Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

177. Notes on Discussions¹

Hyannis Port, August 5, 1961.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Strategy in the 16th General Assembly

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson
• Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Special Assistant to the President
• Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State

The two discussions, one in the middle of the day and one late in the afternoon, were based on the background papers transmitted to the President by the Acting Secretary of State on Friday, August 4,² and particularly on two of these:

1. U.S. Initiatives in the 16th General Assembly, and

2. Tab B: Predictable Major Issues in the 16th General Assembly of the United Nations.

The general plan of action proposed in these papers was to prepare now for a possible Presidential speech to the General Assembly during the General Debate. The theme of this speech, which would be echoed in many other statements made in the course of the Assembly, would be the United States interest in the building of international institutions. One subhead under this theme would be an outline of the new U.S. disarmament plan and other sub-heads might be the building of a more effective administrative and financial arrangement for a UN action in the peace-and-security field; a further specification of U.S. international space policy, following the statements made by the President in his Inaugural Address and in his policy statement of July 24;³ and an initiative in the field of economic development of the less-developed countries.

The President indicated that an opening initiative at the General Assembly in this general field was appropriate. He deferred a decision on whether he would himself come up to the Assembly during the first few days of the session; he agreed with the staff recommendation that we should do our planning in such a way as to avoid encouraging other Chiefs of Government and Chiefs of State to heighten by their presence the sense of excitement and the opportunities for direct policy conflicts. The staff work on the General Assembly initiatives will therefore proceed on the working assumption that either Secretary Rusk or Ambassador Stevenson will make the opening speech in the General Debate, with the possibility left open that the President might later decide to make it himself.

The President has designated Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., as the person on the White House staff to keep in touch with all the planning for the General Assembly.

In the following summary report, the Action Office is listed after the pertinent paragraph.

Disarmament

The presently contemplated procedure was outlined for the President:

1. Bilaterals (Ambassador Stevenson complained about their prolongation).

2. A section of the Presidential speech devoted to disarmament.

3. Follow-up speech by Secretary Rusk or Ambassador Stevenson.

4. Ambassador Stevenson thinks there should, in the meantime, be public reference to the U.S. interest in disarmament.

5. Negotiations transferred to the Disarmament Commission.

Possible “polemicists” to represent the United States in the Disarmament Commission were discussed, but no conclusion was reached.

On substance, the President questions whether the United States will really give power to a UN dominated by less-developed countries. Stage III is too subject to description as “World Government”, Mr. Schlesinger thought.

Ambassador Stevenson thinks it is very important for the United States to be for disarmament in a very positive way. We must take the initiative on this and put the Soviets on the defensive.

Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Cleveland argued these two points of view are readily reconcilable: an attractive vision of Utopia must be featured, but it must not be confused with practical next steps or be regarded as related in some way to next year’s Defense budget.

The President said he knew little about the background of previous disarmament negotiations; he wanted to get Ambassador Stevenson’s views, and also the Pentagon’s, on the McCloy draft of July 28, 1961.⁴ He (a) stressed the importance of the “open society” theme, (b) thought we had a big advantage over the Soviets in any debate or negotiation because we can really take a tough inspection system, and (c) was interested in staff opinion that disarmament is a big issue in domestic politics of a good many other countries, but didn’t think it was much of an issue here. Ambassador Stevenson demurred, based on the experience of using the disarmament issue as a major theme in political campaigns.

In a discussion of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as a related matter, the United States agenda item and the probable Indian item were also touched on. Mr. Schlesinger suggested we take up Ambassador Thompson’s proposal to make a big thing of banning “fall-out tests” (which are readily detectable) by a UNGA resolution-presumably after having beaten down an uninspected ban on underground tests as well.

Action: Ambassador Stevenson is to review the McCloy document, say what he thinks should be done in the UN on disarmament, and recommend the best tactics for doing it. The White House will also solicit Defense Department comments.

Action: USUN, D

2. Peace and Security

Mr. Cleveland described the Peace and Security proposal, related it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff paper⁵ and the Congo operation. The President said it was all right to develop it as an initiative, with proper interdepartmental consultation.

