Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

154. Notes Prepared by the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)¹

Washington, May 14, 1964.

RMcN’s NOTES FOR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT

• South Vietnam

Summarized below are my comments and conclusions based upon the discussions which General Taylor and I held in South Vietnam May 12 and 13.

1. The Situation

a. Since last September the number of villages under Government control has declined by 200, approximately 12%. Most of this decline occurred between September and January, but the decline continued at a lesser rate through March. The adverse trend appears to have leveled off in April.

b. Khanh states that today the Government controls 8 million people out of a total population of 14 million.

c. The Viet Cong continue to hold the initiative. The rate of harassing incidents, with its adverse effects on public morale, continues to rise. The fighting strength of the Viet Cong has risen and they are now able occasionally to stand and fight rather than to retire and dissolve in the face of Government pressure. However, they are not yet capable of seizing an area and holding it for an extended period of time against determined Government attack.

d. The Government’s operations are improving in effectiveness:

“Holding” and “oil spot” operations are under way in several parts of the country.

Khanh has a clear and effective concept of the pacification program.

However:

Frequent changes of leadership continue (there have been six Province Chiefs in Long An in recent weeks).

Incompetent leadership exists in many critical areas, e.g., the 5th Division and Hai Nghia Province.

Resources are not concentrated in the areas of highest priority (for example, the crescent of provinces around Saigon including Long An, Binh Duong, and Hai Nghia, has fewer troops and less competent leadership in relation to the Communist threat than do less critical areas).

Operational plans for applying the “holding” and “oil spot” concepts to all provinces or to all major parts of each important province (Long An) have not yet been developed.

Desertion rates remain high and the strength of both regular and pare-military forces is inadequate and falling.

The administrative processes of the Government, particularly as they relate to the war effort and especially its budgetary aspects, are ineffective (the budget for January has not yet been approved and province chiefs are reluctant to assume responsibility for spending for such purposes as increases in pay, additions to strength, the rural pacification program).

The Government remains fragmented by dissension and distrust (e.g., the Foreign Minister reported to Manfull on May 13 that Khanh had possible Communist or neutralist connections).

A religious crisis is brewing both among the Buddhists and between the Buddhists and the Catholics, and the latter may spread to the Army (note the “ultimatum” letters to Khanh from both the Buddhists and the Catholics and the Bishop’s proposal to remove Catholic chaplains from the Army).

Tri Quang, the leader of the Buddhists in the central part of the country, is an ambitious, dangerous, unpredictable, powerful, political force antagonistic to Khanh’s Government.

e. MACV estimates:

1) The Pacification Program will not be in full swing until September.

2) Governmental control over the Central and Northern areas will not be achieved before mid-1965 and possibly as late as the end of 1965 (per Westmoreland and Stilwell).

3) Governmental control over the Delta will not be achieved in less than two to three years (per Westmoreland and Stilwell).

4) Governmental preparations for operations against the North will not be completed before September or October.

2. Actions which we have recommended to strengthen the Government’s Program.

a. The strength of the regular and paramilitary forces must be increased substantially by the end of the year. MACV was asked to prepare a detailed plan to accomplish this, to obtain Khanh’s approval of the plan, and to monitor its implementation. The plan, prepared while we were in Saigon, proposed the recruitment of 147,000 men between April 1 and December 31, 1964. I asked Khanh to approve this plan—he did.

b. South Vietnam’s financial budget must be approved immediately and the province chiefs must be instructed to implement it at once. Khanh agreed to issue the necessary instructions.

c. Financial limitations or the fear of such limitations must not be allowed to stand in the way of the action required to expedite the Pacification Program. Mike Forrestal will stay in Saigon until he negotiates with Oanh a plan for providing whatever budgetary support is required to offset the bad psychological effect of what the South Vietnamese view as our restrictive financial policies. (Oanh has requested an additional $56 million for the CIP plus $20 million to be added to the foreign exchange reserve.)

d. Detailed plans for the extensive application of the “oil spot” concept must be developed for all provinces and resources provided and allocated in accordance with these plans. MACV will assume the responsibility for this action.

e. Certain additional training or logistical support is required for the Vietnamese forces. We will endeavor to increase by 100% the number of Vietnamese fighter pilots within 90–100 days. We will increase the number of fighter aircraft by approximately 3.3% by the first of October and provide by that date additional pilots for such aircraft. We will approve MACV’s request for additional financial and material assistance totalling approximately $7 million (this list of items to be submitted in response to my request that they tell us of any additional assistance which they required). A detailed training program for the 7,000 additional civilian administrators to be used for pacification cadres must be developed and expedited. The USOM Chief will follow this program.

