Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

196. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

I–19102/61

Washington, October 5, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Alternative Plans for Southeast Asia

The NSC will meet next week, possibly on Tuesday, to discuss Southeast Asia.¹ The following precis of possible alternatives is submitted for your use in discussions with the JCS and State prior to the NSC meeting. These alternatives range from the purely political to the full military solution. In view of their wide range, many of the actions contained in the alternatives are not mutually exclusive.

A. Alternatives

1. Political Settlement in Laos.

The present direction of our effort is to obtain a political settlement in Laos. Ambassador Harriman states that for the first time he sees the possibility of reaching a satisfactory political solution. Mr. Johnson and Ambassador Harriman propose to discuss the political situation with the President on Friday, 6 October.²

The establishment of a unified, neutral Laos will avoid the U.S. getting militarily involved in Laos. However, despite assurances that would be given us by Souvanna Phouma (assuming he will be the Prime Minister) and the Russians, there are risks of a neutral government being taken over completely by the Communists or of a weak neutral government being incapable of taking action to prevent Laos being used as a base and an easy access route for the support of subversion in South Vietnam and Thailand.

2. Continuation of Present Ambiguous Situation in Laos. (No political settlement and no resumption of hostilities)

The draft paper “Limited Holding Actions in Southeast Asia”³ outlines actions that could be taken under this alternative. You have the JCS views on this paper. We feel that while this alternative does hold down the possibilities of the U.S. getting militarily involved in Southeast Asia, it will not meet our objective. It further runs the risk that the Pathet Lao could initiate hostilities and overrun Laos before we could react.

If we must follow this alternative, the draft paper contains action that should be taken, realizing that, as we increase the scale of U.S. military activity in Laos and take action to block infiltration into South Vietnam, we possibly increase the risk of resumption of full hostilities in Laos.

3. No Political Settlement and Resumption of Hostilities in Laos.

a. Intervention with SEATO Plan 5.

SEATO forces would release the FAR to fight and would assist the FAR to regain areas lost since May 3rd by furnishing additional military and logistic support. By demonstrating our willingness to engage, the intervention could restrain the DRV and restore the situation in Laos. It could also trigger large-scale Communist intervention. The question remains as to the ability of the FAR to regain control of Southern Laos, so as to protect South Vietnam.

b. 1Intervention with SEATO Plan 5-Plus.⁴

This plan calls for a de facto divided Laos. It more nearly approaches the U.S. objectives, in that SEATO forces would be used offensively to regain control of vital areas of Laos. It would protect South Vietnam and Thailand. It has the same risks as SEATO Plan 5, to an increased degree.

It should be noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff hold that intervention should not await the resumption of hostilities, but should also be considered if large scale military strength and logistic buildup clearly indicate imminent resumption of hostilities.

4. Other Possible Courses of Action That May be Raised at NSC Meeting.

a. Intervention in South Vietnam by SEATO Forces (Rostow Proposal).

SEATO forces would be placed in South Vietnam to protect the border from the inside. In particular, the forces would take over combat duties along the border with Laos. The action would release GVN forces to fight inside South Vietnam, would give Hanoi a SEATO presence to reckon with, and would give us a bargaining basis for negotiating a solution to the South Vietnam problem. It could revive SEATO. It would place a logistics and communication structure in South Vietnam which could help the war effort there. Ambassador Harriman has stated that such action would not hamper his negotiations in Geneva.

This course of action entails risks of escalation similar to SEATO Plan 5 and would have to be examined on the same basis.

b. Deploying U.S. Combat Forces to Thailand and South Vietnam.

(1) The following possibilities for stationing forces in Thailand have been discussed briefly with the Thais: A SEATO training center, a SEATO standing force, a U.S./Thai joint training center, stationing of a U.S. combat engineer unit, and stationing U.S. combat units on a rotational basis for training purposes.

U.S. forces in Thailand would serve as visible evidence of our readiness to defend Thailand. They could accomplish training of Thai forces and some military construction.

Despite the possibilities, and our SEATO commitment, the Thais feel the need for more formal assurances from us, and have approached us for a bilateral security treaty.

(2) The stationing of U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam for the purpose of training GVN forces would at the same time establish the “plate-glass window” effect and reinforce our stated policy of defending South Vietnam.

U.S. ground forces in South Vietnam could release GVN forces for action elsewhere in South Vietnam only if our forces were committed to take on security duties, with freedom of action as the situation dictated. If this were done, we should also consider the use of U.S. combat and logistic air and naval coastal patrol, in order to bring our military effort to bear directly against the Viet Cong.

President Diem has also raised the issue of obtaining a bilateral security treaty with us, although such a treaty would be in violation of the Geneva Accords.

c. Support Increased Covert Activities in North Vietnam and Communist China.

This would be aimed at creating internal security problems in these two countries, in order to bring pressure to bear on them to relax their present subversive efforts in Southeast Asia. We would need active support of the GRC and GVN and use of their forces. We would create some risks of instigating military action by either of the Communist countries. It is possible we might gain enough success to put the fight in their backyard for a change.

B. Planning⁵

The status of planning for the various military courses of action is as follows:

a. U.S. Plan 32–59.

This is an approved contingency plan for U.S. unilateral action in Southeast Asia. In its various phases it covers action up to and including action with Communist China. It is the basis for SEATO Plans 4, 5, and 6.

b. SEATO Plan 5.

A fully developed and approved plan. The Field Force Commander’s plan is completed.

c. SEATO Plan 5–Plus.

This plan exists only as a U.S. concept. Other SEATO nations have been informed of it in general terms, but their agreement has not been received, nor have the additional Thai and South Vietnamese forces been committed.

d. SEATO Plan 6.

This plan covers large scale DRV intervention in Southeast Asia. The basic plan has been completed. The plan, commitment of forces, assignment of commanders and other required work are being discussed this week at the SEATO MilAd Conference in Bangkok.

e. SEATO Plan 4.

This plan covers large scale DRV-ChiCom intervention in Southeast Asia. Status the same as SEATO Plan 6.

A further main point of discussion in connection with any plan which could result in U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia is the relationship to our commitments in the Berlin area. This is discussed in JCSM–704–61 of 5 October.⁶

Haydn Williams

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, Southeast Asia. Top Secret.
1. Tuesday, October 10. The NSC met on Wednesday, October 11; see Documents 204 and 205.
2. Johnson’s and Harriman’s discussion with the President was at 6 p.m. on Thursday, October 5; see footnote 2, Document 194.
3. This State-Defense-Joint Staff draft paper is attached to JCSM–690–61, from the JCS to McNamara, October 5, in which the JCS state that they did not endorse the plan and that the actions proposed in it would “seriously undermine our military position in the Far East.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, Southeast Asia)
4. See footnote 2, Document 188.
5. Additional documentation on SEATO planning for Southeast Asia is scheduled for publication in volume XXIII.
6. In JCSM–704–61, from the JCS to McNamara, October 5, the JCS contended that execution of SEATO Plan 5, or suitable variation of it, was the “military minimum commensurate with the situation” to prevent the loss of Laos, South Vietnam, and eventually Southeast Asia. The JCS considered that in the event of simultaneous contigencies in Berlin and Southeast Asia, the “implementation of SEATO Plan 5 would provide a US initiated counter to USSR denial of access to Berlin.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, Southeast Asia)