Office of the Historian

472. Summary Record of Meeting1

Washington, May 8, 1963.

SUMMARY RECORD OF MAY 8 ANTARCTICA PERSONNEL ADVISORY GROUP (PAG) MEETING

1.
Those present at the May 8 meeting of Antarctica PAG were Commander Kline (DOD), Mr. Dykes (CIA), Col. Pozinsky (NASA), Mr. Fennemore (State), Mr. Mills (State) and Mr. Freund (ACDA) in whose office the meeting took place.
2.
It was agreed that in drawing up the lists of qualifications for inspectors two lists would be needed. One will be a list of general qualifications that would be needed in light of Tab A of the Committee of Antarctica Working Paper dated April 18 (“Possible activities in Antarctica which would be inconsistent with the treaty”).2 The other list would be based on our knowledge of the specific significant activities known to be carried on at each of the bases we are considering inspecting. Messrs. Mills and Dykes and Commander Kline agreed to collaborate in furnishing for the next meeting of the PAG a list of known activities for each base.
3.
It was further agreed that no matter how uninteresting a base might be from the point of view of U.S. national security or how elementary its activities are, the make-up of the group inspecting would take into account both the sensibilities of the government operating the base and of the Soviets. By this it was meant that there would be serious explorations made by fully qualified U.S. personnel and that we would avoid too great contrasts between the groups inspecting, for example, Soviet and Chilean bases. As Mr. Mills suggested, we would in fact have two categories of inspection groups, one where our national security interests are involved and the other where they are not, but this would not be apparent to the hosts.
4.
The question of whether military personnel would be included among the inspectors was put off for later consideration, although no group would, in any case, be predominantly military.
5.
The question of numbers in each group was also left open, pending examination of the qualifications mix required in each case and the [Page 1068] possibilities of finding individuals who combine a variety of capabilities.
6.
It was agreed that special efforts both in the selection of inspectors and their training will be necessary to avoid any impression that we are carrying out intelligence activities. For example, former service attachés would be excluded.
7.
Inspection groups will be asked to submit serious unclassified reports for later submission to the other signatories. By “serious” we mean that the reports on both the above-mentioned categories of bases will be equally thorough though commensurate with the numbers and kinds of activities going on at any given base.
8.
The draft document of April 18 on “Qualification and Selection of Personnel” was briefly reviewed. It was agreed that a thorough review would await the availability of the promised revised draft. Nevertheless, the following points in the paper were considered:
a.
Near the top of Page 2 provision will be made for State Department suggestion that the inspection will be designed as a precedent for subsequent inspections.
b.
Proficiency in language (Page 3) will be secondary to expertise in substantive fields.3 In fact, Soviet suspicion could be aroused if we include an inspector fully fluent in Russian who is not also highly qualified in one of the technical fields of Soviet activity at the bases inspected.
c.
Observer qualifications (Page 3) should include at least one inspector in each group with good amateur photographic ability. There would still be special training (Page 5) in the peculiarities of photography in Antarctica.4 We would also consider how much aerial photography can be accomplished by the aircraft carrying the inspector groups in and out of the bases.
d.
If there is considered to be any possibility at all that nuclear materials are at or near any of the bases to be inspected, we will consider as a qualification ability to operate detection devices of a relatively simple nature. Mr. Dykes undertook to explore this point in his own Agency and with other Agencies as appropriate.
e.
Mr. Dykes pointed out that the last clause of the first paragraph on Page 4 is unnecessary.5
9.
It was agreed that the next meeting will take place at 2 p.m., May 21 in Mr. Freund’s office. Among other things, the PAG will consider (a) a draft paper giving the list of functions at each base being considered [Page 1069] for inspection and related qualifications for inspectors, (b) the revised version of the “Qualifications and Selection of Personnel” paper, and (c) a draft list of qualifications related to Tab A of the April 18 Antarctica Working Paper.
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IO Files: Lot 69 D 169, Antarctica Files, Inspection 1963. Confidential. Drafted on May 10 by Richard B. Freund (ACDA/IR).↩
  2. Reference is to a working paper prepared by the Committee on Antarctica of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; not printed.↩
  3. On page 3 of the working paper, language proficiency preceded polar experience and scientific background among observer qualifications.↩
  4. The section dealing with training and equipment of observers included the following: “In particular, instruction in the acquisition of photography both from the air and on land would be provided.”↩
  5. This clause listed “an overt connection with a US intelligence agency” among the “negative qualifications.”↩