had put down the coup. The coup attempt itself was an ill-considered, ill-timed move against Khanh by a group of officers and former officers, many of whom had already been discredited by their earlier unsuccessful attempt against Khanh last September 13. One might have expected that General Phat, the coup leader, would have done better on a second go but he again misjudged the temper of the military commanders having effective military strength in the [Page 350] Saigon area. Phat’s unsuccessful effort did have the effect, however, of breaking Khanh’s spell over his colleagues in the Armed Forces Council and of bringing them to a decision to unseat him. This action appears to have been successful and Khanh’s appointment as Ambassador-at-Large3 has just been announced. I understand that he will depart Saigon for Hong Kong on 25 February: but one cannot exclude the possibility of his making another last minute maneuver to save himself.
With Khanh, the troublemaker, removed from the scene, we hope that the Quat government can get under way with our joint programs. We believe that the government has considerable potential but its basic strength will not be known until put to the test. That test is likely to be a challenge by the Buddhist Institute where Thich Tam Chau is presently making pro-Khanh anti-Suu noises. It is hard to see what objection the Institute can find in the Quat government, the members of which were carefully chosen with a view to their acceptability to the Buddhists.
The excitement over the coup tended to divert attention somewhat from the Viet Cong munitions ship sunk off the coast of Phu Yen Province. The cargo of this ship furnishes by far the most dramatic evidence of Hanoi involvement yet uncovered in the war. An incomplete count of the cargo and nearby caches indicates that some 4,000 weapons, large quantities of ammunition and some 500 pounds of medicines were captured. The weapons and ammunitions were [from] the USSR, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Communist China; Hanoi packing slips were found in the medical containers, which include supplies manufactured in North Vietnam, the USSR, Communist China, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Japan. This discovery is particularly timely in terms of justifying the US/GVN air strikes against North Vietnamese military targets.
Viet Cong activity was down during the week but pacification conditions remain unsatisfactory in many provinces, particularly in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen. The deteriorating security situation in this latter area has required a cut back in our economic programs, since USOM representatives are generally unable to leave the principal towns. We can hardly expect to reverse the situation in central Vietnam until the Quat government is able to increase its operational military and paramilitary strength.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Received in the Department of State at 8:58 a.m.↩
- In a telephone conversation with Rusk at 12:15 p.m. on February 23, Bromley Smith indicated that he was sending this telegram to the President at his request. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)↩
- Taylor and U. Alexis Johnson’s conversation with Quat on February 22 regarding Khanh’s future status was reported in telegram 2700 from Saigon, February 22. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 15–1 VIET S)↩