3. Outer Space

Mr. Cleveland described this proposal, and indicated objections raised to it. The President raised the following questions: Can we follow through (analogy with President Eisenhower’s Atoms-for-Peace and African projects)? On meteorological satellites, can we protect against the Soviets using the UN to criticize satellite picture-taking as high-level espionage? In general, can we protect military uses? The President said it was okay to develop the proposal in interdepartmental discussions by floating our paper.

Action: IO, S/AE

4. UN Development Authority

Mr. Cleveland described the general ideas of UNDA. Ambassador Stevenson stressed the importance, and indicated his acceptance of change from proposal for $1 billion of additive aid money. The President said to work up a proposal on this.

Action: S/B with IO and ICA.

Related Matter—U.S. Item on Africa

Mr. Cleveland described the status of this item (including target dates). The President doesn’t want to carry forward in this form, picking up and making good on an Eisenhower initiative. Ambassador Stevenson thought we should somehow challenge the Russians to join in the development of Africa through multilateral channels.

Mr. Cleveland suggested that we try to get out of the “Africa item” with a simple resolution declaring the development of Africa to be a good thing, and calling on all the nations to help. Also perhaps an exhortation to plan self-help and mutual help. Then we could develop the capacity of the Economic Commission for Europe to help in planning and pre-investment activities, using the strength of the Special Fund-UNDA for the purpose. We might then unilaterally earmark some money for projects receiving the UN’s seal of approval through the participation in their development of the E.C.A. and, where they exist, the UN resident representatives in Africa.

Ambassador Stevenson indicated he would like to study the whole question of the Africa item further before making firm recommendations on how to handle it in the 16th General Assembly.

Action: USUN

Chinese Representation

Ascertain by intensive consultations (in New York and through diplomatic channels at government level around the world) what proposition can command a majority vote in the General Assembly.

Action: IO

Including an explicit arrangement with the French Africans as to their affirmative action on ChiRep if we are able to get Mauritania’s membership application past the Soviet veto in the Security Council.

Action: USUN

Proposition to be floated will include two elements for a start:

a. the procedural proposition that ejecting the Chinese Nationalists or seating the Chicoms requires a two-thirds General Assembly vote as an “important” matter. (Watch out for pitfall of two-thirds requirement for acceptance of GRC credentials.)

b. the procedural step of establishing a committee of the Assembly to study Chinese representation in the context of proposals for enlarging the Councils. (Composition of such a committee would, of course, be highly important, and should reflect the relative strength in the General Assembly of the Peking recognizers (33) and the Taipei recognizers (49).)

Ambassador Stevenson gave his opinion that these propositions would not be sufficient, and that something like the successor state idea should not be in the picture.

The President said he realized the committee or any other means of postponement might only lead in time—next year, perhaps—to a Two-China proposal or even to CHICOM admission in some form. But he wanted to avoid taking any major step along this road this year. He also was determined that the United States was not to be defeated on this issue in the United Nations. Based on discussions with Chen Chang this past week, the President fears that Chiang Kai-shek may be in what Mr. Schlesinger called a “gotterdammerung” mood, ready to pull the house down on himself—and on us in the process. Nevertheless, we had to keep on trying to persuade him that in the interest of protecting his UN seat (a national interest of the U.S. as well as of the GRC) some tactical adjustments would be required as we went along. One notable adjustment is the non-use of the GRC veto on the admission of Outer Mongolia.

The President wants to send a letter to Chiang this next week on this matter. Chiang’s friends in this country, notably Roy Howard and Henry Luce, should also be enlisted in this effort of persuasion.

Action: FE

Other Issues in the United Nations

An item-by-item run-through of Tab B in the documentation (“Predictable Major Issues in the 16th General Assembly of the United Nations”) produced these Presidential reactions that should be taken into account in preparing for the 16th General Assembly:

Security Council Election. The President asked whether anything needed to be done to get Guatemala to step aside in favor of a more widely acceptable LA candidate; he was informed that at present the danger of Cuba and Guatemala being the only candidates had been greatly reduced by the emergence of Venezuela with strong support from the LAs.