3. Khanh’s views. (For a more complete exposition of his comments, see the report of my interview with him.)²

a. As stated earlier, Khanh believes that today the Government controls approximately 8 million of the population. He believes his plans for application of the “oil spot” concept will gradually extend the Government’s control over the remainder of the population, but he points out this will require a long time.

b. He states that his major problem today is not military, but rather political and religious in character. Irresponsible elements of the urban population, who have not been exposed to the dangers and pressures of the war, press for political reforms which are inappropriate under the present circumstances. Religious crises involving controversy among the Buddhists and between the Buddhists and Catholics are mounting rapidly. He fears they will spread to the Army. In these areas Khanh stated he is “a fish out of water” and he seeks our advice.

c. Because the war will last a long time, Khanh believes that at some point a strike against the North will be desirable. He will probably not be ready for such a strike before the end of the year, although it may be forced upon him earlier by political and psychological factors. The strikes against the North can be carried out by South Vietnamese forces, but the decision to undertake such action must be that of the United States because if the North Vietnamese and Chinese Communists respond by attacking South Vietnam, Khanh must depend on U.S. forces for the protection of his country. In any event, Khanh states strikes against the North are not required now and he is not yet ready to carry them out.

d. Khanh accepted my statements of the requirement for:

1) A plan to increase the military and paramilitary strength of the GVN forces.

2) The early approval and effective provincial application of the financial budget.

3) The early assignment of ambassadors to key nations throughout the world.

4) The concentration of resources in the strategic heartland.

5) The removal of incompetent leaders in both the military and political organizations.

e. Following Khanh’s acceptance of my statements of the action he should take to increase the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency program, I emphasized again that the U.S. would support fully whatever financial expenditures were required for projects which contributed to the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency program.

4. Lodge’s proposals for strikes against the North.

a. Lodge wishes to carry out air strikes against the North [4 lines of source text not declassified]. The objective of Lodge’s program would be not only to cut off the supply of men and equipment from the North, but also to destroy the morale of the North Vietnamese and to raise the morale of the South Vietnamese.

b. Not only is this the program which Lodge believes should be followed, but, according to Bill Sullivan, Lodge believes his record shows he has consistently recommended it. His memorandum of record of the conversation with Messrs. Bundy and Rusk indicates to him that he proposed such a plan to them.³ He considers that since his memorandum of last October to Averell Harriman he has consistently advocated this proposal.

c. Lodge believes he has made clear his opposition to Bill Bundy’s proposal for establishing a political base and time schedule for action against the North. Dunn’s notes of the conversations with Bundy and Rusk refer to Lodge’s arguments against Bundy’s proposal.

d. The time schedule which Lodge apparently would follow is based on the Canadians’ arrival in Saigon in June. Lodge believes the necessary training will be completed and plans to protect Saigon implemented by the end of the summer, at which time the political-military program could start.

e. Almost certainly Lodge has discussed such a plan with Khanh, hoping to lead him to accept it.

5. Administration of the Country Team.

[Paragraphs a and b (8 lines of source text) not declassified]

c. Harkins and Lodge do not communicate effectively with each other. Neither Harkins nor Nes saw Lodge’s cable reporting on his conversations with Khanh,⁴ nor did they see his “Dienbienphu” cable.⁵ [1 line of source text not declassified]

[Paragraph d (2 lines of source text) not declassified]

e. The morale in the Embassy is poor because the able people on the staff see no effective direction of the counterinsurgency program within the Country Team.

6. Miscellaneous comments.

a. Lodge believes that if Khanh disappears, the U.S. should be prepared to run the country, possibly from Cam Ranh Bay.

b. With respect to coup possibilities, DeSilva states that although Khanh is not very popular, this is a normal condition for a leader of such a country and coup prospects, in his opinion, are lowest since January 30 of this year.

RMcN

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 4370, South Vietnam-Statements and Supporting Papers. Secret. According to the President’s Daily Diary of May 14, Johnson met with McNamara, Taylor, McGeorge and William Bundy, Bell, and Colby from 10:40 a.m. to noon. Sullivan was not listed as a participant at the meeting. Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary)
2. Document 152.
3. See Document 120.
4. Document 136.
5. Document 143.