Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

109. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

JCSM–100–65

Washington, February 11, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Courses of action—Southeast Asia—First Eight Weeks

1. In response to your request at the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 February 1965, an initial program of military actions against the DRV has been developed.² The program extends over a period of eight weeks and is confined generally to targets along Route 7 and south of the 19th parallel. It employs both RVN and US forces and is primarily a plan for air strikes. It also provides for naval gunfire bombardment and for continuation of present activity, including 34A operations, resumption of DeSoto Patrols, and authorization for ground cross border operations. Details as to targets, time phasing, and force requirements are contained in Appendix A and the Annexes thereto³ (the weapons requirements for the lettered targets in the Annexes are presently being computed and will be forwarded to you as a matter of priority); 34A operations, DeSoto Patrols, and ground cross border operations are in Appendices E, F, and G, respectively.

2. It is visualized that the initial overt air strikes of this program will have been undertaken as a retaliation in response to a provocative act by Viet Cong or DRV forces against US or RVN personnel or installations. Successive overt operations to provide sustained pressures and progressive destruction will be continued on the plausible justification of further provocations, which on the basis of recent past experience seem quite likely to exist. As this program continues the realistic need for precise event-association in this reprisal context will progressively diminish. A wide range of activities are within the scope of what may be stated to be provocations justifying reprisal. A list of examples is in Appendix B.

3. The proposed program, with anticipation of extending the effort in intensity and target coverage, provides an initial build-up of forces as shown in Appendix A. This build-up, consisting of an immediate deployment of over 325 aircraft to WESTPAC, provides a visible deterrent to Communist China and the USSR and, together with the alerted forces, improves our capability to cope with possible escalation.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the DRV, Communist China, and the Soviet Union will make every effort through propaganda and diplomatic moves to halt the US attacks. The DRV also will take all actions to defend itself, and open, overt aggression in South Vietnam and Laos by the DRV might occur. In addition, the mere initiation of the new US policy almost certainly would not lead Hanoi to restrain the Viet Cong; Hanoi would probably elect to maintain the very intense levels of activity of the past few days. However, if the United States persevered in the face of threats and international pressures, and as the degree of damage inflicted on North Vietnam increased, the chance of a reduction in Viet Cong activity would rise. They further believe that the Chinese Communists would be reluctant to become directly involved in the fighting in Southeast Asia; however, as the number and severity of US attacks against the DRV increase, they probably would feel an increased compulsion to take some dramatic action to counter the impact of the US pressures. There is a fair chance that Peiping would introduce limited numbers of Chinese ground forces as “volunteers” into North Vietnam, and/or northern Laos, intending to raise the specter of further escalation, to underline its commitment to assist the North Vietnamese, and to challenge the Soviets to extend corresponding support. They also believe that the probable Soviet response to these US courses of action would consist both of a vigorous diplomatic and propaganda effort to bring the United States to the conference table and the provisions of military support to North Vietnam. While the extent and nature of the latter are difficult to predict, it almost certainly would include antiaircraft artillery and radars. In order to provide more effective defense against the US air attacks, North Vietnam would probably press for surface-to-air missiles. The chances are about even that the Soviets would agree to provide some SA–2 defenses, but they would do so in ways calculated to minimize the initial risks to them. By providing the necessary Soviet personnel in the guise of “technicians,” the USSR could preserve the option of ignoring any Soviet casualties. In the event the DRV and Communist Chinese openly undertake aggressive actions, the United States and its allies can deal with them adequately. Two possible plans available for use against a Communist offensive are CINCPAC Operation Plan 32–64, which is a plan for the defense of mainland Southeast Asia, and CINCPAC Operation Plan 39–65, which provides primarily for offensive air and naval actions in Southeast Asia and against mainland China.⁴ Forces required under these plans are set forth in Appendices C and D.

5. No significant logistic, transportation, or personnel problems are anticipated in the execution of Phases I and II of CINCPAC Operation Plan 32–64. Significant logistic deficiencies, as indicated in JCSM–955–64, dated 14 November 1964, subject: “Courses of Action in Southeast Asia,”⁵ begin to appear with the implementation of Phase III and IV of that Plan and, to an undetermined extent, in the implementation of CINCPAC Operation Plan 39–65. These logistic implications are treated in Appendix H.

6. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the program herein proposed will demonstrate to the DRV that continuation of its direction and support of insurgencies will lead progressively to more serious punishment. If the insurgency continues with active DRV support, strikes against the DRV will be extended with intensified efforts against targets north of the 19th parallel.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the proposed eight-weeks program of attacks against DRV targets be approved.

8. While the Chief of Staff, US Army, agrees with the deployments proposed in the plan insofar as they go, he is not in agreement with the adequacy of the ground forces deployed. One US Infantry Division is required in northeast Thailand, as a minimum. A second US Infantry Division in the same area is desirable. It is the view of the Chief of Staff, US Army, that the program of strikes proposed in the Appendix hereto can be supported. However, in SVN and Thailand the logistic support for an effort expanded to the full CINCPAC Operation Plan 32–64, Phase IV, and tentative CINCPAC Operation Plan 39–65 is inadequate to sustain the effort because there are inadequate POL stocks and an inadequate POL distribution system.

9. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, supports the strike program set forth herein and the force movements recommended. He believes, however, that as a further action to the measures proposed herein, the feasibility and desirability of making additional deployments to the Western Pacific area once these forces are in position should be examined as a matter of priority. A follow-on study for this purpose has been initiated.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489, Vietnam 381. Top Secret; Sensitive.
2. No other record of the discussion at this meeting has been found. The program of air strikes against North Vietnam was code named Rolling Thunder.
3. None of the attached appendixes or annexes is printed.
4. CINCPAC Operation Plan 32–64, “Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia,” November 6, 1963, was attached to JCSM 9–55, November 14, 1963. (JCS Files) Plan 39–65, dated September 5, 1964, dealt with responses to Chinese Communist aggression. (Ibid.)
5. Printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, Document 411.