Committee Chairmanships. The President was informed that Roa (Cuba) was a candidate for Chairman of Committee Two (Economic Affairs), with the apparent support of Brazil and Mexico. He thought we should discuss the matter seriously with Mexico in view of Brazil’s commitment, and our own, to sensible progress in international economic development.

Action: IO

Membership. While no decision was recommended at this stage on just how to vote when the Mongolia-Mauretania issue comes up in the Security Council, the President did not exclude the option of voting for the Mongolia application if we could be assured that as a consequence the French Africans would stand with us on Chinese representation.

Angola and Apartheid in South Africa. The President thought it served our purposes well to vote for criticisms of repressive policies, but thought the application of sanctions in such cases was unrealistic, improbable, and probably ineffective. The possibility was noted that another Congo-type operation might be required if Angola blows up in the near future.

The Congo. The President indicated his gratification at the turn of events in the Congo.

Algeria. We will presumably resist efforts to drag the Algerian issue back into the United Nations as long as there are any possibilities of achieving a settlement through direct French-FLN negotiations.

Tibet. Ambassador Stevenson expressed the opinion that the legal grounds for objection to China’s action in taking over the administration of Tibet were relatively weak.

Korea. Ambassador Stevenson described the device used in the Resumed Session to frustrate the proposal that the North Koreans be heard by insisting they would then be bound by whatever action was taken by the UN. The President asked whether there was any thought of making South Korea a member of the UN, and was advised that to do so would spark an offsetting application from North Korea. To admit North Korea too would fly in the face of a long history of UN exhortations to bring about a unified Korea, and would also create a dangerous precedent for Germany and Berlin.

Vietnam. The President indicated his question on South Korea was provoked by considering whether South Vietnam could not be brought into the UN actions (some form of “presence” was mentioned in the discussion) that might help meet the actuality of large-scale indirect aggression in South Vietnam.

Hungary. During the day it developed that three of the President’s sisters were planning a trip to Poland and Yugoslavia that might include a short visit to Hungary. In view of the present plans for a trip to Hungary by Frederick Boland of Ireland to try to clear up the “Hungarian item”, and the involvement in the problem of the issue of religious prisoners, a question was raised about the inclusion of Hungary in the itinerary. A State Department opinion on the mater is requested.⁶

Target Dates for Self-determination. The President expressed a lively interest in the Interior Department’s plans for speeding up the development of United States dependencies and the U.S. Trust Territory in the Pacific. He was informed that State, Interior and Defense were considering together how best to bring the issue of self-determination to a head, and asked to be informed soon of the Departments’ conclusions in this regard.

Berlin

In a discussion of the UN aspects of the Berlin problem, the President asked Ambassador Stevenson to give some thought to the idea that a UN-supervised referendum might be held in West Berlin—a suggestion which had been canvassed with the Secretary before he left for Paris. The first reaction of Ambassador Stevenson was that such a referendum might better be proposed for the whole of Berlin including the Eastern Zone. (Signal to this discussion is in Secto 18, August 7, 1961.)⁷

Action: GER, IO, and USUN.

The President gave Ambassador Stevenson his copy of the latest report on Berlin strategy by Mr. Dean Acheson,⁸ and asked him to study it and give the President his considered reaction.

Action: USUN

Mr. Cleveland said the Acheson memorandum reflected to some extent the suggestions in an IO memo which had been discussed in Ambassador Stevenson’s absence with Ambassador Yost and other members of the USUN staff; however, the timing of “going to the UN” on Berlin is still subject to some discussion within the Department.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, Arthur M. Schlesinger Papers, UN Speeches, 8/2/61–8/11/61, Box WH22. Confidential. Prepared by Harlan Cleveland.
2. See Document 174 and footnotes 2 and 4 thereto.
3. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 1–3 and 529–531.
4. Presumably a reference to McCloy’s proposal for a conclusion to U.S.-Soviet discussions and the convening of the UN Disarmament Commission.
5. Not further identified.
6. Referred to S/S-Mr. Battle for action, August 7, 1961. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, 762.00/8–761)
8. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Document 89.