Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

452. Draft Guidance Paper Prepared by the Antarctica Staff of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs¹

Washington, February 10, 1961.

PRELIMINARY GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ANTARCTIC TREATY FOR USE OF OCB WORKING GROUP

I. Exclusively Peaceful Use of Antarctica (Article I)

A. U.S. Programs

Discussion

U.S. practice has consistently been in accordance with Article I of the Treaty and will continue to be so. Beyond this, in order to maintain U.S. initiative, enhance U.S. prestige in connection with this Treaty that resulted from a U.S. proposal, and promote world-wide recognition of the provisions of this Treaty, it is desirable to give emphasis to the peaceful nature and nonmilitary purpose of our programs. In this connection, the use of military personnel to assist in peaceful scientific efforts has been traditional in the United States.

Guidance

All agencies concerned will give proper emphasis, in public pronouncements and press releases, as well as in organizational and administrative procedures, to the peaceful and nonmilitary purpose of our programs.

B. Activities of Other Countries

Discussion

To date there is no evidence of non-peaceful activity by other countries. However, it should be noted that a major difficulty exists in the identification of what constitutes a non-peaceful activity. Current U.S. estimates indicate that Soviet and other interests in Antarctica are primarily scientific. Under Communist ideological concepts, however, such Soviet research has long-range utility for military as well as peaceful purposes. These research activities, however, cannot be excluded or prevented under the terms of the Treaty.

Since Soviet basic research already serves long-range military interests and in the face of the unlimited inspection terms of the Treaty, it is not expected that the Soviets will undertake any overt military activities and none have been observed to date.

In this connection, there are in particular three types of scientific activity, permitted under the treaty, which could have possible non-peaceful applications of significance in the present state of military technology.

First, known Soviet interest in satellite tracking could make such data usable against the U.S. reconnaissance satellite, and, in the event of war, such facilities could even provide midcourse guidance for an extended range ballistic missile attack against the United States. Second, ionospheric and magnetic research, both important in Soviet programs, may prove useful to controlled blackouts of communications at conjugate points in the Northern Hemisphere. Third, the large expansion of Soviet whaling (to four flotillas by the 1961–62 season) could provide a fleet of 60 or more ships to serve as auxiliaries to Soviet Southern Hemisphere submarine operations.

The measures to be taken in regard to the foregoing and the means by which covert military activity could be detected are discussed in connection with the inspection system.

Guidance

In the event of activities contrary to Article I (or of any other of the Treaty provisions), the United States will consider what course of action is most suitable, in the light of the circumstances, including consultation with other parties and implementation of the Treaty provisions concerning disputes and activities of non-parties.

II. Matters Related to the Inspection System (Article VII)

A. Exercise of Rights of Inspection by the United States.

Discussion

We are satisfied with the inspection provisions established by Article VII of the Treaty which ensure absolute unilateral rights of inspection and over-flight.

The inspection provisions relate to ensuring observance of the various other provisions of the Treaty. The major objectives in the U.S. exercise of the rights of inspection is to forestall and detect the use of Antarctica for military purposes, chiefly by the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Whereas, inspection for other activities prohibited by the Treaty present no insurmountable obstacles, there are complications relative to inspection for evidences of military activity, part of which have been outlined in Section I above. In addition to these, the following factors are pertinent:

Inspection planning and operations are confronted with environmental characteristics unique to Antarctica: extremely low temperatures and high winds, the predominance of ice in the interior, widespread coastal inaccessibility because of heavy sea ice conditions. These will lend a distinctive and unique character to the inspection system and program that will evolve. These unique characteristics will both complicate and facilitate inspection planning and operations. Activities currently are generally limited to a few stations. Main stations are dependent on ships operating out of non-Bloc controlled ports. In the future, accessibility may be significantly increased by the USSR employment of the atomic icebreaker, and jet air power which could broaden Bloc station deployment. In this connection, Soviet interest in the mapping of one-half of the ice-free areas is noteworthy.

The complexity of identifying Soviet activities which may violate any of the Treaty provisions and the harsh environmental conditions make an absolutely fool-proof inspection system all but impossible. Nevertheless, because of the elaborate logistic arrangements presently required for Antarctic operations, it will be possible, in the immediate future, to keep track of the establishment of stations and support operations therefor by other countries, by means of relatively few over-flights and normal procedures for observation of shipping.

