377. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to President Kennedy1
SUBJECT
- Need for DOD-NASA Coordination and Consolidation in Earth-Orbit Space Activities
At the present time the United States is supporting two more or less independent and growing efforts in the development of earth-orbit space capabilities. These include both the near term developments of DynaSoar and Gemini and the longer term development of orbiting space stations for research and reconnaissance purposes. I believe that earth orbit activities will become an increasingly important and costly part of both the military and scientific space efforts, therefore we should make a major effort to unify them now before we become further committed to two large programs.
In addition to the long-term desirability of a single effort, there are a number of possible short-term gains which would be worthwhile. These would include the savings made possible by a major cutback in the DynaSoar program, which would be possible if the Air Force were given a significant role in the Gemini program, and some relief from the technical manpower needs of NASA. Furthermore, I am convinced that you will be increasingly faced with criticism for allowing this duplication to persist. In this memorandum I present a series of arguments for assigning a major responsibility in this area to the Air Force, as follows:
- 1)
- There be created a joint NASA-DOD development effort for development of an earth orbiting space station as a national space program facility and that the DOD be the executive agent for the program.
- 2)
- Arrangements be initiated for a major investment of the DOD, including funding, in the Gemini program and that the DynaSoar effort be collaterally reprogrammed to a small fraction of its current level.
I believe that Secretaries McNamara and Gilpatric would concur in the desirability of these proposals and support such an effort. Mr. Webb would also agree on the philosophical desirability of such steps, but probably would vigorously oppose such a proposal because of his past experiences with the Air Force, because of the problems which may be created for the tracking network, and because of the peaceful image [Page 855] problem which he believes would be created by the direct involvement of the DOD. There is more than a little justification for his attitude.
During the last few days there have been discussions between Secretary McNamara and Mr. Webb regarding joint support of Gemini. While this would be less sweeping than I regard as desirable, it would nonetheless be an important start in changing the present trend. It is important to move rapidly if we are to affect the Gemini program.
Relevant Components of Present NASA and DOD Manned Space Flight Programs
Attention is focused in this memorandum on only four components of the National Space Program; two in NASA and two in DOD. Although other projects could no doubt be included in this analysis, those to be described below are probably the largest in the resources required and in their potential importance for growth of general technological capability for manned space flight.
- a)
- Gemini (NASA). Intended to provide long-duration experience (up to two weeks) with manned flights in earth orbit and to develop rendezvous, docking, and controlled land landing techniques. Because of overlapping time schedules, the development of Apollo rendezvous and docking technology will proceed largely independently of Gemini.
- b)
- DynaSoar (USAF—X–20). Principal objectives are to demonstrate flexible, controlled recovery and landing from space flight, to test vehicle equipment, and to explore man’s functions in near earth space flight. Because the X–20 is a winged vehicle, its development is substantially more difficult than that of spacecraft such as Gemini, and the effective orbital payload for a given launch capability is substantially smaller. On the other hand, it would be maneuverable during re-entry, capable of choosing a landing site over a large area, and to execute a landing, more or less, as a conventional aircraft.
- c)
- Military Orbital Development System (“MODS” USAF-648C). The objective is to provide a manned, long-duration orbital base for the conduct of military tests and experiments, under laboratory conditions, in the space environment. The base would be assembled from modules delivered to orbit by the Titan III, and serviced by modified Gemini-type personnel carriers.
- d)
- Manned Space Station (NASA). The objective (as in MODS, above) is to provide a near earth capability for conducting experiments in space, and for testing of spacecraft components. In addition, the station would be used for “maintaining and refueling spacecraft engaged in lunar and deepspace missions.” The Space Station would be orbited by a Saturn C–5 rocket, and would have a supply and personnel transfer system based on a variety of launch vehicles as required.
The present budgetary plans for the above four projects are as follows (to date, MODS has only been approved by the Headquarters, USAF Systems Review Board, and a request for emergency funding to conduct a “Phase I Program Definition” during 1963 is being forwarded to DOD):
| Fiscal Years (In Millions of Dollars) | |||||
| 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | |
| Gemini (NASA) | 55 | 249 | 312 | 28 | — |
| DynaSoar (DOD) | 131 | 125 | 135 | 135 | 50 |
| MODS (DOD) | 15 | 125 | 324 | 179 | 37 |
| Space Station (NASA) | — | 4 | 10 | 150 | 350 |
Past experience would lead me to believe that projections for 1965 and later are probably low.
