338. Airgram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1
SUBJECT
- British Comments on US Position Relating to Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
REF
- CW 7653, dated March 28, 19622
The Embassy has received a statement of British views regarding the reference subject, which was prepared by Mr. Green of the Drugs Branch in the Home Office. In forwarding these comments the Foreign Office indicated that it was instructing its Embassy in Washington to raise the question with the Department. The verbatim text of the British note is reproduced below.
Begin Verbatim Text
THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961
Although it is now nearly nine years since the 1953 Protocol was drawn up it has still not come into force. While it is true that all that is required to bring it into force is ratification by one other opium producer, it is most unlikely that the Protocol will ever be as widely accepted as most of the other international narcotic Conventions have been. This was perfectly clear at the plenipotentiary conference which drafted the new Single Convention, where many countries explained that they were not prepared to accept several of the provisions of the 1953 Protocol.
There would indeed be objections to pursuing a policy that would bring the 1953 Protocol into effect. The only other opium producer now likely to ratify the Protocol is Greece. If Greece were to ratify, the treaty would then be ratified by three producers, India, Iran and Greece. Greece has not for many years produced opium in significant quantities. Iran has not produced any opium for the last six years or so. India would therefore be the only effective producer, but all the other countries which had ratified the Protocol would be bound by it to obtain their opium from India. This would establish a monopoly of the supply of opium for India so far as countries parties to the Protocol were concerned. The other producers would, however, continue to trade with [Page 744] non-parties and there would be no incentive for any of them to come into the Protocol.
Objection has been taken to the provision in the Single Convention which would allow a country to produce and export as much as five tons of opium without obtaining international authority. Although it is true that this would not be possible under the 1953 Protocol, it is also true that under that Protocol any country can produce opium for its own use. Moreover, the comparison should not be with a protocol which is unlikely to come into general effect, but with the present situation, in which any country can grow as much opium as it wishes without obtaining anyone’s authority. There would not appear to be any reason why, if the Single Convention comes into effect, countries which could at present produce and export opium but do not do so should suddenly decide to do so. Indeed the Single Convention should discourage them from doing this since they would first have to satisfy themselves that their production of opium would not lead to overproduction in the world as a whole, and they would have to establish a national monopoly to control production. The Single Convention would therefore impose additional safeguards which do not exist at the present time.
It is true that the reservations clause of the Single Convention was, in the rush of the last week of the plenipotentiary conference, drafted in somewhat wider terms than had been intended. There does not appear, however, to be any reason to think that the provision will be abused. If the scope of possible reservations is studied carefully it will be seen that they can be of only a limited nature. What is more important, however, is that there is no reason to expect that any signatory is going to make unreasonable reservations. Such reservations as have already been made under this Article are in accord with the intentions expressed by the plenipotentiary conference and do not go beyond what the conference envisaged.
As regards reservations being made about the Board’s power of imposing sanctions, the arguments in the previous paragraph would again apply. In this connection it may be noted that the Board has never made use of its present powers of sanction and it seems very improbable that it will ever wish to make use of the more drastic powers given to it.
[Page 745]The United Kingdom Government expects to be able to ratify the Single Convention in due course, but some further consideration of one or two points is necessary. It will probably also be necessary to have some minor legislation before the Convention can be ratified, and in view of the congested parliamentary time-table, it may take a little time for this legislation to be passed.
The United Kingdom Government takes the view that the Single Convention is in many respects an improvement on the existing narcotics treaties, and it hopes that the Convention will come into effect in the near future.
End Verbatim Text.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, 341.9/4–3062. Official Use Only.↩
- See Document 336.↩