Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

151. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 21, 1965, 12:30–12:55 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Discussion with British Ambassador on Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS

• Lord Harlech, British Ambassador
• Mr. Michael Stewart, British Embassy
• Mr. Oliver Forster, British Embassy
• The Secretary
• Ambassador Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

Apropos the appearance of Foreign Minister Couve de Murville on TV at the moment of Ambassador Harlech’s arrival, the Secretary told the Ambassador that the French appear much more persuaded than we that Hanoi is anxious to work out the difficulties in Viet-Nam. The Secretary remarked that this would no doubt be on Hanoi’s own terms even if they are indeed ready to negotiate, and he added that in his view the French are not really deeply concerned with how problems are resolved in that part of the world.

The British Ambassador agreed that the French are out of the area for good. He inquired whether Couve had tended in recent conversations to minimize the importance of the support and direction by North Viet-Nam of the Viet Cong effort. The Secretary said the French had not pressed this point but in any case he had given them at length yesterday the evidence on the North Vietnamese ship just recently captured in South Viet-Nam waters, loaded with arms.

Harlech then referred to UK-Soviet conversations in Moscow and relayed Ambassador Trevelyan’s conviction that any public statement made on this subject would promptly blow up the whole effort. The British are persuaded that the Soviets do want seriously to consider the British proposal but insist on no publicity at this stage. It is clear from what Lapin has said that the Soviets are not ruling out some joint public statement at a later date. It is the British assessment that if there were a leak now the Soviets would immediately make a militantly hostile statement ruling out any possibility of a joint effort.

The Secretary assured the British Ambassador that in giving Minister Couve a little background on this subject he had stressed to him the necessity for absolute silence. Couve, he said, had agreed that it would be advantageous if the Russians were prepared to play their Co-Chairman role in the Vietnamese situation.²

Lord Harlech then reviewed Ambassador Trevelyan’s conversation with Lapin, noting that at the outset the latter had accepted the British formula about the status of the Co-Chairmen with regard to the 1954 Accords on Viet-Nam. Lapin had also promised seriously to study the British proposal even though Trevelyan surmised that there was some disappointment that the British were not suggesting a conference. While Lapin mentioned that the Soviets had already had submitted to them views from the French and North Vietnamese, they were nevertheless ready to consider the British proposal for requesting views from the other countries. Harlech said that his estimate was that there would be a reply from the Soviets in two to three days. He also assured the Secretary that all of the US suggestions about the approach to the Soviets, including the bringing in of the ICC countries, had been accepted and acted on by the British.

Secretary Rusk then referred to the difficult question posed by Trevelyan’s judgment opposing any further strikes at this time. The Secretary observed that as long as the current confusion in Saigon exists we would not be inclined to lay on a strike. On the other hand the capture of the North Vietnamese arms ship almost begs for a response. He acknowledged the pressure on the Russians which a strike would represent but emphasized that London and Moscow must not believe that embarking on the Co-Chairman process would be accompanied by a unilateral cease-fire by the US. When the British Ambassador said it was the conviction of London and their Embassy in Moscow that another strike at this time would doom the British initiative with the Soviets, the Secretary added that it was not his expectation that a decision would be made today concerning a further strike and he promised the British advance warning on this subject. He noted nevertheless that we do not regard this connection between a strike and the British initiative in Moscow as a really decisive element in our decision.

Ambassador Harlech said the British saw real value in getting a clear Russian reaction at this time. It is most important to learn what we can of their purposes and get whatever evidence we can of their readiness to play a mediating role and help avoid escalation. He said that his Government urged the US strongly to hold its hand until the British have an answer from the Soviets.

The Secretary pointed out that the Soviets may come back and state that the end of US strikes is a precondition to their playing the Co-Chairman role as suggested by the British. In this case the Secretary assumed that the British would make sure that into the ensuing consideration there would also be the demand for North Viet-Nam to put an end to infiltration. In this regard the Secretary referred to the British position in Malaysia which would envisage reaction against Indonesia in response to rather less provocation and he emphasized how the arms ship illustrates the nature of the North Vietnamese role. In conclusion, however, he stated again there would be no strike today or tomorrow.

Lord Harlech acknowledged that the US cannot agree to a unilateral cease-fire and he also referred, himself, to the arms ship as “straight aggression.”

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL UK-US. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Unger. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)
2. See footnote 6, Document 144.