Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

219. Research Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

RSB–148

Washington, August 27, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Soviet Tactics on Some Major Issues at the 17th UN General Assembly

This memorandum assessing probable Soviet tactics at the forthcoming UN General Assembly was prepared in response to a request from Mr. Harlan Cleveland.

Abstract

Without attempting to exhaust the list of more than one hundred items on the General Assembly’s agenda, this paper singles out those subjects on which Soviet initiatives or responses will be of particular concern for US policy.

We note the possibility of a Soviet initiative on Berlin in the UN and of Khrushchev’s heading the Soviet delegation. The Soviets will almost certainly give major emphasis to a series of disarmament questions and attempt to make up for the relatively poor showing of their delegation at the Geneva talks.

The space exploit of Nikolayev and Popovich in addition to contributing a note of self-confidence to Moscow’s foreign policy generally may foreshadow more pointed Soviet attacks on US space programs at the General Assembly. The Soviets will doubtless continue to exploit issues on which they can pose as the leaders of anti-colonialism and may attempt to present their proposal for an international trade conference as a means for underdeveloped countries to reply to the threat posed by the EEC.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Looking forward to the 17th session of the UN General Assembly, the Soviets do not expect the Assembly to endorse completely the Soviet line on any major issue before the UN. However, the Soviets probably do hope to use the forthcoming Assembly session to enhance their ability to influence neutralist opinion while at the same time attacking and if possible embarrassing the West on a number of issues.

UN Finances. The July 20 decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirming the legality of expenditures for peace-keeping operations carried out on the Assembly’s initiative was a major setback for Soviet UN policy. The Soviets had taken the unprecedented step of participating in oral argument before the ICJ in their effort to stave off the decision. While Moscow may possibly hope to avoid either paying its arrears for peace-keeping expenses outside of the regular annual budgets or suffering the loss of its voting rights (the Soviets may reckon that the number of countries in arrears would make immediate imposition of the sanction envisaged by article 19 of the Charter politically impractical), the USSR nevertheless will probably wish to recoup the loss to its prestige occasioned by the ICJ decision by skillfully exploiting other issues before the General Assembly.

II. SPECIFIC ISSUES

1. Berlin and Germany

It is possible that the Soviet Union will bring the question of Berlin and Germany before the UN General Assembly this year. Humiliated when the German question was last debated at the UN a decade ago, the Soviets have been chary of opening up a debate of which they might easily lose control. However, in recent years Moscow appears to have been giving increasingly serious consideration to raising the issue before the UN, and this year Khrushchev, personally, appears to have been engaged in policy discussions on such an initiative.

The Soviet Union probably has no hope that the General Assembly would rubber-stamp the USSR’s position on Berlin and Germany, but Moscow may now hope that the General Assembly—many of whose members have little interest in what appears to them to be a purely European problem—would tend to seek a “compromise” resolution which would be more damaging to the Western than to the Soviet position.

The Soviets might pose the question in terms of a Western threat to the peace in hopes of ultimately securing a “compromise” resolution enjoining both sides from the use of force in the Berlin dispute. The Soviet Union would hope that such a resolution would help to inhibit a vigorous Western response to unilateral changes in the local situation which the Soviet Union and the GDR might impose either in preparation for or by way of implementing a separate peace treaty. The Soviet Union might also believe that the UN General Assembly would be a favorable forum in which to plead the bloc’s case for a free-city. The USSR might calculate that proposals to turn West Berlin into a free-city under UN auspices can be made to appear natural and reasonable to many members of the Assembly (if not to the two-thirds majority needed to carry a resolution), even though such proposals would seriously undermine Western rights. By appearing to make concessions by providing for continued US, UK and French troop presence as UN forces, Moscow might hope to make it difficult or even impossible for the West to reject the Soviet proposal and to maintain its position that Western presence in Berlin is not a negotiable question.

For the moment the Soviets do not appear to have decided yet whether or not to raise the Berlin issue at the 17th General Assembly.