Moreover, to a considerable extent, observation of the activities of other nations at existing facilities may be accomplished through continuation of certain practices without necessarily resorting to all of the procedures for inspection provided by the Treaty. Among these practices are:

1. The exchange of resident scientists, such as has been practiced with other countries, including the USSR. It is, indeed, more difficult to hide a covert military operation from a technically qualified inspector who is spending his entire time at a station than from a similarly qualified inspector who visits the site on a periodic basis. This does not mean that U.S. scientists assigned to foreign stations need be designated observers under the Treaty procedures, nor that they should become clandestine observers. Their presence, in the normal performance of their scientific functions, provides, in effect, a first-hand opportunity to become aware of many of the types of activities which might result in possible violations of the Treaty.

2. Visits to other stations by air, sea, or overland will also provide opportunity to observe foreign activities.

3. Continuation of the program of exchanging persons to accompany resupply expeditions (who have heretofore been designated “official observers”) will provide a similar opportunity. In certain situations, it may be found useful to designate these persons observers under the Treaty procedures. However, the practice has been to exchange them by agreement, through State Department channels. An observer under the Treaty does not, of course, require prior agreement for his presence. It is noted that the USSR has not, to date, agreed to exchange these “official observers.”

4. Implementation of the observer codicil² to the international whaling convention might also provide a means outside the Treaty machinery to keep informed of Soviet activities in Antarctic waters.

In view of the foregoing considerations and the conditions peculiar to Antarctica, it is believed that the establishment of an elaborate inspection system is not an absolute necessity at this time.³ However, there are certain factors which make it both necessary and desirable to conduct a program of inspections of activities, facilities, equipment, ships, aircraft and ground stations by observers specifically designated in accordance with the Treaty:

1. Exercise of the inspection procedures set forth in the Treaty will provide information on the activities of other countries which might be unobtainable either by the methods outlined above or otherwise.

2. There is the likelihood that the right of inspection will be impaired if it is not exercised. It is desirable that inspections be made as a matter of course, whether or not there is evidence indicating a special need for inspection. Establishing the routine of inspection during the early stages of the Treaty will minimize the probability of interference with inspection at a later date.

3. Because the Antarctic Treaty is the first that grants the right of inspection, the Treaty may come to be viewed as a precedent which should influence our position in negotiations on inspection arrangements in other fields. It would be dangerous to our long established position on arms controls if we fail to exercise the right of inspection granted by the Treaty.⁴

4. The conduct of inspections under the Treaty might serve as a deterrent of violations.

5. The actual conduct of operations may provide useful experience in inspection procedure, which might be helpful in the future development of inspection arrangements relating to arms controls, under [sea] nuclear testing, and outer space.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the logistic support required for large-scale official inspection, involving visits on an unannounced or minimum notice basis, is substantial, and must be weighed against the benefits to be gained. To transport an observer to Mirnyy or Lazaryev requires caching of fuel at Pole or other stations and special logistic arrangements. In order to avert undue diversion of present resources from support of scientific programs, present resources, appropriately supplemented, should be used for inspections, or sizable increases in the men, planes, and ships committed to Antarctic operations will be required.

Although the U.S. may, for reasons of economy, rely primarily on over-flights, the observation of shipping, and other practices already described to prevent⁵ or detect violations of the Treaty, at least in the initial stages, these measures alone cannot satisfy the inspection requirements and the U.S., in the interests of security should also conduct land, sea, and air inspections of ground stations, installations, facilities, equipments, ships, and aircraft. These inspections should be instituted during the first Antarctic season after the Treaty enters into force, and should be applicable as a minimum to the main Soviet station and to stations of one or two other countries.

The assignment of tasks to establish a U.S. inspection program in Antarctica should be consistent with the alignment of functions implicit or specifically designated within the mission of the various agencies of the Executive Branch as well as with the special arrangements made for conduct of U.S. operations in Antarctica. Whereas the Department of Defense is responsible for the conduct of arms control inspections, the Department of State is responsible for conduct of relations with other countries, and hence has an interest in scheduling Antarctic inspections so as to maintain the best climate for these and other foreign relations. [The Department of State being responsible for conduct of relations with other countries would have to determine when a specific inspection or program of inspection would be undertaken.]⁶ The inspection provision of the Antarctic Treaty is not limited to scrutiny of activities to determine their military application alone, but extends to other prohibited actions, such as the disposal of nuclear waste, in which the Department of Interior and National Science Foundation, among others, will have an interest. Finally, any sizable inspection effort will impinge on other U.S. Antarctic programs and hence become subject to the coordination control of the Operations Coordinating Board, the agency presently charged with the over-all direction of U.S. operations in Antarctica.

Guidance

1. Appropriate agencies involved shall continue to collect, evaluate and maintain information on the activities of other nations in Antarctica through utilizing the information provided by the means above, in addition to any other sources available. The need to keep informed of activities of other countries will be taken into consideration in the plans of agencies conducting operations in Antarctica and they shall advise the Department of State when violations are suspected or detected.

