Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

458. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Antarctica, Bureau of International Organization Affairs (Owen) to the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher)¹

Washington, October 23, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Inspection under Antarctic Treaty

U.S. Navy ships participating in the Deep Freeze operation which are likely to find themselves in circumstances where they would be subject to inspection under Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty, now carry only such cryptographic equipment and materials, the “viewing” of which gives rise to no problem of “compromise” or only to such “compromise” as may be eliminated.

One of the ships has, in effect, inquired what should be done in relation to inspection procedures as regards classified papers, documents, and books, other than cryptographic materials. The Navy has asked for an “interpretation” from the Department (see Navy messages on this case, State Department Control Nos. 8677 and 8816).²

Apparently there are some such classified papers which have to remain on board. The Navy would like us to interpret the inspection provisions in the sense that, as far as papers are concerned, inspection may go no further than to determine that they are, in fact, papers.

A statement of this position might be made as follows:

1. The United States maintains the position that the inspection provisions of the Antarctic Treaty do not establish the right of a foreign observer to examine the contents of written materials, whether in the form of books, documents or other papers. The right of inspection of these materials is confined to such examination as is reasonably necessary to ascertain that they are papers.

2. U.S. personnel in Antarctica shall prevent the examination by a foreign observer of any documents classified “Secret” or “Confidential” except to the extent reasonably necessary to ascertain that they are documents.

3. U.S. stations in Antarctica and ships that may be subject to inspection under the Antarctic Treaty shall retain only the essential minimum of classified documents.

I would appreciate ACADA’s expression of concurrence or other views. This is one of the first instances of development of “inspection law.”

I am also sending a copy of this memorandum to L (Mr. Neidle) for comment.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IO Files: Lot 69 D 169, Antarctic Files, 1961–62, U.S. Policy Matters 1961, Department of State, August–December. Secret. Drafted by Owen.
2. Neither printed. The first message (No. 8677, October 13, 1961) said that the Navy was seeking an interpretation from the State Department that would allow classified, non-cryptographic materials to remain aboard ships taking part in Antarctic missions. The second (No. 8816, October 16, 1961) said that one such vessel, the USS Arneb, had received instructions concerning reduced allowances of cryptographic materials, but carried non-cryptographic materials of all classifications and would continue to do so unless otherwise directed (UNODIR).