Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

424. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)⁰

Washington, September 24, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Laos—The Troop Withdrawal Question

As you requested, we have examined both (1) recent evidence tending to indicate Communist intentions toward troop withdrawal in Laos; and (2) the implications of these intentions for our own decision on withdrawal.¹

Military Position in Laos

1. There is still no hard evidence on Viet Minh troop withdrawal except for 15 Viet Minh “technicians” certified to the ICC. Truck convoys and the Soviet airlift continue to operate into communist areas in Laos. Whether they are evacuating, regrouping, or resupplying is a matter of conjecture. Minor skirmishes continue.

2. Publicly, the communists continue to insist that no Viet Minh combat forces are present in Laos. Privately, both Souphanouvong and Quinim admit that there are, but say to US officials that the Viet Minh will be out before October 7. Souvanna takes the same position.

3. U.S. army intelligence estimates that since late July covert withdrawals may have reduced Viet Minh forces in Laos from around 9,000 to perhaps 7,500. Of the 11 Viet Minh battalions previously accepted, two are presumed to have returned to North Vietnam from the north and central parts of Laos. Two more battalions from the central area are believed to have retired to the eastern edge of Laos near the Keo Neua and Mu Gia passes. (This would leave elements of one battalion in the Nam Tha-Muong Sai area in the north; one battalion in Sam Neua province in the northeast; three battalions in the Plain of Jars; and two battalions in southern Laos along the infiltration routes into South Vietnam.)

4. There are indications that Viet Minh units in central Laos may be pulling back from their advance positions and regrouping. These preparations would permit either rapid withdrawal (within 10 days to two weeks) or merely concealment.

5. Since it takes about two weeks for information to filter in, it will be difficult to reach a firm judgment on how many Viet Minh remain until some time after the deadline on October 7.

Probable Communist Position

1. Our memorandum of August 28 suggested that the communists probably plan to pursue their goal—control of Laos—primarily through political means and generally within the Geneva terms as conceived in elastic, i.e. communist, dimensions. Even if they do not contemplate resorting to military means, the communists probably still wish to maintain a military position in Laos—to backstop the Lao Communists in intra-government negotiations; to guard against a possible coup by Phoumi; to provide military pressure for possible use in the future; and to safeguard strategic interests in Laos including the corridor to South Viet Nam.

2. The Viet Minh are the military backbone of the Pathet Lao and the shock troops in attack. Equally important is their political role. They ensure that the “correct” line is propagated in the countryside and uphold North Vietnamese interests and status in communist councils. At least for Souphanouvong and Ho Chi Minh, then, there are very good reasons for retaining the maximum number of Viet Minh in Laos and we have no reason to believe the Peiping and Moscow Communists see the local situation much differently. At the same time it is probably true that Moscow is more willing than the Asian Communists to subordinate these local interests to broader questions—most importantly that of Soviet-US relations.²

3. Whatever differences may exist between Moscow and its Asian partners, they probably both agree that the situation in Laos does not call for either withdrawing completely or completely refusing to withdraw. They probably envision a flexible and phased policy, facilitated by the complex nature of the North Vietnamese presence in Laos,³ the rugged terrain and the low population density in the parts of Laos they hold, and the ease with which personnel can pass undetected across the border with North Vietnam.

4. We judge that the final communist decision on withdrawal of their military forces from Laos may not yet have been made. We believe this decision will be based on a communist assessment of how much they can get away with without either stirring up a military confrontation with the United States or incurring unacceptable political costs on charges of violating agreements. We also believe they will try to avoid a military confrontation so long as there is no direct threat to the frontiers of North Viet Nam and Communist China.

5. If the foregoing is correct, it follows that the primary element in the communist assessment will be the evidence that the United States and other Geneva signatories will take steps to offset communist non-compliance. Such evidence would presumably strengthen the Soviet Union in pressing for greater compliance with the Geneva Agreements—since, as we have said, the Soviet Union, unlike its Asian Communist partners, has interests in other parts of the world that it considers of greater importance.

Conclusions

1. On present evidence there is reason to believe that the communists will not have fully complied with the withdrawal provisions of the Geneva Accords by October 7. The degree to which the communists will have complied will depend on a compromise assessment within the bloc as to the proper balance between the requirements for Viet Minh support in Laos and the risks of unacceptable military or political consequence. The communists, particularly the USSR, will put a high premium on securing US withdrawal from Laos and on avoiding a strong and credible charge that they have violated the Geneva Accords.

2. Our strategic interest in Laos, we take it, is to keep the Mekong lowlands out of communist hands. For the moment, at least, the best means to this end still appears to be an effective government of national union. The following are therefore essential: (a) to secure a maximum—if possible, complete—Viet Minh withdrawal; (b) to keep Souvanna on our side in this issue; and (c) to discourage Phoumi from rash actions that would jeopardize the government and invite communist military action.

Implications for US Policy

1. Moscow is our best avenue of pressure on the communists. But the analysis above suggests that Moscow will increase pressure on its Asian colleagues only if it believes that it must in order to avoid either a military confrontation with the US or unacceptable political costs. Therefore, expressions of concern from our side that are not supported by something that would give the USSR grounds for concern, seem unlikely to have much impact.

