116. U.S. Information Agency Background Paper1

THE “PRESTIGE POLLS” ISSUE

The mission of the U. S. Information Agency is to inform and influence peoples abroad.

If we are ignorant of public opinion abroad, we have to shoot in the dark. With these two facts in mind, the Office of Research and Analysis has sought to refine the assessments of popular opinions and attitudes.

We know that an accurate measure of the opinions of a people cannot be obtained by diplomatic reporting, press analysis, or other traditional research methods. These methods measure opinions of special groups and measure the opinions subjectively.

Public opinion polls or surveys can, however, measure objectively the opinions of a whole population.

This is not to say that we need only the public opinion polls. Although increasingly precise, survey data cannot be taken as the last word but must be weighed along with all other types of evidence to produce a comprehensive assessment.

As our reports concerning world public opinion measurements grew more comprehensive and more incisive, the demand for more and more pointed reports followed. Since those reports were expected to remain within the executive family of the government in order to help guide government programs, we had no trepidation about calling the shots as we saw them. Objective analysis, we felt, provided the only justification for the exercise. Unfortunately, these reports got caught in the domestic political line of fire. Now there is some thought that to avoid future difficulties, we might discontinue these surveys. Several factors discount this easy solution.

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1)
Our difficulties highlight a major governmental problem, the “security” system. At the root of this problem is the difficulty of deciding, under heavy pressure, precisely which facts and conclusions can be made public or must be kept within the governmental family. Once a decision is made that a report is a security matter, it should remain secure. If it doesn’t remain secure, this is the fault of the security system.
2)
Public opinion surveys conducted by USIA are an essential part of the intelligence-gathering mechanism of the U.S. Government. All government intelligence estimates, including public opinion assessments, have to be made on the assumption that the resultant product is for government guidance rather than for public print. If USIA surveys were taken out of this intelligence complex and released to the public, the picture would be incomplete and could be distorted.
3)
The USIA survey mechanism has been made available by former Director Allen to other departments and agencies of the government to collect facts of particular interest to them. Through arrangements with the Bureau of the Budget, other users can reimburse the Agency. This arrangement means that more comprehensive surveys can be run with proportionately less cost to the cooperating agencies. The first such survey is being made in seven countries in Latin America and it will provide data for a specific National Intelligence Estimate on the situation in that crucial area.
4)
President Kennedy has committed himself to fully and frankly inform the American people. He has implied not that a particular report or series of reports must be automatically released or discontinued but he and his authorized spokesmen will, after considering all the evidence, report to the people through public pronouncements. A more comprehensive research program is possible now for several reasons. Research techniques have improved considerably in recent years. Coincident with this development the Agency has established a survey research mechanism which extends to all parts of the world. Moreover, this mechanism has gained enough experience to move ahead with confidence.

A comprehensive research program cannot confirm or revolutionize the information program in a single year. A build-up is necessary. In three years, however, a comprehensive research program could go a long way toward guiding, supplying, and evaluating the information program.

This program can enable us to know more about the basic aspirations of the people we are trying to reach. It can give us concrete indicators of the current climate of opinion. With this basic knowledge, it can determine the target “influentials” we have to work through and it [Page 228] can tell us the most effective communications channels to use. Finally the program of the future will provide more facts, objective facts, for evaluation of Agency programs and products.

Most USIA surveys are omnibus surveys. In addition to public opinion questions, they include questions on communications habits (how they learn and from what media), on reaction to specific USIA programs and products, and other incidental information.

The new frontiers around the world are immense. Rather than reduce any intelligence-gathering mechanism, we should seize and exploit all techniques for learning more, particularly in the field of human relations.

USIA has proved the survey technique. It should be brought to full flower.

  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA Files: FRC 68 A 1415, FOIA/Classified Folder. Confidential. Attached to a memorandum from Oren Stevens of USIA’s Office of Research and Analysis to USIA Director-designate Edward R. Murrow, February 1, 1961, when Murrow and the rest of USIA were turning their attention to the proper scope, utility, and classification of their foreign opinion analytical products.