107. Editorial Note
On February 4, 1963, James R. Killian, Jr., Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), sent President Kennedy a report based on the Board’s survey of intelligence coverage, assessment, and reporting by U.S. intelligence agencies prior to the Cuban missile crisis in the fall of 1962. The report was based on PFIAB’s review of intelligence on the Soviet military buildup in Cuba during the months preceding the President’s report to the nation on October 22, 1962, on the Soviet establishment of offensive missile sites in Cuba. The February 4 PFIAB report was signed for the Board by Killian as Chairman, and included the names of the other Board members, William O. Baker, Clark Clifford, James Doolittle, Gordon Gray, Edwin H. Land, William L. Langer, Robert D. Murphy, and Frank Pace, Jr. Killian transmitted the report under cover of a shorter separate memorandum to President Kennedy, also dated February 4, 1963. The texts of the report and covering memorandum are in Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, and also printed in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pages 361–371. Documentation on the crisis is in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XI.
The PFIAB report noted by way of introduction that the Board’s review “sought to determine whether there were lessons to be learned from an objective appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. foreign intelligence experience as disclosed by the Cuba experience. We directed particular attention to those areas of the intelligence process which are concerned with such matters as (1) the acquisition of intelligence, (2) the analysis of intelligence, and (3) the production and dissemination of intelligence reports and estimates in support of national policy formulation and operational requirements.”
The report discussed the U–2 reconnaissance overflights of Cuba from October 14, 1962, onward that provided photographic evidence the Soviet Union had begun to establish a strategic missile complex in Cuba. The report noted that “the definitive photographic evidence [Page 212] obtained as a result of the October 14 and subsequent overflights of Cuba were promptly processed and submitted to the President in time for decisive action before the Soviet MRBM and IRBM systems became fully operational. Beginning with the President’s initial receipt of this crucial intelligence there was an effective performance on the part of the U.S. intelligence community in providing the President and his top policy advisers promptly with the coordinated intelligence necessary to enable our Government to respond effectively to the offensive missile threat in Cuba.”
With respect to the period prior to October 14, 1962, the report concluded that “our foreign intelligence effort should have been more effective in (1) obtaining adequate and timely intelligence as to the nature and scope of the Soviet military build-up as it developed over a period of months, and (2) exploiting the available intelligence as a basis for estimating Soviet and Cuban plans and intentions.”
On the subject of intelligence acquisition, the report found that “clandestine agent coverage within Cuba was inadequate,” and that “full use was not made of aerial photographic surveillance, particularly during September and October when the influx of Soviet military personnel and armaments had reached major proportions.” With respect to aerial photographic surveillance of Cuba, the report found that “the President granted authorization for all U–2 flights which were recommended to him by his policy advisers on the Special Group having responsibility for such matters.” But until October 3, “it appears that there was a failure on the part of the intelligence community as a whole to propose to the Special Group U–2 reconnaissance missions on a scale commensurate with the nature and intensity of the Soviet activity in Cuba.”
With respect to the issue of intelligence analysis, the report found a “need for improvement of the processes used in making national intelligence estimates and the processes used in making current intelligence analysis, and also in the techniques for relating these two functions.” The report noted that “the President and policy-advisory officials were ill served by the Special National Intelligence Estimate issued by the intelligence community on September 19, on ‘The Military Buildup in Cuba.’” This Estimate “pointed away from the likelihood of the establishment of Soviet nuclear missile systems in Cuba.”
The report found that “in the analysis of intelligence indicators and in the production of current intelligence reports, the intelligence community failed to get across to key Government officials the most accurate possible picture of what the Soviets might be up to in Cuba, during the months preceding October 14.” The report further stated: “We believe that the near-total intelligence surprise experienced by the United States with respect to the introduction and deployment of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba resulted in large part from a malfunction of the analytic [Page 213] process by which intelligence indicators are assessed and reported. This malfunction diminished the effectiveness of policy advisers, national intelligence estimators, and civilian and military officers having command responsibilities.” The report continued: “We believe that the manner in which intelligence indicators were handled in the Cuba situation may well be the most serious flaw in our intelligence system, and one which, if uncorrected, could lead to the gravest consequences.”
