Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

468. Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Exercise of the Right of Inspection Under the Antarctic Treaty

Discussion

In reviewing United States interests and objectives in Antarctica, it is gratifying to note the progress made there and the continuing spirit of friendly cooperation between the United States and the other signatories of the Antarctic Treaty; Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom (Tab A).² To the best of our knowledge, Treaty provisions reserving the continent for peaceful purposes only and prohibiting any measures of a military nature have been observed by all countries active in Antarctica. It is in the interest of the United States to foster this situation by continuing to implement the unique provisions of the Treaty which ensure continued use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only.

Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty (Tab B) provides that “In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions” of the Treaty, each Contracting Party which conducts substantial scientific research in Antarctica has the right to designate observers to inspect all areas of Antarctica. It seems to us that this inspection provision should be implemented beginning with the 1963–64 season by arranging for the inspection of bases in Antarctica. Extensive logistic requirements do not permit an inspection of all Antarctic bases in any one year, but routine annual inspections should be initiated. (Tab C).³

In Senate hearings on the Antarctic Treaty it was made clear that inspections would be carried out. On June 14, 1960 before the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Herman Phleger, representing the Department of State, said “… it would be contemplated that upon ratification of the treaty and its coming into force the parties, including the United States would designate observers who would see to it that the provisions were respected.” (Tab D).⁴

The inspection provision of the Treaty has not been a controversial subject between signatory countries since the signing of the Treaty. In his opening statement at the Canberra Consultative Meeting under the Antarctic Treaty, on July 24, 1961, the United States representative spoke of inspection as “a normal activity under the treaty.” A Soviet legal adviser has stated that “any State with the right to attend consultative conferences may appoint observers. They are free to travel to any part of the Antarctic at any time. The signatories must admit them for inspection of all stations, installations, equipment, and ships and planes at points of discharge and loading in the Antarctic.”⁵

United States agencies and departments active in Antarctica are complying with the obligations of the Antarctic Treaty, and they of course do not object to their activities being inspected should another signatory choose to inspect.

The Treaty does not prescribe procedures for carrying out inspection. The precise manner in which inspection is to be carried out will depend upon the procedures which are developed and the precedents established as the Treaty is implemented. Since we do not believe that the Soviet Union, or any other Contracting Party, is presently engaging in improper activities, it should be relatively simple to develop inspection procedures at this stage. It will become more difficult to procure adequate inspection if we wait until the Soviets may have something to hide. Moreover, while we have no reason to believe that the Soviet Union is acting in violation of the Treaty, inspection would provide additional assurance that the objectives of the Treaty are being fulfilled. Finally, inspection would, if properly executed, deter possible violations, and provide a body of experience which might be applicable elsewhere.

Inspection parties would be transported by ship or aircraft of the U.S. Naval Support Force in Antarctica. Since both ships and aircraft are tightly scheduled to carry out existing projects, careful and early planning and coordination will be required in order to carry out effective inspections without disrupting scientific projects. Planning and logistics for 1963–64 are set forth in Tab C.

Recommendation

It is recommended that the United States plan and carry out inspections in accordance with Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty of areas in the Antarctic, including bases of the Soviet Union, on a routine annual basis, starting with the 1963–64 austral summer season. It is further recommended that arrangements for carrying out these inspections begin immediately.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, SCI 11–1 ANT. Confidential. According to covering memoranda from Secretary Rusk and Executive Secretary Brubeck, the memorandum was sent to Secretary of Defense McNamara on March 29 and to McGeorge Bundy on April 5.
2. The tabs are not printed. The list of contracting parties was updated to include the accessions of Poland (June 8, 1961) and Czechoslovakia (June 14, 1962). These most recent signatories had not yet met the requirements that would permit them to delegate observers.
3. According to the memorandum at Tab C, the United States intended to designate about six observers, who were to have appropriate scientific backgrounds as well as proficiency in Russian, Spanish, or French. Three or four would be selected to inspect that sector of Antarctica that included French, Australian, and Soviet bases. If logistic support was available, Argentinian, Chilean, and British bases on the Palmer Peninsula would also be inspected during the 1963–1964 austral summer season. Transportation would be provided by ships or aircraft of the U.S. Naval Support Force, Antarctica. The United States would in turn be willing to open its Antarctic bases to inspection, and expressed the hope that other signatory powers would designate observers and carry out inspections.
4. See The Antarctic Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Sixth Congress, Second Session (Washington, 1960), p. 67.
5. The Soviet statement, “An Example of International Co-Operation,” by Professor G. I. Tunkin, Legal Adviser of the Soviet Foreign Office, was published in International Affairs (USSR), No. 2, February 1960.