Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

208. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 11, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Tour d’Horizon

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Georgi M. Kornienko—Counselor USSR
• Mr. Joseph J. Sisco—Director UNP

At Mr. Kornienko’s request I had lunch with him today at the Hay-Adams. The following principal points emerged during our luncheon conversation.

1. Ruanda-Urundi. Mr. Kornienko took the initiative in raising the question of General Assembly consideration of Ruanda-Urundi. He was particularly interested in the question of the continuing presence of Belgian troops. I indicated that our objective is to support independence of Ruanda and Burundi on July 1 under conditions which would give reasonable assurance that stability will be maintained. After Mr. Kornienko stressed the need to assure that Belgian presence was not an indefinite one, I pointed out to him that it was important that the USSR distinguish between symbolism and reality on this matter. I said that I understood why for propaganda reasons the Soviet Union might wish to stress in the Assembly the need for early Belgian withdrawal. However, I pointed out that the USSR has an interest in not creating conditions which might bring about another Congo-like situation in the heart of Africa. Mr. Kornienko said there was no need for a direct confrontation between the US and USSR on Ruanda-Urundi.

2. 17th GA. Mr. Kornienko indicated an interest in how we viewed the coming 17th General Assembly. He was particularly interested in knowing whether the US intended to make any formal proposal looking towards the establishment of a UN Peace Force or the strengthening of the UN peace-keeping machinery. I limited myself to indicating that these matters were under consideration and that no definite decisions had been taken. I did reiterate our continuing interest in strengthening the peaceful settlement procedures of the UN as indicated in a number of speeches given recently by Ambassador Stevenson and Department spokesmen.

3. SYG. In response to my statement that the question of the election of a Secretary-General would arise this fall, Mr. Kornienko said that “Mr. Thant had not fulfilled the hopes they had regarding him.” Mr. Kornienko cited in particular Thant’s failure to meet regularly with his “cabinet of under-secretaries.” Mr. Kornienko affirmed that one of the purposes of receiving Thant in Moscow in August is to give Mr. Khrushchev the opportunity to have a personal look at the Acting Secretary-General.

4. UN Financing. I pointed out that a key issue this fall will be the question of UN financing. Assuming a favorable Court decision indicating that peace-keeping expenses would be mandatory obligations on the part of the members of the UN, I asked Mr. Kornienko what the USSR position would be. Mr. Kornienko was non-committal, saying that the USSR would not wish to indicate in advance what peace-keeping operations it would support. He indicated USSR willingness to support peace-keeping operations decided upon by the UN “in accordance with the Charter.” He expressed dissatisfaction with the UN operation in the Congo. He held out very little hope that the Russians would support putting UN finances on a more firm footing.

5. Disarmament. I asked whether he felt that disarmament would be considered at the fall session. Mr. Kornienko said historically the USSR has always felt that the Assembly should consider disarmament each year. However, he indicated that whether they would favor a discussion at the Assembly would depend on whether any progress was being made in Geneva. I asked whether this would not also depend on whether or not the USSR had resumed testing by that time. Mr. Kornienko smiled and said “Yes it would” and that if they resumed testing by that time they would be less anxious for a discussion in the Assembly, but that we would be more favorable to such a debate.

6. Hungary. Mr. Kornienko expressed the hope that we would not once again press the Hungarian issue at the GA this fall since it was only an irritant to US–USSR relations. I pointed out that Hungary, after so many years, had yet to fulfill any of the objectives of the innumerable UN resolutions adopted on this matter and that its complete disregard of the UN resolutions made it difficult for this question to be removed from the agenda.

7. Laos. Mr. Kornienko had received, as we had, the report of the provisional agreement on the new Laotian Government under Souvanna Phouma. He limited himself to saying that the USSR was cooperating with the US to achieve a neutral Laos. He also contended, though mildly, that Communist China shares these objectives.

8. Geneva Conference. Mr. Kornienko said that the American press had made much too much of the Soviet reversal on the war propaganda resolution. He said it was just a case of second thoughts on their part. He then went on to say that it would have been foolish for an agreement to have been achieved on this matter between the US and USSR while “the US was putting troops into Thailand.” He said the climate was not propitious for such an agreement.

9. Walter Lippmann. I asked Mr. Kornienko if he had any observations regarding the Lippmann telecast last week and Lippmann’s writings that the balance of force had changed in favor of the West over the past year and a half. Mr. Kornienko did not understand on what basis Lippmann was making this evaluation. He said such an evaluation could be dangerous if it led the American people to think that the US has overwhelming strength and therefore could take greater risks in its diplomatic dealings with the USSR. I indicated to Mr. Kornienko that we realize that this was no time for rash action on the part of any of the principal powers. I expressed the hope that the USSR would avoid incautious action in Berlin. Mr. Kornienko said he wished to stress that the USSR cannot “put on ice” the Berlin question indefinitely. The situation is risky and dangerous, and that while the matter can be kept on ice for a while, the dangers and risks increase if the situation continues. He reaffirmed the desirability of continuing the talks.

10. Stevenson-Zorin Talks. The luncheon concluded with Mr. Kornienko commenting “as a personal suggestion” the desirability of Stevenson and Zorin having full discussions before the opening of the 17th General Assembly so that some of the key items could be discussed beforehand.

Joseph J. Sisco²

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, 611.61/7–1962. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Sisco on June 13. Assistant Secretary Cleveland referred this memorandum to Secretary Rusk under cover of a July 19 memorandum. (Ibid.)
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.