Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

82. Report From the Chairman of the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (Hull) to President Elsenhower¹

Washington, January 5, 1961.

Mr. President:

I.

We appreciate the opportunity of again reporting to you on the continuing review of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort which we have been making pursuant to your Executive Order (#10656) of February 6, 1956.²

Since we have all submitted our resignations to you, and because this will be our last meeting with you as members of your Foreign Intelligence Board, we propose this morning to give you a brief accounting of stewardship, as well as a few impressions concerning the present status and future trends of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort.

If agreeable to you, we will limit our briefing to a few of the more significant aspects of our association with, and our views concerning, the foreign intelligence effort.

II.

Since you created the Board five years ago, we have held 18 full-scale meetings covering a total of 31 working days. In between these meetings continuity in the work of the Board has been provided by the Board’s Executive Officer (on detail from the NSC staff) who has worked on a full-time basis in furtherance of the business of this Board. Additionally, in between these meetings individual members of the Board and the Board’s Executive Officer have made periodic on-the-scene reviews of the foreign intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the National Security Agency and its three supporting cryptologic services. These reviews have been made at the Seat of Government, elsewhere in the Continental United States, and in a great many countries in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa and South America. In addition, at varying times, review has been made in all those locations of selected major cold war activities conducted by CIA’s Clandestine Services.

In the past 5 years we have made 7 written and 6 oral reports to you, consisting of 37 major recommendations covering the most significant phases of the foreign intelligence and covert action business. From time to time, on subjects of lesser importance we have made observations and recommendations directly to member agencies of the Intelligence Community.

Of the 33 recommendations approved by you, action has been completed on 15. The remaining 18 are in varying stages of consideration or implementation by the agencies concerned. (We will comment on these pending matters later in this briefing)

At your direction 9 of the 18 pending recommendations have been made the subject of specific, continuing review by this Board and/or the subject of future reports (annual, semiannual, etc.) to the President and to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Board (if there is to be such Board in the future).

III.

Manpower and Dollar Costs

As you appreciate, our foreign intelligence effort is a very large one when measured in terms of manpower and money. As of June, 1960, an estimated [3 lines of source text not declassified]. As of December, 1960 the cost of the effort was estimated to range between [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a large fraction of these dollars going to the procurement of the very expensive intelligence hardware involved.

IV.

Recommendations Pertaining to Coordination, Integration, Reduction of Duplication, and Strong Centralized Direction of the Foreign Intelligence Effort

To reduce undesirable duplication and to improve coordination, integration, direction and control of the entire foreign intelligence effort (including the manpower, dollars and related assets just referred to), we proposed and you approved 16 recommendations in this area. Among the noteworthy actions which resulted were: (a) the abolition of three committees, and the establishment of a single forum, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) which is now utilized on a regular basis (at least weekly) by the heads of all intelligence agencies for the collective consideration of important foreign intelligence matters; and (b) a re-examination of all National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) leading to the issuance of revised NSCIDs (reduced in number from 17 to 7) which clarified the basic duties and responsibilities of the member agencies of the Intelligence Community and which placed increased emphasis on several critical aspects of foreign intelligence organization and activities.

While we recognize that these results are noteworthy, we are of the view that there is still considerable room for improvement in the coordination, integration, direction and control of the intelligence effort.

We believe that, in the months ahead, consideration should be given to: (1) further revising pertinent NSCIDs to reflect the increasing intelligence role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958; and (2) reducing ultimately the size of the USIB membership to provide the Director of Central Intelligence with a more efficient mechanism to assist him in carrying out his mission of coordinating all foreign intelligence activities. (At present USIB is composed of 6 Defense agencies [OSO, J–2, NSA, G–2, ONI, A–2], 2 civilian agencies [State, CIA] extensively engaged in foreign intelligence, and 2 additional civilian agencies [AEC, FBI] which are engaged in the foreign intelligence effort in only a marginal way.)³

In addition to our recommendations on USIB and the revised NSCIDs, we have made some 14 other recommendations (40% of all our recommendations) pertaining to coordination, integration, reduction of duplication and strong centralized direction of the foreign intelligence effort. Because we consider this to be one of the most significant problem areas confronting the Community, and since this problem is tied inextricably to the role of the Director of Central Intelligence, we next address ourselves to that subject.