If the Soviets decide to take a major initiative on Berlin at the UN, Khrushchev very probably would attend in order to present it in person. Khrushchev may decide to come in order to lend maximum dignity to Soviet participation, even if there is no Soviet move on Berlin. There have been hints and rumors that Khrushchev may be coming to the 17th General Assembly at some time during its deliberations, but at the present time there is no firm basis for predicting that he will attend.

2. Disarmament

Unless there is a dramatic move on Berlin, disarmament will probably be the central issue at the UN General Assembly, and Moscow apparently hopes to exploit the UN as a favorable forum to recover from its relatively poor showing at the Geneva disarmament conference.

From Moscow’s point of view, the General Assembly, where disarmament debate is necessarily limited to generalizations, is a better forum than the disarmament conference, where the discussion gets down to details, for the Soviet Union’s propagandistic approach to disarmament issues. While Soviet diplomats have indicated that the USSR will not risk another rebuff by the neutrals by repeating its June proposals for a prolonged recess in the disarmament conference with its reconvening in New York rather than Geneva, the possibility cannot be excluded that the Soviets will again seek to reconvene the conference in New York where it is likely to be overshadowed by other UN business.

General and Complete Disarmament. Moscow’s principal objective will be to develop the image that it sincerely desires disarmament while the West is frustrating the will of world opinion by dragging its feet in disarmament negotiations. The Soviet Union will probably use its now standard propaganda line alleging US aggressive intentions (e.g., quoting out of context a remark attributed to President Kennedy in the Alsop article in the March 31 Saturday Evening Post to prove that the US administration advocates preventive war and citing the remark in Defense Secretary McNamara’s June 16 speech about attacking military rather than civilian targets as an effort to sell the American people on the desirability of nuclear war) in order to lend the appearance of substance to their argument that US demands for controls are in reality schemes to develop espionage agencies on Soviet territory.

Moscow will probably continue to argue that the US plan is deficient because it prolongs the danger of nuclear war by not providing for the elimination of delivery vehicles in Stage I, because its provisions on transition from stage to stage (despite US willingness to forego having a veto over transition), do not guarantee that the disarmament process—once begun—will be carried through to completion, because failure to provide for abolition of foreign bases would give the US a strategic advantage and because the peace-keeping arrangements envisaged by the US would both throttle the national liberation movement and violate the UN Charter.

On the other hand the Soviets will attempt to create the impression that they are earnestly seeking disarmament by emphasizing the concessions they have made at Geneva where the USSR has accepted the US figures for Stage I reductions in conventional arms and has said that it was prepared to accept a five-year rather than a four-year overall time period for general and complete disarmament.

The Soviets will also use amendment of their draft treaty to include measures for the prevention of war by accident or miscalculation (exchanges of military missions and establishment of rapid communications among heads of governments and the UN Secretary General) as “evidence” of their effort to meet the US halfway. At the same time the Soviet Union can use its proposal to provide in the treaty on a general and complete disarmament for a ban on combined military maneuvers of two or more states as a vehicle for attacking NATO maneuvers such as last year’s Checkmate exercises which were alleged to be “provocative.” Moscow may well use other standing propaganda arguments—for example, anecdotes in the press about false US alerts resulting from communication failures and radar errors, the unreliability of the American rockets used for lifting nuclear weapons to be tested in space, charges that US planes have buzzed Soviet ships and examples of neurosis among US military personnel—in order to create the impression that “irresponsible” practices of the US military create a threat to the peace of the world.

To the present the Soviets remain firmly opposed to the American plan for zonal inspection, arguing that it would jeopardize Soviet military secrecy before the disarmament process had gone far enough to protect the Soviet Union from the possibility of attack by the West. However, the Soviet Union appeared earlier this year to have considered the idea of introducing some form of statistical sampling into its control proposals and a bloc delegation in Geneva has spoken of a modified zonal plan. The Soviet Union has long been vulnerable on the control issue, and the possibility of a move to enhance the Soviet position cannot be excluded.