2. To spur Soviet concern over the possible political costs of the Viet Minh remaining in Laos, it would be most effective if we could bring forward hard and publishable evidence. For technical reasons this would be difficult to do, especially before October 7. However, in the meantime we could apply indirect pressures and at the same time prepare the ground for action after October 7 by the following actions:

(a) Arming Souvanna with such information and estimates as seem appropriate to the purpose of hardening his disposition to use the ICC for investigations after October 7.

(b) Imparting similar information to the Canadian (and perhaps the Indian) member of the ICC, together with specific suggestions for inspections after October 7.

(c) Discussing with Souvanna and the ICC the desirability of preparing a case to present before the UN should adequate inspection of suspect areas not be possible. Soviet knowledge of these discussions would presumably provide Moscow with additional cause for concern, and we do not believe that this would be taken lightly at this time, given Khrushchev’s avowed intention to resume pressure on the Berlin issue and his apparent hope of meeting with President Kennedy, both developments to occur following the November elections.

3. The above steps are designed to convince the communists that failure to withdraw the Viet Minh would be costly in political terms. Ultimately more effective than these, however, would be success in convincing them that failure to withdraw increases the risk of a direct military confrontation with the US. In our judgment there are two immediate courses of action open to us which might achieve this result.

(a) Withdrawal of MAAG Teams

One of these is to postpone further withdrawals of our MAAG teams and, if necessary, to hold them in Laos after October 7. To do so, however, would probably not of itself have much deterrent effect. The communists would probably calculate that they could afford to await further indications of our intentions, meanwhile wringing propaganda and political profit from our violation of the Geneva Accords. More important is Souvanna’s reaction. Unless we could win Souvanna’s approval—which is doubtful—our action would weaken his position in Laos and our influence with him. Given Souvanna’s keystone position, and the fact that his own stake in the withdrawal of foreign forces is so high, it is important to work with and through him. At the same time, keeping the MAAG teams in Laos would tend to encourage intransigence on the part of both Souphanouvong and Phoumi. Withdrawing them on schedule would avoid these risks.

If this course is adopted, it might be useful to emphasize our dissatisfaction by pulling the teams no farther back than Thailand for the time being. The possibility of their return to Laos unless the ICC were able to verify Viet Minh withdrawal would not be lost on the Communists.

(b) Strengthening the US Military Presence in Thailand

The second course of action tending to persuade the Communists that failure to withdraw increases the risk of a direct military confrontation with the US is strengthening our military position in Thailand—and especially if we make obvious preparations for this move prior to October 7. The action itself could be taken at such time and in such pattern as our intelligence judgments of the Viet Minh position indicated. Even the preparations for such a move, however, would probably have a strong impact not only in Moscow but also in Hanoi, which is concerned over the dangers of direct reprisal. To Souvanna, strengthening of the US position in Thailand should be preferable to maintaining a US military presence in Laos itself, and might even win his tacit approval. To Phoumi it would be welcome, and it might make him more tractable if he entertains coup ideas. To Sarit and Diem, it would be reassuring and perhaps positively helpful in the broader operation of our relations with each of them. To the American public and elsewhere it would help offset any impression of US supinity [sic] in the face of another communist failure to live up to commitments.

4. In sum, we believe that in pressing the communists for Viet Minh withdrawal we should choose the means likely to be most effective against the communists and least expensive to us in political and military terms. US approaches to Moscow should take place only in the context of other moves that would give weight to our words. However, the UK, as Geneva co-chairman, and possibly other Geneva signatories might well express their interest and concern in the withdrawal situation at any time before October 7, making the point that a serious US reaction could be expected. The timing of our own approach to Moscow might be either before or after October 7, if our back-up moves are in train. After October 7, however, seems more practical, given both the lags and the gaps in our intelligence and the need to maintain Souvanna’s alignment.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–2462. Secret; Noforn.
1. A forthcoming SNIE, due to be laid before USIB September 26, gives our overall estimate for Laos. See also my memorandum to you on August 28, “Communist Intentions in Laos.” [Footnote in the source text. Regarding the SNIE, see footnote 4, Document 425. Hilsman’s memorandum of August 28 is the attachment to Document 421.]
2. There is no direct evidence of a divergence of views among the Communists over withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Laos, but there is circumstantial evidence pointing in that direction. This includes Peiping’s earlier public admonitions against any weakening of communist military positions in Laos by accepting US proposals similar to those advanced by the 1946 Marshall Mission to China; private Chinese Communist concern as expressed in the Tibet documents over Soviet compromises in Laos; the differing tenor of Soviet as compared with Chinese Communist remarks last summer at the Geneva conference; and the sudden resumption in late August of Chinese Communist barbed remarks implicitly criticizing the Soviet Union for imposing its views on other countries in foreign and domestic affairs. Against this evidence of differing views, the announcement in September of additional Soviet aid to the DRV, Souphanouvong’s trip to Peiping and possibly Moscow, and Peng Chen’s scheduled visit to Hanoi take on added significance as possible indicators of continuing pulling and hauling among the communists. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. The North Vietnamese presence includes completely Viet Minh military units; mixed Viet Minh/Pathet Lao military units; Viet Minh “advisors” and military technicians attached to Pathet Lao and Kong Le military units; army engineers, civilian technicians and laborers engaged on such projects as road-building; and agents at the local level. [Footnote in the source text.]