2. The Department of State will accumulate from participating agencies all information concerning activities of other countries in Antarctica, pertinent to their observance of the Treaty provisions. The evaluation of the information in relation to military or other significance will continue to be responsibility of the appropriate agencies.

3. The Department of Defense shall have continuing responsibility for developing and maintaining capabilities to conduct inspection operations. Supporting agencies will be CIA, AEC, and others with demonstrated interest. In particular, the Department of Defense should develop specific plans for the conduct of over-flights and air, sea, and ground inspections to be initiated as early as possible after the Treaty enters into force, and maintained on a continuing basis.

4. The persons to be designated as observers under the Treaty provisions shall be recommended by interested agencies, selected by the Department of Defense in consultation with the Department of State, which shall designate them as such, and inform the other Governments, in accordance with the Treaty.

5A. The Operations Coordinating Board (or successor agency) will determine the scope of the inspections on an annual basis, specifying the foreign installations and activities to be officially observed, as well as other measures that may be required. The Senior U.S. Representative in Antarctica will be authorized to depart from this schedule to the extent that unforeseen contingencies necessitate, and when timely action would be aborted by referral of the matter to higher authority.

[5B. Specific Inspections and Programs of Inspection of foreign installations in Antarctica will be initiated by the Department of State at the recommendation of, or in consultation with agencies conducting operations in Antarctica and carried out by the Department of Defense in accordance with paragraph 3 above.]⁷

B. Inspection of U.S. Facilities by Other Countries.

Discussion

No particular difficulty is envisaged here since the United States does not engage in activities contrary to the Treaty provisions. Instructions are being prepared for the Task Force to permit the admission of observers of foreign nations to all installations, stations, and ships in the Antarctic area in accordance with the Treaty. The inspection of ships and aircraft by foreign observers is limited to those discharging or embarking cargo or personnel in the Antarctic area. The purpose of this latter qualification is to be sure that we do not permit the establishment of a precedent whereby our ships on the high seas could be halted.

At the present time, except for cryptographic gear, and a limited amount of classified material aboard ships and aircraft (such as sonar, ECN), there is nothing maintained in Antarctic stations or placed aboard ship which, if made open to inspection by the Soviets, or others, would compromise the national interest. The Department of Defense has the principal interest in this area, and is prepared to take administrative action to eliminate from ships and aircraft participating in the Antarctic operations, all classified matter, except written material.⁸

Guidance

The Department of Defense and other agencies concerned should take such measures as may be necessary to insure that facilities, equipment, aircraft, and ships are open for inspection to foreign observers officially designated for this purpose by the signatory power concerned. The Department of State is to keep all agencies involved informed as to the names of officially designated observers and those empowered to appoint observers. The United States position should be that we are open to inspection.

C. Attitude of the United States in International Consultations Regarding the Inspection System

Discussion

We are satisfied with the Treaty provisions as they stand and see no advantage in multilateral discussion of inspection procedures at the present time. However, several friendly countries maintain that in view of public interest in the inspection feature of the Treaty (as a deterrent, not only of military, but also other, e.g., nuclear, activities), matters related to the inspection system should appear on the agenda of the Canberra meeting to be held under Article IX of the Treaty, which refers to measures regarding the “facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection” as a matter to be considered at such meetings.

Guidance

If matters related to inspection procedures are raised by other countries for multilateral discussions among the Treaty countries, the U.S. position will be:

1. To prevent any impairment of the unilateral inspection rights as set forth in the Treaty.

2. To support discussion and recommendations concerning agreement on the scope and nature of information to be exchanged under Article VII, paragraph 5.

III. Nuclear Explosions and Waste Disposal (Article V)

A. U.S. Installations

Discussion

The extent to which the operation of our planned reactor may involve disposal or emission of waste may be questioned. The United States has consistently maintained that Article V does not preclude the installation and operation of a reactor. The United States must be prepared to show that a reactor can be operated in strict compliance with Article V and also should be able to reassure any Government which may be concerned with the effect that a reactor may have on scientific programs.

Guidance

Present and planned installation of nuclear reactors in the Antarctic under U.S. sponsored programs should provide means whereby disposal of waste would be accomplished outside Antarctica and all prudent measures taken to insure against the possibility of nuclear accidents. The United States should make available to other signatory powers such information that may be helpful in understanding the plan to avoid nuclear contamination from nuclear power plants.

