Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

422. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, August 29, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Meeting in the Cabinet Room, August 28, 1962, to Discuss Laos

PRESENT

• The President, The Secretary of State, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Koren, Mr. Hilsman, Mr. Janow, Mr. Fowler, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Mr. Nitze, Gen Clay, Admiral Heinz, Mr. Kaysen

Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by indicating that he had emphasized to the Canadians the importance of their role in the International Control Commission for a proper functioning of the Geneva Agreement.¹ He asked Mr. Hilsman to comment on the present situation in Laos in respect to troop movements and the carrying out of the Accords. Mr. Hilsman summarized briefly his memorandum of August 28 (attached).² He said that it was too soon to form a definite judgment as to what was happening. The activity we observed, namely, a certain amount of staged withdrawal and a certain amount of real movement on the part of the North Vietnamese, was consistent with our expectations and consistent with a number of possible Communist strategies along the lines indicated in his memorandum. He sketched the availability, as a fall-back position for us, of a de facto partition under the umbrella of a non-functioning but still visible coalition government. Secretary Rusk asked whether there had been any change in the situation of infiltration from Laos to South Vietnam since the signing of the Geneva Accords. It was Mr. Hilsman’s view that there still are no North Vietnamese in South Vietnam and that the infiltrators are returning southerners rather than Vietnamese of the northern origin. [1 line of source text not declassified] pointed out [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that the Viet-Minh and Pathet Lao are proposing minimum compliance with the Geneva Accords. He also mentioned the continuing fighting that these two groups are engaged in with the Meos.

The President asked what we were doing about supplying the Meos. Mr. Harriman responded that we had an agreement with Souvanna that permitted us to get food supplies to the Meos. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] They indicated that there were still U.S. advisers with the Meo, and that their presence would not constitute violation of the Geneva Accords until after October 6.

The President asked whether we had more requests for arms and whether we should accede to them if the other side were not in fact withdrawing their troops. Secretary Rusk thought that if we get no assurance from Souvanna of a genuine cut-off of help from the North, we should reserve freedom of action for ourselves. In response to the President’s question, Mr. Hilsman emphasized that we don’t know of any heavy movement from Laos to South Vietnam. In response to the other question of the President’s, Messrs. Hilsman [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] indicated that we do have evidence that there is some genuine movement of Viet-Minh troops, as well as the staged withdrawals mentioned above. Further, there has been a sharp decrease in the Soviet airlift, with no Soviet movements observed in the last few days.

The President asked about our plans for the U.S. battle group in Thailand. Mr. Koren sketched out our long-period plan for replacing this battle group with engineers and service troops and constructing logistic facilities.

The President asked whether this had been agreed with Sarit, and Secretary Rusk indicated that he thought we should wait until October 6 (the Geneva Accords date) before making any move on this point. Mr. Hilsman pointed out the deterrent effect of the presence of troops in Thailand on Communist actions.

The President asked what we were doing now for Phoumi in the event we would have to fall back on the position of supporting him in a de facto partition in Laos. Mr. Harriman indicated that we were paying Phoumi’s troops through the RLG and pushing him to demobilize down toward a force of a more appropriate size. We were also talking to Souvanna about helping his political party, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

The President asked about Kong Le. Messrs. Harriman and Hilsman indicated that we do not trust Kong Le and do not think him a reliable person. However, his troops are being pushed by the Pathet Lao, and many of his troops are strongly against the Pathet Lao. We could not rely on Kong Le’s neutralism, but we could rely on the anti-Pathet Lao sentiments of some of his troops.

The President then asked for the problems that required immediate decision. Mr. Harriman requested approval of an interim cash grant of $2 million to Souvanna, and initiation of discussing with him the aid plan presented to the President on August 15.³ The French were not responding at all to our requests for a joint effort; the British were responding, but only slowly. Mr. Harriman did not think we should wait for the British and French responses before beginning to explain our new program to Souvanna. Mr. Janow seconded this point.

In response to the President’s question as to whether Souvanna had asked for a cash grant for the month, Secretary Rusk pointed out that Ambassador Unger had recommended it strongly but also recommended that it no longer be put in terms of a monthly grant.⁴

The President indicated to Mr. Harriman that he thought negotiations with the British and French should be pushed as vigorously as possible after the first of September, and in Paris or London, rather than in Washington.

The President approved the $2 million cash grant and initiation of interim discussion of the new methods of organizing aid with Souvanna, but without any commitment as to the amount of aid. Further, we would continue to urge the French and the British to join with us.

The President asked who our negotiators would be. Secretary Rusk suggested that we rely on the two embassies for at least the first stages of the negotiations, as both were strong and contained officers with wide Far Eastern experience.

The President approved the offer to provide the ICC with helicopters by sale or lease.

The President asked the extent to which we were able to supply intelligence to the ICC. Messrs. Hilsman [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] responded that they were not planning on giving them all our intelligence, but that we were able to tell them substantially what was useful although not always in the most convincing way.

CK⁵

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 8/28/62–8/31/62. Top Secret. Drafted by Kaysen. This meeting lasted from 4 to 4:40 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book)
1. In Ottawa on August 24, Rusk discussed Laos with Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Green. (Memorandum of conversation, August 24; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–2462)
2. Attachment to Document 421.
3. See Documents 418 and 419.
4. In telegram 68 from Vientiane, July 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–1762)
5. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.