Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

421. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, August 28, 1962.

1. The Laos review meeting you asked for will be at 4:00 p.m. in the Cabinet Room today. It will be run by Governor Harriman and those present in addition will be: Barney Koren (SEA Task Force), Roger Hilsman, State; Sy Janow, Assistant Administrator, and Jim Fowler, Deputy Administrator, Far East, AID; [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Paul Nitze, Admiral Heinz, and General Lucius Clay, Jr. (JCS Far East Planner), Defense.

2. The main point of the meeting will be to review the situation in Laos. Harriman and the others will present what is happening in Laos with respect to steps toward the integration of the government, the military situation, and whatever troop withdrawals we know about. They will be prepared to talk about our contingency plans in the event that things do not work out.

I think the general conclusion from our intelligence information is that it is much too soon to tell whether things are working out. I attach a copy of a memorandum from Hilsman indicating his views of where we are now. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

3. In addition to this general review, there are three decisions which you will be asked to make, all connected with aid matters. First, Harriman thinks it urgent that we agree to give a $2 million cash grant to Souvanna for August. This is $1 million less than we have been giving, and it will be the first aid we have given to Souvanna. It is part of the total of up to $10 million in cash grants you approved tentatively at the Laos aid review of August 15. Harriman’s view is that we must do something concrete to show we are supporting Souvanna and that this is the most practical thing to do now. Second, you will be asked to make a formal determination that we can sell our helicopters to the ICC. Everybody agrees that we should do this so that the ICC teams can get around. The French have agreed to be responsible for the operation and maintenance on these helicopters.

The third decision concerns the timing of our approach to Souvanna on aid.

4. In your last review of Laos aid policy, you instructed Harriman to approach the British and French for assistance and to defer discussion with Souvanna until we received a response from them. We have made approaches, both here and in their capitals, but responses are slow to come, partly because of the August vacation. Janow (AID) thinks it urgent that AID be authorized to initiate discussions with Souvanna on the aid program. We will make no final commitments until we know what we can expect from the British and French, but it is important to begin to indicate to Souvanna what our line of thought is.

Carl

[Attachment]

¹

Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)

Washington, August 28, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Communist Intentions in Laos

As requested, we have (1) examined recent reports coming out of Laos in an effort to assess possible Communist intentions; and, (2) attempted to explore the implications for United States policy of these intentions.

The Facts

Events and reports which should be considered in estimating Communist intentions include the following:

1. The Communists and the Pathet Lao continue to deny the presence of Viet Minh forces in Laos.² Although movements of Viet Minh personnel have been reported to include some withdrawals, there is no concrete evidence that Viet Minh combat forces have been evacuated from Laos in significant numbers. Nhommarath, which Souphanouvong offered as the only checkpoint in his area, is of little practical significance.

2. Truck convoys continue to move between North Vietnam and Pathet Lao areas. We do not know what they carry. The Soviet airlift has not yet been stopped, although there is evidence that at least its pattern may be changed.

3. Pathet Lao attacks continue against Meo “pockets.” Some minor Pathet Lao attacks against Phoumi’s forces have also taken place in Sayaboury Province, north of Luang Prabang, and in the Saravane-Attopeu area.

4. The Pathet Lao has restricted the movement of neutralists into its areas and, according to Phoumi, even Souvanna has not had complete freedom of movement. The cabinet on August 23 decided in principle on the freedom of movement throughout Laos by central government officials. Souphanouvong took the position, however, that some areas may be “inaccessible during the rainy season.”

5. In mid-July the Pathet Lao refused to allow a company of Phoumi’s troops for the integrated battalion to enter Khang Khay, although Phoumi had permitted the Pathet Lao and Kong Le companies to go to Luang Prabang for the integrated battalion there.

6. The cease-fire committee established by the Souvanna government on June 30 has not as yet reached agreement on provisions to govern the cease-fire.

7. Reports indicate that Chinese Communist troops may have been introduced into Phong Saly Province where the Chinese Communists are building a road.

Our Judgments

These tactics are consistent with an intention to prevent the formation of a true government of national union in effective control of all Laos. On the other hand, given the traditional pattern of Communist behavior, they are equally consistent with a Communist intention to pursue their goals within the Geneva framework as they conceive it.

We would not expect the Communists to cooperate fully in permitting each side to penetrate the other’s territory. Neither Hanoi nor Peiping can be expected to abandon Communist gains or to jeopardize them by admitting effective anti-Communist authority into areas they hold.

At the same time, however, the evidence so far available does not indicate that the Communists and in particular Moscow are ready to abandon the entire coalition principle. The pattern of past Communist negotiations at Panmunjom, Warsaw, Berlin, and elsewhere is to confront the West with prolonged intransigence and obstructionism in the hope of eroding resistance and winning cheap gains without provoking an unacceptable military response. When convinced that such a response may be in the offing or that public rupture of an agreement carries intolerable political costs, the Communists usually compromise their position so as to avoid either consequence.