Suggested Program Considerations and Realignments
- a)
-
MODS—Manned Station. In general, a major problem in the development of useful and reliable space systems is the great difficulty in realistic reproduction in earth surface laboratories of the stresses due to extended space operations. There is little question that a most important step in accelerating technological development of systems suitable for prolonged space missions, manned or unmanned, will be in providing laboratory and testing facilities in earth orbit. The USAF proposal for a Military Orbital Development System (MODS) and the NASA plan for a Manned Space Station are both principally intended to provide such capabilities. However, it is difficult to see any differences in the basic requirements for an engineering space laboratory for the DOD or NASA—substantially the same technological problems involved in developing equipment suitable for extended operations in space will be met by both agencies, and the same will be true of crew conditioning and training problems. Accordingly, it seems clear that a single Manned Space Station Program, designed to meet all national needs, would be feasible.
Since both the DOD and NASA projects for a Space Station are now in their early planning stages, a decision at this time to the effect that a single development for all national needs will be undertaken would inhibit growth of parallel efforts in both agencies-and would insure future savings not only of funds, but of the relatively scarcer resources in technological and managerial skills.
In view of previous remarks, it would seem advisable that the DOD be assigned responsibility for this development. This step, aside from the important advantage of allowing greater NASA concentration of skills and energies on the Manned Lunar Landing Program, should also serve [Page 857] to advance the rate of growth in the technical maturity of military approaches to the space medium. In addition, it might also result in diminished political pressure for more vague and less rational approaches for expansion of military operations in space.
- b)
- Gemini-DynaSoar. There seems to be general agreement that the use of space for reconnaissance and surveillance activities is a high-priority element of the DOD Space Program. More recently, such agreement has been extended to include communications, navigation and geodesy. Aside from these fairly well defined areas, there is little general agreement either as to the character of worthwhile missions or as to their suitability for DOD implementation.
However, if surveillance of Soviet territory is to be a high-priority element of the national space program, then it can be argued that U.S. surveillance of near-earth space should also have high priority. For example, it must be assumed that if, and as soon as, it becomes technically possible and militarily advantageous, the Soviet Union will use space for military purposes. The fact that no such purposes can now be described as probable is not an argument against research and development of the capabilities for defensive measures; it implies, rather, that such preparations must be flexible, non-specific and not on a crash basis—concerned, for example, with developing the technology of operations in space and the physical capability of discovering and identifying threats if and when these should appear. With respect to initial emphasis in such technological developments, it is now reasonable to say that: (1) development of rendezvous, docking, maneuver, and re-fueling techniques in earth orbit and of routine recovery from earth orbit are prerequisite objectives; (2) such operations must, at least initially, be based on the utilization of manned spacecraft since technical reliability and instrumentation considerations both imply that useful, fully automatic systems will probably take considerably longer to develop.
The current space program of the Department of Defense largely reflects the above line of argument; the purpose of the immediately following remarks is to focus it on the interaction between the DOD X–20 and NASA’s Gemini projects.
The X–20 (DynaSoar) vehicle, in view of its relatively greater sophistication, will mature substantially later than Gemini. Moreover, it is not clear that boosters provided by the current national program will be able to support useful military operational versions of glider-type manned spacecraft in this decade. In view of the evident desirability of establishing at an early date the existence (if any) of military potential of manned applications in space reconnaissance and surveillance, the question naturally arises as to whether growth in national space capability would not be accelerated by diversion of technical effort (and funds) from the [Page 858] X–20 to Gemini, which should be available at least 18 months sooner than the X–20. Such diversion in addition to allowing earlier military experience in space, with rudimentary capability for controlled land landings, would complement and accelerate development of techniques for effective use of an orbiting space laboratory—particularly if responsibility for this program is assigned to DOD as suggested above.
Furthermore, because the Gemini project is not integrally related to the Apollo in any important technological respect, and the resources of NASA’s Manned Spacecraft Center will obviously be strained to an increasing degree in Apollo technical management, the question must also be asked as to whether greater success in the national space program would be achieved by shifting part of the responsibility for Gemini from NASA to the DOD. In addition to direct management benefits, such reassignment of responsibility would enable more effective and rapid exploration of the military utility of the space medium, as well as have obvious domestic political advantages. On the other hand, in view of the fact that the USSR Space Program is entirely military in character, and because of recent increasingly frequent public utterances in the USSR about the importance of military applications in space, it would not seem likely that seriously damaging political criticism would result from such a step.
- Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Wiesner, Jerome B., Box 67C. Secret. A note dated January 10 requested permission to give copies of the memorandum to Webb and to Secretary Gilpatric.↩