The Soviets appear to have considered—and a Polish diplomat recently mentioned once more—the possibility of a separate agreement on the first stage of disarmament, and there exists the possibility of such a Soviet move at the UN General Assembly.

Test Ban. Clearly the Soviets do not wish to pay a high price (in terms of control) for a test ban, and it is problematical whether they have any interest at all in reaching a test-ban agreement. The USSR does not in any case expect to negotiate such an agreement at the UN, and Moscow’s objective in discussing the test-ban issue at the General Assembly will be to make the West bear as large a share as possible of the opprobrium for the continuation of nuclear weapons testing. The Soviets appear to believe that their position on this question has improved over last year when the USSR was guilty of ending the de facto moratorium.

The Soviet Union can be expected to continue their rejection of the latest US proposal to consider scaling down control requirements on the basis of new scientific data resulting from the Vela test series if the USSR would agree to recognize in principle the need for on-site inspection. Moscow can be expected to hold to its position that the US proposal is not a significant concession since the US insists on the need for obligatory inspection. The USSR will probably continue to argue that national means of detection are adequate to police a test ban, and that on-site inspection is not necessary.

Moscow will continue to claim that the Soviet Union and not the United States has genuinely accepted and correctly interpreted the compromise memorandum (of April 16, 1962) of the 8 unaligned members of the Geneva disarmament conference. The Indian delegate at Geneva, Arthur Lall, has been informally circulating a draft treaty on testing-based on the memorandum—which supports the Soviet contention that inspection would be voluntary and not compulsory; Moscow at the General Assembly would welcome such a treaty—whether put forward by the eight or by India alone—as “proof” that the USSR and not the US was responsive to neutral opinion on nuclear testing.

Because the USSR claims that national means of detection are adequate to monitor observance of a test ban, the Soviet Union is free to support any appeals for an uncontrolled moratorium on testing. In supporting such a proposal, Moscow might well link its endorsement of a moratorium with a demand for Western recognition of the USSR’s claim that because the US began nuclear testing the Soviet Union has the “right” to be the last country to carry out nuclear weapons tests.

Moscow is likely to respond to any proposals for a ban on tests in the atmosphere by calling—as it has in the past—for the end of tests in all environments.

Soviet propaganda has made much of US nuclear weapons tests in space, and Moscow will probably seek—either in the context of debate on disarmament or outer space—to stigmatize these US tests.

Non-dissemination. In discussing non-dissemination of nuclear weapons at the forthcoming General Assembly, the Soviet Union will apparently make a point of attacking potential creation of a NATO nuclear force.

Heretofore, Moscow has in two previous sessions voted in favor of the Irish resolution which referred to transfer of control over nuclear weapons, and left aside the question of arrangements within alliances. Moscow has publicly broached the issue by including a specific provision against transfer of nuclear weapons to alliances in its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament tabled at the opening of the Geneva disarmament talks. The Soviets will probably demand that a UN resolution contain a similar provision and may hope to win neutral support for its position, thus forcing the West to vote against a widely supported disarmament resolution.

In future negotiations the Soviet Union may be persuaded that it must either accept the creation of a NATO force or be faced with the prospect of an independent West German nuclear force. If Moscow becomes convinced that such a choice cannot be put off, and, further, if it is assured that creation of a NATO force would not in fact be a step toward an independent West German force, it may well sign a non-transfer agreement worded along the lines of the Irish resolution, i.e., one which would permit creation of a NATO nuclear force. For the present Moscow does not appear to be prepared to accept a NATO force, and will probably use the General Assembly debate to press its case against NATO and play upon anti-German prejudices by charging that NATO arrangements are a forerunner of nuclear weapons for the West German army.²

While the Soviet Union may have an interest in using the non-dissemination issue as a justification for not granting further nuclear assistance to the Chinese Communists, this appears to be a purely secondary consideration. Soviet delegates are hardly likely to discuss Communist China in debates on non-transfer, but the bloc delegates may not be above mentioning the CPR to lend emphasis to the importance of non-dissemination in lobbying for support of the Soviet position.

