Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

329. Paper Prepared by the Head of the Narcotics Division of the United Nations (Yates)¹

Geneva, undated.

1. The criticism of the Single Convention made by the U.S. at the Narcotics Commission session was that illicit production would be greater under the Single Convention than under the existing conventions (E/CN.7/SR.466).²

2. First, as regards licit production, since surplus licit production tends to find its way into illicit channels. Under the existing conventions there is no international obligation at all to limit production of opium, or to control the process of cultivation and production, if production takes place, by a Government monopoly, or against exporting opium.

3. Under the Single Convention, on the other hand,

(a) new producers for export would have to notify the Board, up to 5 tons, and get the permission of the Council over 5 tons (Article 24);

(b) all countries producing opium, for internal consumption or for export, would have to set up a strict internal Government monopoly on the lines of the Indian system (Article 23);

(c) subject to the transitional provisions (Article 49), which apply only to countries in which opium smoking or opium eating is at present traditional and legal, and which have a limited life, all countries would be under an obligation to limit the cultivation, production and consumption of opium to medical and scientific purposes (Article 4).

4. Comment as regards Article 24. It is quite true that the limitation provisions, either as regards more or less than 5 tons, do not provide for any specific limits and are not worth much in themselves: except that they do provide for advance notice of intention to export by new exporters—which, if any country did develop this intention, could be a valuable provision, since it would enable the matter to be discussed in advance and considerations such as those below to be pointed out.

But the fact is that, during the U.N. period, for commercial and social reasons, even though there has been no limitation on producing opium for export, countries have in fact been giving up such production—Iran and Afghanistan in particular.

The licit market for opium amounts to something between 800 and 900 tons a year. There is not enough money in this—900 tons at $20 a kilo—$18 million as a rough estimate-to make it worth while for more than a very few big producers. The cost of administering a highly-policed Government monopoly (Article 23) emphasizes this situation. In fact, India and Turkey have a dominating position in this market in the Western world, with well-established connexions with purchasers, and new producers would be likely to burn their fingers. (Burma for instance which had ideas of this kind appears to have given them up.)

Again, the largest proportion of the opium in licit trade is used to produce codeine. As soon as a fully acceptable synthetic replacement for codeine comes into wide clinical use—several have already been marketed with partial success—the long-term outlook for opium will be further affected.

5. Illicit opium. The Single Convention maintains and does not weaken the obligations of Governments as regards fighting the illicit traffic. For those countries which are constitutionally able to accept the 1936 Convention, that convention will continue, while in Articles 35 and 36 the Single Convention provides more general obligations which should be acceptable to all Governments—many of whom are not now bound by any such obligations—and not only to the limited group of the 1936 Convention.

The U.S. spokesman stated in the Commission that U.S. experts estimated that under the existing conventions the illicit production amounted to 3,070 tons and that under the Single Convention it would be 5,575 tons. Others in the Commission were simply not able to follow this argument (E/CN.7/SR.466).³

There is nothing in the Single Convention to encourage either the licit or illicit production of opium, and much to control licit production and to stop leaks therefrom. It is difficult to see how any valid estimates can be made for a hypothetical future. Are the U.S. prepared to name publicly even one country in which illicit production will go up as a result of the Single Convention? The main factor in the increase or decrease in illicit opium in the future must be the relative effort which the Governments concerned put into the policy of limitation and suppression.

Attention is drawn in this connexion to para. 234 of the Commission report (E/3512) in which a short account is given of the frank views expressed by a group of administrators from South-East Asia regarding the admittedly high production of illicit opium in that region. This passage indicates the sort of effort that is required, over and above any type of action that can be expressed in treaty form, if headway is to be made as regards indigenous opium production in such regions.

6. 1953 Protocol and the Single Convention. The 1953 Protocol would come into force if ratified by one further producing country of the following 7: Bulgaria, Greece, India, Iran, Turkey, USSR, Yugoslavia; India and Iran having already ratified, and Iran’s ratification being valid for this purpose even though it is in fact no longer a producer of opium.

7. The 1953 Protocol applies to opium only, not to other narcotics, and its provisions are considerably different from, and more elaborate in a number of respects than, those of the Single Convention.

8. Article 44 of the Single Convention provides that, as from its coming into force, the Single Convention will replace, as between the parties to it, the older conventions, including the 1953 Protocol if that Protocol should by then have come into force.

9. The effect of the 1953 Protocol coming into effect before the Single Convention would therefore be very confusing. It would introduce a new regime for opium—and one which a number of producers have said they regard as unacceptable—for a period which would not be known in advance. This regime would then be superseded within a relatively short time by that of the Single Convention. The process would be burdensome and confusing both for producing and importing countries and for the international organs, especially the Board.

10. The time it will take for the Single Convention to be ratified can of course only be guessed. It requires ratification by 40 Governments, but without any limitations to their being producers, manufacturers, etc. 43 countries signed the Convention at the close of the conference. There are more than 100 countries entitled to ratify it, and it is thought that there are considerably more than 40 who are quite willing to ratify it.

11. The disadvantages also of two international regimes, adhered to by different groups of countries, i.e. one under the Single Convention, and one under the old conventions plus the 1953 Protocol, continuing for an extended period of time after the Single Convention comes into force need no underlining.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IO Files: Lot 67 D 378, Deputy Assistant Secretary Richard N. Gardner Files, 1961–65, Opium. No classification marking. In a July 7 covering letter to Deputy Assistant Secretary Gardner, Walter Kotschnig, Deputy U.S. Representative to the Economic and Social Council, noted that he had asked Yates for summary arguments in favor of ratification of the Single Convention by the United States. He had concluded that “from where I sit it is absolutely plain to me that we ought to ratify the Single Convention both because it will make for better rather than for weaker controls, and because it would be disastrous if two systems of control were set up if the 1953 Protocol should be ratified by a sufficient number of countries.” He urged Gardner not to attribute the paper to Yates.
2. U.S. Representative A. Gilmore Flues commented that the United States was concerned that the Single Convention, by allowing additional countries to cultivate and export opium, would facilitate an increase in illicit opium production. (United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 16th Session, Summary Record of the 466th Meeting, Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, Monday, 1 May, 1961 at 10:30 a.m., p. 3)
3. Flues’ statement is ibid.