261. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1

422. Committee of 24.

1.
Pursuant to US–UK talks held by Cleveland in London we have (a) weighed pros and cons our continued participation in work of Cmte and (b) desirability of making effort with key members prior to Sept 5 meeting to induce greater moderation.
2.
Re (a), Cmte’s 1963 record thus far exhibits both moderation and lack of realism. Initial consensus to approach Portugal for talks with Cmte representatives without preconditions was model of how we believe Cmte should act. GOP sharp rebuff triggered res drawing situation to attention SC. In our view, Cmte acted with moderation in cases of SWA and Malta but acted unwisely re Aden, Fiji, High Commission [Page 577] Territories, British Guiana. To date, Cmte’s officers have resisted pressures take up Puerto Rica. Because Cmte now scheduled consider US Trust Territory Pacific Island and can be expected take up other US territories in next six months, Dept inclined believe over-all US interests best served by remaining on Cmte for the time being in order have possibility explaining and, if need be, defending our record in person. Since we suspect UK anxious to have us remain for their own reasons, we should be careful not to give UK impression our decision firm but rather that it “knife edge” similar to UK position described Cleveland (London’s 144) and subject to constant review.
3.
Re (b), we should where not counter-productive seek to convey to key Afro-Asians our sincere conviction that remaining “hard core” colonial problems not susceptible to doctrinaire approach of immediate independence in every instance. US dedication to principles 1514 (XV) requires no proof. We earnestly desire assist remaining two per cent of world’s population living in dependent territories to achieve self-government or independence as rapidly as possible without precipitating serious new dangers for such populations. Certain actions of Cmte have come close to falling into latter category. Unrealistic res calling for early independence SR at this delicate stage of negotiations on colony’s future ran risk of provoking what Cmte and UN most wishes avoid-independent SR under white supremacist govt. Similar indiscriminate action re High Commission Territories risked provoking their incorporation into South Africa. Worst example of Cmte’s 1963 session was its call for immediate independence Fiji with almost total disregard for complicated internal political situation and effect Cmte’s action would have thereon. We have all too often heard otherwise responsible Cmte members explain privately that, while they recognize important differences between territories considered, once others raise demand for unqualified immediate independence they unable do anything but support simplistic approach. US hopes more responsible trend in Cmte will prevail and that greater discrimination and leadership will be shown by responsible members Afro-Asian group, enabling Cmte play constructive role in decolonization process. If less responsible trend should prevail, we see real danger Cmte’s actions could damage rather than further cause of decolonization, and could cause us reassess our attitude towards Cmte.
4.
Would appreciate addressee’s comments and suggestions soonest re approach along lines para 3 to: non-bloc Cmte members except LA’s and Cambodia. We would not plan approach LA’s since ASAFs are key to possible future moderation. After comments received we will, as Cleveland promised FonOff, consult UK.
Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, POL 10 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Michael H. Newlin on August 12; cleared by Henry J. Tasca, Richard Friedman, and William B. Buffum; and approved by Richard Gardner. Also sent to Pretoria and repeated to London.