Presumably, the Soviet Union shares with the US a desire to prevent the emergence of other potential Nth countries, not members of either Eastern or Western alliances. However, this consideration does not appear to have actively motivated Soviet policy makers in dealing with this issue. Moscow will almost certainly avoid statements which might offend potential non bloc Nth countries (excepting Israel).

Denuclearization

The Soviets will almost certainly raise or support initiatives for the creation of nuclear-free zones as well as proposals along the lines of last year’s Swedish resolution for the creation of a “club” of countries which pledge neither to develop their own nuclear forces nor to allow foreign powers to station nuclear weapons on their territory. The bloc may attempt to revive the Polish proposal of 1960 for a freeze on foreign bases together with a ban on transfer of nuclear weapons.

Non-use

This year the Soviet Union will almost certainly support proposals for a ban on the use (or first use) of nuclear weapons. While statements in Soviet journals about the inevitability of escalation of local wars and Khrushchev’s remark to Sulzberger last September that someone who signed such an agreement in good faith would in the exigency of war be proved a liar show that the Soviets have no illusions about the effect of such a declaratory agreement. Moscow has long advocated such a ban as a means of detracting from the credibility of the Western nuclear deterrent. This year Moscow’s advocacy of such a ban will probably be used as a backdrop for further propaganda exploitation of the Soviet distortion of the Alsop article in the March 31 Saturday Evening Post.

Moscow may also raise the issue of a ban on the use of other weapons of mass destruction, i.e. chemical and bacteriological weapons. Soviet propaganda has already commented upon the use of defoliants in South Vietnam and in several instances has described them as causing injury to persons and as an attempt to produce famine by destroying crops. The recent death of a British scientist who had been working on bacteriological agents—an event duly recorded by TASS—affords another point of departure for a possible Soviet attack on alleged Western preparations for aggressive war.

3. Space

The Soviets will approach the UN General Assembly discussion of outer space matters with its prestige greatly enhanced by the recent exploits of Nikolayev and Popovich. They can be expected to use the occasion to glorify Soviet scientific achievements, to project the image of Soviet peaceful intentions and willingness to cooperate with other countries and to set forth once more Soviet criticisms of American space programs. Moscow does not appear to have added very much to its repertoire of propaganda arguments since the meetings of the UN Outer Space Subcommittees in Geneva last summer. However, it appears likely that the Soviets will state their case in sharper terms at the General Assembly this autumn. While using a harsher tone in its criticisms of the US, Moscow will probably continue to exercise a measure of restraint to avoid jeopardizing its public posture of seeking more active cooperation with the free world in this field, to minimize the risk of spoiling prospects for agreements with the US on possible joint projects and to avoid statements which might embarrass Soviet programs for use of space for military purposes.

Reconnaissance Satellites. Most principal interest in attacking US space efforts would appear to be to inhibit (or make as politically costly as possible) US development of reconnaissance satellites. Until last year Moscow gave little publicity to the subject of reconnaissance satellites, apparently because it was reluctant to make a public display of Soviet impotence. However, this inhibition appears to be diminishing as the Soviet Union develops a reputation for being well on the way to early acquisition of an anti-satellite capability. Along with the voicing of Soviet anti-missile claims (with the implication of a possible anti-satellite missile) there has been more frequent references in Soviet propaganda to the need for a ban on espionage satellites. Soviet success in putting Vostok III into orbit close to Vostok IV has produced widespread press speculation that Soviet capability for shooting down reconnaissance satellites and provides a favorable context for a Soviet political attack on the US.

In addition to demanding a ban on spies in the sky, the Soviets may attempt to embarrass the US by demanding that it register with the UN data on all satellite launches. The Soviet news agency, TASS, has made a point of meticulously reporting announcements of launchings of US satellites whose purpose is not announced and the USSR may use these as a talking point in attempting to embarrass the US. However, in demanding registration of data the USSR will almost certainly wish to include some limitations in order to avoid undertaking (even by implication) an obligation to reveal certain information about its own space efforts.

