104. Memorandum of Conversation1

Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Robert S. Amory, Chief, International Division, Bureau of the Budget, 4:30 P.M., 26 Sept.

1.
The first part of the discussion concerned itself with the role of the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) in respect to coordination and guidance. While Mr. Amory did not claim any responsibility for “policy” he nevertheless asserted a keen interest in “management.” He indicated that BOB intended to be much more active with regard to the intelligence community in general than has been the case in the past. He referred to some reorganization which had taken place in the BOB which had made his office the focal point for foreign intelligence matters with the exception of certain military functions.
2.
I asked whether he could speak on behalf of the BOB with respect to the role of the DCI in “coordination and guidance matters.” Mr. Amory replied that he could speak not only for himself but could also repeat Mr. Bell’s often asserted views. He said that they took very seriously the President’s Directive to the DCI and supported it fully, including the aspect of a “Chief Intelligence Officer” for the Government.
3.
Mr. Amory went on to say that in the last eight or nine months he and others in BOB had been very much concerned at the lack of movement in respect to coordination. He said he had felt that there had been a good deal of fanfare earlier this year about a more positive role for the DCI but that results had been disappointing. He acknowledged that the DCI had been faced with a number of things which had necessarily complicated and delayed certain actions. He expressed the hope that Mr. McCone as DCI would pursue a different approach than his predecessor in respect to devoting an excessive amount of his time to operating details of CIA. I reminded him of the delegations to General Carter.
4.
I asked Mr. Amory whether if he or any others in the BOB at any time believed that the DCI was not performing his proper role, it would not be appropriate for such feeling to be communicated to the DCI. Mr. Amory agreed that this was a necessary course and indicated that this process exists largely through the staff. I then pressed him for specifics with respect to his allegation about lack of movement. He said that one example he had in mind was the failure to act in USIB with respect to the elimination of service members and the complete substitution therefor [Page 207] of the Director of DIA. He spoke in detail of postponements and indicated that his grapevine led him to believe that a new postponement was about to take place. He pointed out the budgetary implications in terms of personnel. He said that it was alleged that General Carroll could not properly represent Defense until he had sufficient competent personnel which would come from the services. On the other hand the services are not willing to give up personnel supporting them in their respective memberships on USIB. He left me with the impression that budget projections for 1964 did not reflect a firm decision to proceed with the personnel transfers.
5.
I asked Mr. Amory whether he was concerned about the relationships between the DCI, the Secretary of Defense and Mr. Rubel with respect to NSA affairs. Mr. Amory adverted to the familiar conflict between departmental and national intelligence requirements and between military and other general requirements. [9 lines of source text not declassified]
6.
I then asked him what he conceived to be the role of the DCI in respect to these matters including projections of large increases in NSA personnel and budget. He acknowledged that the DCI has no command function but asserted that it was a DCI responsibility to make certain of the proper allocation of resources. As to NSA, Mr. Amory believes that Mr. Rubel has made great strides from the management point of view. I pointed out to him that by Mr. Rubel’s own statement, he was devoting no more than ten to fifteen percent of his own time to NSA matters which I felt was quite inadequate. Mr. Amory agreed that it was inadequate.
7.
When I pressed Mr. Amory further about how he felt the DCI could exercise his responsibility in this area especially in the light of the fact that the DIA has no real relationship to NSA, he only could suggest a close working relationship between Mr. Rubel and his associates on the one hand and Mr. Cline, Mr. Sheldon and perhaps others on the other hand.
8.
Mr. Amory indicated that in his area he was responsible for about eight billion dollars expended in the foreign field. He said that it was his view as well as the view of Mr. Bell, Mr. Sorensen, Professor Schlesinger and others of the New Frontier in the White House that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was an excessive proportion of this overseas expenditure. He said further that there was a determination that the proportionate amount spent on intelligence would have to be reduced. [3 lines of source text not declassified] In the discussion on this point he made several cost comparisons which reflected his impression that the intelligence effort was receiving a disproportionate allocation of resources. I pointed out to Mr. Amory that he was trying to equate things which could not be equated and that I questioned this approach.
9.
I sought to bring the conversation back to specific roles. I posed as an example the possibility that the technical services of the army might be performing estimating and production chores which were in duplication of other efforts in the community. I asked Mr. Amory whether the budget process was not perhaps the best vehicle for detecting and eliminating such unnecessary duplication. He replied it was very difficult to identify people in the military with the size of the establishment and its budget and with only about 50 people in the BOB concerning themselves with the Defense Department.
10.
In closing the conversation I again repeated that it would be only fair for him and his associates to report to the DCI any failures or omissions which they felt they had detected. I said I felt there had been enough general talk about failure of coordination and unless allegations in this regard were made on the basis of specific instances, general talk only complicated the problems of the DCI. Mr. Amory did not take issue with this point of view.
G.G.
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Gordon Gray Papers. Secret. Prepared by Gordon Gray on September 27.