214. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
SUBJECT
- The Candidacy of Sir Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) for President of the Seventeenth General Assembly
There are two announced candidates for President of the Seventeenth General Assembly—Sir Zafrulla Khan and Dr. G. P. Malalasekera, Representatives, respectively, of Pakistan and Ceylon to the United Nations. This year is generally recognized as an “Asian year” since the last Assembly President from this area was Prince Wan of Thailand in 1956. The Zafrulla candidacy appears to have attracted substantial support and has the quiet endorsement of the Secretary General. So far as we are aware, the Malalasekera candidacy is supported only by the Soviet bloc and India.
Malalasekera formally announced his candidacy on May 3. At that time both Zafrulla and Okasaki, the Japanese United Nations Representative, had indicated their interest in the presidency to our Mission in New York and had been told that either would be acceptable to us. Okasaki, in fact, informed our United Nations Mission that he was a candidate on April 26 but he has never circulated a formal announcement, as is customary. We avoided taking any position in favor of one against the other in view of our close relations with both Pakistan and Japan. The situation was made more delicate by the fact that Zafrulla (and the Pakistan Government) have held us primarily responsible for Zafrulla’s failure to be reelected to the International Court of Justice last year, when we supported the Japanese candidate and not Zafrulla. Okasaki made it clear that he did not wish to enter into an open contest with Zafrulla and has not pressed his candidacy since Zafrulla formally announced his candidacy on May 11.
We have so far given no formal commitment of support to Zafrulla, not wishing to do so until the Security Council’s consideration of [Page 458] Kashmir had been concluded and the Indian aid issue was out of the way. However, this has been a matter of timing rather than of substance. Malalasekera would not make an acceptable General Assembly President, not only because of his Government’s radical neutrality but because he, personally, is widely regarded as both incompetent and unreliable. It appears very unlikely that Okasaki would advance his candidacy so long as Zafrulla is a candidate and, in any event, our United Nations Mission believes it is too late for him to make an effective campaign.
Our Embassy in New Delhi is concerned that open United States support of Zafrulla’s candidacy may exacerbate United States-Indian relations because of current Indian-Pakistan tensions, Zafrulla’s role in the Kashmir debate in the Security Council, and the possibility that the Kashmir issue will be brought to the General Assembly. We believe it highly unlikely that Pakistan would bring Kashmir to the General Assembly. However, were we to have any indication that Pakistan might do so, we would indicate our opposition. The Pakistan United Nations Delegation has recommended to Karachi against this and believes the Government will accept its recommendation. We agree with this estimate on the basis of the clear self interest of both Pakistan, and Zafrulla personally, in not having this issue raised at the Seventeenth General Assembly.
We have authorized our United Nations Mission to give a formal commitment of support to Zafrulla next week after having made clear to him our views of the handling of the Chinese representation issue at the Seventeenth General Assembly. Pakistan did not support us on this issue at the Sixteenth General Assembly and current Pakistan-Chinese Communist exchanges are not reassuring. However, we would expect Zafrulla as a reputable jurist to be an impartial presiding officer and we believe our position on the handling of the Chinese representation issue at the Seventeenth Session to be well founded from the legal standpoint. We are not in a position to exact a quid pro quo from him since Malalasekera provides no alternative. We should, however, make completely clear to Zafrulla our unshakeable determination not to be defeated on this issue.
We do not propose to seek assurances from him with respect to Kashmir since we believe it most unlikely Pakistan would seriously consider raising this issue at the forthcoming session and we do not wish to waste our bargaining power. We do, however, intend to point out that an active United States campaign on behalf of Zafrulla might well prove counterproductive by provoking an organized Indian campaign against him. We will of course, as is our usual custom, make known our support of him when asked and in the course of our normal[Page 459]pre-Assembly consultations. Since the vote is by secret ballot, without nominations or discussion, it is not our custom to make any public announcement of how the United States will vote.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, United Nations (General), 7/62–8/62, Box 311. Confidential. A July 26 covering note to Brubeck from Sam Belk reads: “The attached memorandum was prepared at my request following our chat on Tuesday. One minor point not mentioned in the memorandum was that Malalasekera, the Ceylonese candidate, was once Ambassador to Moscow and has the reputation of having a disposition very much like Krishna Menon’s. In view of the difficulties US-Indian relations have encountered over the past year and chronically bad Indian-Pak relations, I think we should expect Menon to make every effort to whip the Assembly into a frenzy in an attempt to keep Zafrulla from being elected.”↩
- Johnson signed for Brubeck above Brubeck’s typed signature.↩