If the Communists intend to pursue their objectives within the context of the Geneva accords, a limiting factor in their behavior is the importance of retaining Souvanna at the head of a government of national union. They must therefore calculate the degree to which their obstructionism threatens the willingness of Souvanna to continue to cooperate.

The interests of Moscow in issues much broader—and in their view more important—than Laos is also a limiting factor.

As to the attitude of the Chinese Communists, they may well be consolidating their logistic lines into Phong Saly, but their present area of suspected activity is so close to the Chinese border as to give no indication of offensive designs. Peiping’s cautious and defensive stand along the Taiwan Strait and the Indian border makes it unlikely that the Chinese Communists will push the Pathet Lao into resuming hostilities.

In sum, we believe it is still too soon to take the full measure of Communist intentions. However, they probably plan to play the game within the Geneva terms as conceived in broad, elastic Communist dimensions. Accepting our challenge to shift from the military to the political arena does not, of course, mean that the Communists have abandoned their goal of obtaining control over all of Laos. Rather they are more likely to devote their effort at each point of political attack—from winning key ministries in the government to the penetration of village administration. In this sense, an agreement in Geneva is only the beginning of a long and very difficult road, as we have long recognized.

Possible Course of Events

At the moment, then, it is impossible to say with certainty what direction events will take.

• First, various pressures—including the deterrent effect of United States troops in Thailand and pressure from the Bloc itself—might conceivably lead the Communists to modify their tactics in the direction of greater cooperation with an increasingly effective central government.
• Second, if the Communists change to a less obstructionist and more sophisticated course of action and if Souvanna is gullible and Phoumi stupid the Communists may succeed in taking over by purely political means.
• Third, if the Communists insist on following an obstructionist line, Souvanna may quit in disgust and retire to Paris.
• Fourth, if the Communists insist on following an obstructionist line and if Phoumi is equally firm, the result may be a de facto partition of Laos under the umbrella of an essentially powerless central government.

Implications for United States Policy

We take it that our strategic objective in Laos is to deny the Communists use of the Mekong Valley and its north-south communications routes. We take it also that given the geographic and political handicaps in Laos, the most promising means immediately at hand of attaining this objective is the establishment of an effective government of national union. We take it, finally, that our tactics are to support Souvanna without destroying the morale of Phoumi and the Vientiane group; to split Souvanna from the Pathet Lao; and thus to arrive at a position where we can strengthen all the anti-Communist forces (both Souvanna and the Vientiane group) in their political struggle with the Pathet Lao.

Conclusions

If the above analysis is correct, it would be premature to abandon the present course of United States policy at this time.

It is by no means certain that the anti-Communist elements would lose a political battle for control of a true government of national union. As demonstrated by the interesting account of his month’s captivity submitted by the First Secretary of the British Embassy in Vientiane, the Pathet Lao at least in Southern Laos do not have effective programs of political indoctrination and economic betterment. If the neutralist and right-wing forces unite in civic, economic and political action programs, they would appear to stand an excellent chance in all of Laos except the Pathet Lao’s long-established northern strongholds.

If the United States continues to press hard for the establishment of an effective government of national union, even though there may be doubts as to the likelihood of achieving it, we can strengthen Souvanna’s hand vis-a-vis Souphanouvong and thus maximize whatever chances exist for a true government of national union. In any case such a policy serves the United States’ purpose of clearly fixing the blame for a breakdown of the Geneva accords on the Communists, and greatly strengthens the possibility that Souvanna would be willing to call the Pathet Lao to answer for their obstructionism or that he will blame them if he chooses to abandon his role as Premier.

Moreover the coalition effort provides a legitimacy for the Vientiane group which permits its continued strengthening, thereby safeguarding United States interests should the coalition effort fail. The problem lies in tailoring our support of the Vientiane group to the requirements of backing an effective government of national union under Souvanna. To the degree that Souvanna, and to a lesser extent Khamouane Boupha, gain confidence in our support of the coalition as an effective authority over all of Laos, they may become correspondingly hostile to Communist obstructionism. Difficulties between the neutrals and the Pathet Lao in the field, in fact, have been going on for some time. This disillusionment could have wide and favorable political ramifications were a final, irrevocable split between the Communists and the non-Communists to reopen the conflict.

So far Communist intransigence and obstructionism have failed to undermine the position of Phoumi and the Vientiane group or to discredit the United States deterrent posture in Thailand. These remain the twin bases for our policy of protecting the Mekong Valley and hence our position in Southeast Asia.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries, Laos Security, 8/1/62–8/31/62. Secret.
1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 8/28/62–8/31/62. Secret.
2. The presence of Viet Minh “technicians” has been admitted, and the ICC has been notified that 15 have been withdrawn. [Footnote in the source text.]