US Militarism in Outer Space. The enhancement of the USSR reputation for military prowess in space resulting from twin manned satellites will also make it possible for the Soviets to denounce American military space programs from a position of apparent strength. Soviet media have been increasingly picking up and exploiting articles in the US press on use of space for military purposes, and the Soviets may attempt to accuse the US of attempting to launch an arms race in outer space.

At the Geneva disarmament conference the Soviets reacted coolly to suggestions that disarmament in space be considered as a topic for separate measures of disarmament. And while the Soviets will doubtless remain opposed to arrangements entailing control over rocket launchings outside the context of general and complete disarmament, pejorative references in Soviet propaganda to American schemes for bombardment satellites suggest that Moscow may be considering a proposal for a declaratory ban on stationing nuclear weapons in orbit.

Moscow will probably renew its charges that the US programs have contaminated outer space, referring in particular to the West Ford project for putting a large number of copper needles into orbit and to US nuclear tests which leave radioactive fallout in space.

In discussing communications satellites the Soviets will probably again advocate a ban on the use of satellites for the transmission of war propaganda and may reiterate the bloc’s argument that capitalistic private business not be allowed to operate in space.

4. Anti-Imperialism

Soviet long-range ambitions in the UN appear to be predicated upon the hope that the USSR may with time gain sufficient influence over non-aligned members to assure the Soviet Union of the one-third vote necessary to block resolutions detrimental to Soviet interests while affording the Soviet Union an increasingly great opportunity to shape resolutions aimed against the West. Obviously, the colonial issues occupy a key place in Moscow’s attempt to win over neutralist sentiment and to direct it into anti-Western channels.

Committee of 17. The Soviets appear to have been gratified by the work of the 17-member committee established last year to oversee implementation of the UN declaration on granting independence to colonial countries. Gratified by the anti-Western bent of many of the Committee’s decisions, the Soviets appear to be developing ambitions for enhancing the committee’s importance and the Soviet role in it.

The USSR will very likely resist strongly any attempt to deprive it of its seat, and may attempt to secure greater Asian and African representation. In addition a Soviet official in New York has indicated that the Soviet Union is preparing to propose some form of enlarged program of work for the committee; Moscow may argue that the committee should deal directly with governments rather than report to the General Assembly and might propose that it undertake visits to non-self governing territories.

The Soviets may hope that the committee—a promising new institution from the Soviet point of view—can ultimately become the principal UN organ in the field of colonialism to the detriment of the present role of the more conservative Trusteeship Council and Fourth Committee of the General Assembly.

Policy lines. Little change is to be expected in the now standard Soviet approach to issues to which it can give an anti-imperialistic cast. Moscow will doubtless avail itself of opportunities to embarrass Western colonial powers, and probably believes Portugal to be the most vulnerable of them. The Soviet Union will welcome, and attempt to claim credit for, the “liberation” of West Irian. The Soviets will probably urge greater vigor in dealing with Katangan separatism in the hope of later similarly claiming credit for the reunification of the Congo. The USSR can be expected to welcome discussion by the General Assembly-either in general debate or as a separate agenda item-of Cuban charges of American aggressiveness both as an opportunity to embarrass the US and as a means of creating an impediment to any potential US move against the Castro regime.

Soviet Colonialism. The Soviet delegation would probably prefer to avoid discussion of Soviet imperialism, and will doubtless react sharply to any mention of the subject. Moscow probably believes that, because most of the former colonies regard Soviet affairs as remote and are preoccupied with their own problems, the best Soviet rebuttal is to brand the Western charge a “cold-war” tactic and a stratagem to absolve the West from its guilt.

5. World Trade Conference

The Soviet Union will probably carry its fight against the Common Market to the General Assembly this autumn and attempt to brand the EEC as an imperialist device for discriminating against the less developed countries.