In its review of the intelligence reporting process, the Board found that “limitations which were placed on the publication and dissemination of reports and information concerning the situation in Cuba were either misinterpreted or misapplied. This inhibited the flow of significant data.” With respect to the subject of emergency planning, the Board noted that the Cuban missile crisis “points up the need for advance planning to ensure that our human and material intelligence resources are sufficient, and are adequately organized, to meet the demands of an emergency such as that which confronted our Government in this instance.”
On February 23, 1963, Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone sent a memorandum to President Kennedy commenting on the PFIAB report of February 4. McCone indicated that in appearances before the Board on November 7, December 9, and December 28, 1962, he had stated that “there was an understandable reluctance or timidity in programming U–2 overflights over Cuba after we had discovered the presence of surface-to-air missile installations. This caution was understandable not only because of the extremely severe criticism of ‘U–2 incidents’” dating from the downing of a U–2 aircraft piloted by Francis Gary Powers over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960 (see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, volume X, Part 1), and the more recent loss of a Chinese Nationalist-piloted U–2 over Sakhalin on September 9, 1962 (see ibid., 1961–1963, volume XXII, Document 154).
McCone noted that “for two years the intelligence community had been surfeited with reports of ‘missiles in Cuba,’ all of which proved to be incorrect prior to those which we received on or about September 20.” McCone stated: “I continue to feel that the intelligence community performed well. I have examined this performance personally and in depth, and incidentally with a critical eye. As you know, my own views differed from those of the community. I believe that the conclusions reached from my study made for the Board at your request reflect a more reasonable judgment of the performance of the intelligence community in the six months’ period prior to the October crisis.” McCone attached his conclusions, which read in full as follows:
- “1. Although the intelligence community’s inquiry into its actions during the Cuban crisis revealed certain areas where shortcomings existed and where improvements should be made in various areas of intelligence collection and processing, the intelligence community operated [Page 214] extensively and well in connection with Cuba. Every major weapons system introduced into Cuba by the Soviets was detected, identified, and reported (with respect to numbers, location and operational characteristics) before any one of these systems attained an operational capability.
- “2. A relatively short period of time ensued between the introduction of strategic weapons into Cuba, particularly strategic missiles, and the commencement of the flow, although meager, of tangible reports of their presence; detection of their possible presence and targeting of the suspect areas of their location was accomplished in a compressed time frame; and the intelligence cycle did move with extraordinary rapidity through the stages of collection, analysis, targeting for verification, and positive identification.
- “3. The very substantial effort directed toward Cuba was originated by an earlier concern with the situation in Cuba and the effort, already well under way, contributed to the detection and analysis of the Soviet build-up.
- “4. Information was disseminated and used.
- “5. Aerial photography was very effective and our best means of establishing hard intelligence.
- “6. The procedures adopted in September delayed photographic intelligence, but this delay was not critical, because photography obtained prior to about 17 October would not have been sufficient to warrant action of a type which would require support from Western Hemisphere [or?] NATO allies.
- “7. Agent reports helped materially; however, none giving significant information on offensive missiles reached the intelligence community or policy-makers until after mid-September. When received, they were used in directing aerial photography.
- “8. Some restrictions were placed on dissemination of information, but there is no indication that these restrictions necessarily affected analytical work or actions of policy-makers.
- “9. The 19 September estimate, while indicating the improbability that the Soviet Union would place MRBM’s and IRBM’s in Cuba, did state that ‘this contingency must be examined carefully, even though it would run counter to current Soviet policy’; the estimators in preparing the 19 September estimate gave great weight to the philosophical argument concerning Soviet intentions and thus did not fully weigh the many indicators.
- “10. The estimate of 19 October on probable Soviet reactions was correct.”
The Report from McCone to Kennedy, February 28, 1963, is in the Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A; it is also printed in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pages 373–376.