V.

The Role of the Director of Central Intelligence

We are pleased that the unique capabilities of the present Director will continue to be utilized by the next administration, thereby providing continuity in this important area. However, we continue to be concerned by the great burden of work involved in the assignment to one individual of the two-fold responsibility of serving simultaneously as administrator of the Central Intelligence Agency, a large and complex organization, and as Director of Central Intelligence with responsibility for coordinating all foreign intelligence activities of the ten agencies comprising the Intelligence Community. We believe that the present incumbent has made progress in the direction of increased integration of the total Community effort, but that this progress has not proceeded with sufficient speed, because he has been preoccupied in the main with commanding the work of the CIA. Further, we believe that his effectiveness as Director of Central Intelligence is impaired somewhat by the feeling on the part of several member agencies of the Intelligence Community that he is “both umpire and pitcher” in that he is, at the same time, the coordinator of the entire Intelligence Community and the head of an operating agency which in many quarters is looked upon as a competing element of that Community.

We do not believe that this situation would be materially improved by the recommendation of the Joint Study Group (Recommendation #29) that the DCI establish a coordinating staff to assist him in carrying out his duties as coordinator of all intelligence activities. Rather, we believe that the situation would be bettered substantially if the DCI would divest himself voluntarily of many of the functions he currently performs in his capacity as Head of CIA and by assigning such duties elsewhere within CIA. To accomplish this purpose we again recommend that he be provided with a Chief of Staff or Executive Director to act for him, together with the Deputy Director, in the management of the CIA, thereby relieving him to perform the even more important duty of coordinating, integrating and directing all U.S. foreign intelligence activities.

After a reasonable trial period, if this course of action does not accomplish its intended goal, serious consideration should be given to complete separation of the DCI from the CIA.

VI.

Recommendations Pertaining to Signals Intelligence and the Management of the National Security Agency

We have made 8 recommendations on various aspects of the COMINT–ELINT business. Significant actions which have resulted in this area include the following: (a) the issuance of a new NSCID (No. 6) calling for the fusion of COMINT and ELINT activities under the Director, NSA; (b) a detailed study and constructive proposals to the NSC by Dr. Baker and his associates [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] and (c) periodic assessment and guidance by the Office of the Secretary of Defense with respect to NSA’s plans, programs, and allocation of resources.

Although there has been some improvement in the fusion of COMINT and ELINT, we feel that it has been too slow and that much more can be done to improve their coordination by: (a) requiring positive operational and technical control of COMINT and by the Director, NSA, rather than the practice of yielding to individual service claims, and (b) actually combining COMINT and ELINT planning in USIB, rather than present handling of this in separate committees of USIB.

VII.

Recommendations Pertaining to the Strategic Warning Process

You have approved the four recommendations we have made on the vital matter of strategic warning. We are pleased to report that, as a result of your action, highly commendable progress has been made by the Department of Defense in perfecting the CRITICCOMM System to assure rapid transmission to Washington of critical intelligence data.

Apart from the communicating aspects of this matter, however, we continue to have misgivings as to whether USIB’s Watch Committee and its National Indications Center are organized, supported and operated in such manner as to (a) assure timely receipt, processing and evaluation of all available information pertaining to strategic warning, and (b) assure timely transmission to higher authority of significant information bearing on the early warning problem.

In the Intelligence Community we believe that there is no subject more deserving of continuing attention, if the President and the National Security Council are to place reliance on USIB’s Watch Committee and its National Indications Center to supply them with timely, strategic warning of enemy attack. Accordingly, we would urge that the DCI and USIB re-examine the current organization and functions of the Watch Committee and, particularly, its National Indications Center, to assure that both are properly organized and supported in such a way as to carry out their vital mission in the most effective manner possible.

VIII.