B. Nuclear Activities of Other Countries

Discussion

At the present time there is no foolproof means by which we could monitor against the occasion of a nuclear explosion or disposal of nuclear waste in Antarctica. However, through normal seismic observations and air sampling for radioactive particles, it is fairly certain that any open nuclear explosion that took place in Antarctica would be detected. The question of where it took place would be difficult to determine. In any event, this does not seem to be an immediate problem or one for which we should take special measures. Rather, the United States should encourage the dissemination and exchange among signatory powers of information relative to nuclear activities in Antarctica.

Guidance

The U.S. position should be to encourage strongly the exchange of information among signatory countries regarding nuclear activities in Antarctica. Agencies involved in Antarctic operations should keep alert to the possible use of nuclear devices by other nations.

IV. Scientific Cooperation (Article III)

Discussion

Article III of the Treaty sets forth the obligation of the parties to promote scientific cooperation, in particular, by means of (1) exchange of information regarding programs, (2) exchange of scientists, and (3) exchange and making available of scientific observations gathered in Antarctica. The United States favors scientific cooperation among the Treaty parties. The Special Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), the nongovernmental sub-body of International Council of Scientific Unions, which sponsored the IGY, now serves as a nongovernmental mechanism for the free exchange of views among scientists and for the development of scientific cooperation in an advisory capacity. There is no current need for the Governments to set up a new mechanism for the discussion of scientific problems nor is it desirable to convert SCAR into an official body, since this would inhibit the free discussion of scientific programs. However, the United States should be prepared to support inter-governmental action and arrangements in the field of scientific cooperation in circumstances where such official action would be more effective in relation to U.S. policy objectives.

In inter-governmental discussion of scientific cooperation, the United States should be in a position to demonstrate its active interest therein.

Guidance

1. The United States favors full exchange of information regarding scientific programs among the Governments who are parties to the Antarctic Treaty or among their scientists, including information as to scientific work being done and being planned, and information regarding equipment that is being used, and also by encouraging our participation in meetings and symposia on Antarctic scientific research.

2. The United States favors increasing the exchange of scientific personnel and joint research among scientists with other countries in Antarctic operations. The National Science Foundation, in consultation with the Department of State, shall coordinate and make arrangements regarding the conduct of joint scientific work with other countries; and may seek the assistance of public and private scientific organizations, when appropriate, in making these arrangements.

3. The United States favors the broadest possible exchange of scientific data gathered in Antarctica and should be prepared to support appropriate inter-governmental arrangements which would assure the availability of scientific data gathered by other countries, including arrangements for systematic reporting on ice conditions and weather conditions by vessels and aircraft operating in the Antarctic area.

V. Matters Related to the Question of Claims of Sovereignty

Discussion

The Treaty, by virtue of Article IV, does not, of course, modify the U.S. policy of nonrecognition of any of the territorial claims which have been asserted. On the other hand, the Treaty does not either imply renunciation of these claims by the claimant countries. Although the Treaty precludes the assertion of new claims, it is nevertheless useful, from the standpoint of maintaining a leading U.S. position in Antarctica, that a convenient legal record of current U.S. activities in exploration and discovery be available.

Guidance

1. The agencies concerned with Antarctic affairs shall continue to avoid any action that might be construed as evidence of recognition of any claim of sovereignty over any part of Antarctica by a foreign country and shall reaffirm, whenever appropriate, the U.S. policy of nonrecognition of such claims and of reservation of all U.S. historic rights.

2. The agencies having responsibility for operations in Antarctica shall, insofar as practicable, assure that orderly and convenient public records be established of future instances of discovery and exploration by persons participating in U.S. operations.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IO Files: Lot 69 D 169, Antarctica Files, 1961–1962, U.S. Policy Matters, Department of State, January–July 1961. Secret. A covering reference slip dated February 20 indicates that the paper was transmitted to Alexander Akalovsky, Officer in Charge of General Disarmament Negotiations, U.S. Disarmament Administration. The draft printed here bears several handwritten revisions, but there is no indication who made them or when they were made. See footnotes 2–5 and 8 below.
2. “codicil” was changed to “Protocol of 1950.”
3. Inserts have changed the phrase to read: “it is not believed that very extensive inspection is likely to be an absolute necessity in the near future.”
4. A final sentence of this paragraph was added by hand: “The Soviets might argue that our failure to exercise a treaty given inspection right demonstrates that our insistence on inspection rights in other countries in insincere.”
5. “Prevent” was changed to “deter.”
6. Bracketed portion is Department of State wording. Department of Defense wording, underscored, is not acceptable to Department of State. [Footnote and brackets in the source text. The underscored text is printed as italics.]
7. Agreement not reached on substance; para 5A is DOD recommendation; para 5B represents Dept. of State position. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]
8. A sentence is written above this paragraph: “Instructions and regulations in this regard shall be approved by the Dept. of Defense and the Dept. of State.”