On May 30 Khrushchev publicly called for a world trade conference and a resolution endorsing such a conference was passed at the ECOSOC meeting in July.

In light of the Cairo conference’s resolution endorsing the idea of a trade conference (though it made no reference to the USSR) and the favorable reaction of the underdeveloped countries to the resolution on a possible trade conference at the General Assembly last year, the Soviet Union may hope to capture leadership of a popular cause and use the international-trade-conference issue in attacking the EEC.

6. Korea

The Soviet Union by demanding inscription on the Assembly agenda of an item on the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea has indicated that it hopes to take the offensive on the Korean issue this year. If the Soviet Union can focus the debate on the presence of US troops, it may hope to popularize arguments which mutatis mutandi can support the Soviet case for withdrawal of US troops from foreign bases as a disarmament measure, for withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin and for withdrawal of US forces from other areas including South Vietnam.

Moscow’s ability to manipulate successfully the Korean issue at the Assembly, and possibly to effect changes in the composition of UNCURK favorable to it, is seriously circumscribed by Soviet and North Korean unwillingness to take a cooperative attitude toward the UN and their rejection of a UN role in Korea.

7. Secretary General

Moscow almost certainly hopes eventually to replace the single Secretary General with a “troika” or some other arrangement which will afford the Soviets an effective veto over UN executive actions. The Soviet Union, must, however, take into account the climate of opinion in the UN; the Soviets probably do not expect to secure early adoption—presumably including amendment of the UN Charter-of their “troika” proposal. Moscow must realize that prolonged obstruction of the question of filling the Secretary General’s office will be counterproductive; the Soviet Union would bear the onus for not cooperating with the UN.

In the immediate future Moscow will probably avoid committing itself either to support U Thant’s election to a regular term or to oppose him. The Soviets would apparently wish to put U Thant in the position of having to seek Soviet favor (perhaps by not exercising his authority in applying Article 19 of the Charter to deprive the Soviet Union of its vote because it is now in arrears in its contribution to the UN). At the same time they would retain their freedom of action while assessing the parliamentary situation in order to determine what Soviet proposals for downgrading the status of the Secretary General (increasing authority of his deputies, for example) might stand a chance of being accepted by the Assembly.

8. UN Financing

The Soviet Union will probably resist efforts to carry out the July 20 decision of the International Court of Justice. But, if Moscow expects that it may be defeated on a resolution on this subject, it may hope that the General Assembly will not recommend and the SYG will not take immediate action under Article 19 to take voting rights from members who are in arrears.

9. Chinese Representation

The Soviet bloc will doubtless again go on record as favoring a change in Chinese representation, both for the purpose of making a friendly gesture toward Communist China and in order to avoid making a show of intra-bloc differences at the UN. But, the Soviets are probably comforted by the calculation that their efforts are not likely to succeed, for while Moscow may be constrained to fight for Communist China’s claims, it probably has little desire to see the Chinese Communists become members of the UN.

If demands for Chinese participation in disarmament agreements are raised—Indian delegate Lall has begun referring to the need to have all militarily significant powers participate from the very first stage-the Soviet Union will probably repeat its disavowal of being empowered to negotiate for the Chinese which was voiced by Gromyko at the Supreme Soviet last April 24.

10. Charter Revision

The USSR will probably continue to oppose proposals for charter revision on the ground that new arrangements cannot be made until after the Chinese Communists take their rightful seat.

11. General Assembly Procedures

Moscow thus far has shown little interest in improving General Assembly procedures, and the USSR does not appear to regard the subject as particularly important.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, United Nations (General), 7/62–8/62, Box 311. Secret. Sent from Roger Hilsman (INR) to Secretary Rusk.
2. Alternatively, the USSR appears to be prepared to sign a nontransfer arrangement which singles out the FRG and GDR, but makes no mention of alliance, in effect trading off an explicit anti-NATO provision for an agreement likely to undermine NATO by discrimination against the Federal Republic. [Footnote in the source text.]