Recommendations Pertaining to CIA’s Covert Action Programs

You have approved the 4 recommendations we made on various aspects of CIA’s covert action programs. As a result, we are pleased to report that at present the Special NSC 5412/2 Group appears to be better organized and to be functioning with greater effectiveness than was the case in earlier times.⁴ However, we continue to have concern as to whether the Clandestine Services of CIA are sufficiently well organized and managed to carry out covert action programs. Further, we have been unable to conclude that, on balance, all of the covert action programs undertaken by CIA up to this time have been worth the risk or the great expenditure of manpower, money and other resources involved. In addition, we believe that CIA’s concentration on political, psychological and related covert action activities have tended to detract substantially from the execution of its primary intelligence gathering mission. We suggest, accordingly, that there should be a total reassessment of our covert action policies and programs and that the Head of CIA should devote continuing attention to improving the organization and management of CIA’s Clandestine Services.

IX.

The Joint Study Group Report

We have reviewed the recommendations recently submitted by the Joint Study Group (established to study the organization and management of the foreign intelligence effort). We believe the report is an excellent one and that it is deserving of most careful study by USIB and the responsible agency heads concerned.⁵

Except for Recommendations #29 and 30 and the additional recommendations which pertain to the intelligence element of the JCS, we concur generally in the recommendations of the Group. We have previously expressed our views on #29 (dealing with the coordinating role of the DCI).

As to Recommendation #30 (which calls for a very substantial reduction in the membership of the USIB, we would make the following observations. Military intelligence should be brought into conformity with the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, as recommended by the Group. However, the recommended reduction in USIB should not occur until the J–2 element of the JCS develops the vitality, experience and capability which are prerequisite to a meaningful fulfillment of the recommendation. Army, Navy, and Air Force Intelligence should not be removed from USIB until the J–2 (JCS) and the Secretary of Defense’s Office of Special Operations are capable of serving as effective substitutes.

As to the recommendations pertaining to the intelligence element of the JCS we do not believe that the JCS, with its present composition and activities, can provide intelligence direction of the sort proposed by the Joint Study Group.

X.

Summary

By way of summation, we would like to express the following convictions based on our 5-year Board activity: (a) the Intelligence Community has made substantial progress in several significant areas and is more productive than at any time in the past; (b) we foresee no reduction in the vital role which intelligence must play in support of the Nation’s security, or in the cost of an intelligence program adequate to meet the ever increasing threats to our national security; (c) we will continue to experience serious intelligence deficiencies due to rigorous Soviet bloc security measures, but these can be overcome in large measure if our Nation is prepared to meet the challenge and the costs involved; and (d) we feel that maximum utilization must be made of scientific and technological know-how because positive intelligence and counterintelligence will rely increasingly on sophisticated scientific techniques.

Finally, we refrain from commenting concerning the desirability or need in the future for a Presidential Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence. We feel that you are in a much better position than we to assess the value of an activity of this sort.

However, we would urge a recommendation to your successor that, if he does not find the need for such a Board, a staff officer of the NSC be assigned full-time responsibility to maintain a continuing review of these subjects and to report periodically thereon to him. Until a decision is made on the aforementioned matters, we suggest that, as an interim arrangement, it be recommended to your successor that our present Executive Officer be continued on detail from the NSC staff to provide necessary continuity with respect to the handling of the variety of previously mentioned matters which, at your direction, are scheduled to be the subjects of future reports by the Intelligence Community.

XI.

Finally, Mr. President, the other members of the Board and I appreciate the trust and confidence you reposed in us by appointing us to this Board, and we wish to record our pleasure at being permitted to serve you.

John E. Hull⁶
Chairman of the Board

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Top Secret. Following the creation of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to replace the Board of Consultants on May 4 (see Document 87), a copy of this report was transmitted to Bundy for President Kennedy under cover of a May 18 memorandum from J. Patrick Coyne. (Eisenhower Library, Records of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs)
2. Executive Order 10656, signed by President Eisenhower on February 6, 1956, established the Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. (21 Federal Register 859)
3. Brackets in the source text.
4. The NSC 5412/2 Special Group was established pursuant to the issuance of NSC 5412/2, December 28, 1955, to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA. See William M. Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), pp. 63, 146–149.
5. See Document 78.
6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.