205. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy0
Washington,
October 11,
1961.
SUBJECT
In the course of the meeting this morning on Southeast Asia,1
General Taylor and I believe it
would be wise if you were to make the following point.
We may end up in Laos with a wobbly Souvanna government. Starting right now we need vigorous
forward planning to maximize the chance that a Laos which might emerge
from the present negotiations would, in fact, remain neutral and
independent. We are all aware of the
[Page 469]
risks involved in this settlement, but we feel
that a good many things could be done by all the agencies of government
concerned to prevent the most unfavorable possible outcome. A note is
attached to this memorandum suggesting some of the directions in which
such planning and action might proceed.
Attachment2
Illustrative List of Topics That Might Be Covered in a
Plan for Strengthening Non-Communist Forces in Laos in the Event of
a Political Settlement
- 1.
- Getting Close to Souvanna. We need
activity to search out ways through which we can express our
support for Souvanna. These may include economic aid, relief
assistance and political actions. At the same time we must honor
our commitments to Phoumi. This may create some very difficult
dilemmas.
- 2.
- Actions to Strengthen Non-Communist
Political Organization. We need to examine the ways in
which we can strengthen Souvanna’s political organization; how
we can achieve a coalition among the non-Communist political
forces; and how we approach the problem of political
organization if no such coalition is achieved.
- 3.
- The Army as a Political Force. We are
already working on plans for reorganization of the armed forces.
We need to consider how we can effect reorganization in such a
way as to retain able non-Communist military commanders and
place them in politically key spots. We need to consider how we
can achieve rapprochement with Kong
Le and his forces.
- 4.
- Development of an Adequate Police
Force. The creation of an adequate police force with a
significant anti-guerilla capability could be almost as
important to preservation of Lao independence as a satisfactory
reorganization of the Lao armed forces. A plan has been
developed for reorganization of the police to provide an
anti-guerilla capability and is to be discussed with the French.
Whether we will want such a force will depend in part upon who
gets the Interior post in the Cabinet.
- 5.
- Economic Development. We ought to seek
to absorb the new government in the constructive tasks of
economic development. As a first step we should be ready to
insure that, as soon as a political agreement is concluded, an
able economic advisor from some neutral country perhaps Sweden
or India is made available to help develop a preliminary
economic plan. We shall need to decide how aid can best be
provided to a neutral Laos whether through the UN, through some kind of consortium,
or bilaterally.
- 6.
- Creating an Awareness of Communist
Techniques of Takeover. Employing related studies on
Eastern Europe as a model, we ought to do a quick study of how
the Communists might take over a coalition government from
within. The study should cover such matters as which are the key
cabinet posts, how the Communists are likely to infiltrate
political organizations, Communist techniques of village level
organization etc. This would be a guide for our own action and
might also be translated into French and Lao for distribution to
non-Communist political leaders in Laos. There should be a
related study on how to forestall Communist success.
- 7.
- Making the ICC Effective. We ought to study the ways
that we can make the ICC as
effective as possible. The key will be the Indian attitude. A
major communication from the President to Prime Minister
Nehru may be in
order.
