Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

297. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea⁰

Washington, March 28, 1963, 7:33 p.m.

1825. (A) Seoul’s 710 rptd Tokyo 245, CINCPAC 216;¹ (B) Seoul’s 728 rptd Tokyo 257, CINCPAC 226;² (C) Seoul’s 736 rptd Tokyo 262, CINCPAC 231.³

1. We consider it unwise tie ourselves any particular solution, especially at this time, because:

a. We and Korean opposition have good cause be suspicious of good faith Chairman Pak and his advisors;

b. We do not yet have views of principal opposition leaders;

c. We are not clear concerning real views of Kim Chong-o and other service chiefs, despite their public support of Pak’s March 16 decision.

2. Our objectives are:

a. Creation of stable government with sufficient base of political and popular support;

b. Removal of Korean military from political arena; and

c. Maintenance of international support of ROK and UNC.

3. To these ends, we believe transition to civilian government should be effected through elections at earliest practical date. Military junta is broken by military factional quarrels and probably faces declining stability and popularity. Also, if repeatedly promised elections are not held before 1963 UNGA we will have hard time explaining and will run risk of losing much of international support that is vital for ROK and UNC.

4. We agree you should give no encouragement to compromise on basis of making proposed referendum freer or shortening extension of military rule (para 6 ref A). Under present circumstances, it almost inconceivable any assurances of free political discussion would be fulfilled. Recent suspension political activity and arrest party leaders has created impossible atmosphere for referendum. As for mere shortening period of extension, we consider one or two year extension to have no greater justification and to be basically open to similar objections as four year extension. We do not believe atmosphere for smooth transition to effective civilian government likely improve with only passage of time.

5. Prime emphasis should continue to be placed on need for genuine consultation by junta with civilian leaders, including necessarily opposition leaders Ho Chong and Yun Po-sun, who are obviously of greater stature than others on scene. We thoroughly approve your stressing this point in discussing plan for reorganizing SCNR with General Kim Chong-o (para 5 ref B).

6. In order to be in better position to bring about meaningful consultation between junta and civilian opposition leaders, you should at earliest opportunity secure directly or indirectly views of major opposition leaders and report them with your recommendations and comment. Although we certainly would not support their arbitrary veto of a reasonable solution, we should be careful not undercut them in dealing with government side, since future government will almost surely sooner or later come from their camp. You should urge them make constructive approach and give junta leaders an honorable way out and assurances as to future role and safety.

7. We would find return to February 27 formula thoroughly acceptable and believe best arrangement might be along those lines, if junta and opposition can agree upon it. Idea of compromise by returning to February 27 agreement if “corrupt” politicians withdraw is hard to understand. Who is to decide who is corrupt? You might point out entire political purification concept has been strongly censured outside Korea as well as inside, and ask specifically whether such men as Ho Chong, Yun Po-sun and Kim Pyong-no are judged to be corrupt and if so why. FYI. Despite lack of clarity in this compromise proposal, it should not be rejected out of hand. It might in fact be acceptable if only few second-rank politicians are required to retire. End FYI.

8. We believe it important for you to continue your talks with General Kim Chong-o, since he played part in developing February 27 formula and later opposed martial law and was not consulted regarding extension military rule, and since he is chief figure in group you consider new main military force. As for his ostensible support of junta’s March 16 decision, we do not see how he could realistically be expected to do otherwise. Despite show of military unity on March 22, we have impression factionalism exists in military forces as a whole, that many military strongly believe military should not be involved in politics, and many still hold to long Korean tradition that armed forces do not have internal security role, especially against popular movements.

9. Although we are skeptical about practicability and durability civil-military combination, we recognize it has some potential as short interim arrangement pending elections. Under such arrangement Chairman Pak should, however, be bound by collegiate action of enlarged SCNR, and cease his recent practice of one-man decisions based apparently on advice from outside SCNR.

10. At appropriate point, you should let Chairman Pak know that in our view return of Kim Chong-p’il to Korea would be most unfortunate, both in terms of prospects for Korean political stability and international support of ROKG.

11. Defense concurs.⁴

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 15 S KOR. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Norred; cleared by Yager and Rice and in draft with William Bundy and Richard N. Gardener, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs; and approved by Harriman. Repeated to Tokyo and CINPAC for POLAD.
1. In telegram 710 from Seoul, March 25, Berger suggested that Pak was under “heaviest pressure” from his supporters not to reverse his decision for a referendum. Berger doubted he wanted to reverse, but was also sure Pak could not do it even if he wanted to. Berger stated in paragraph 6 of the telegram that he read his instructions to mean that the United States did not find acceptable Pak’s March 16 proposal for a referendum, even if Pak and the junta allowed wider latitude for free debate and a reduction of military rule to less than 4 years. Berger considered as the only solution an interim military-civilian government that would act as a transition to full civilian rule. (Ibid.) A copy of telegram 710 was sent by Forrestal to the President. (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries Series, Korea Security, 1961-1963)
2. In telegram 728 from Seoul, March 27, Berger reported on separate conversations with ROK Chief of Staff of the Army General Kim Chong-o and Prime Minister Kim Chong-so covering the political impasse between junta and civilian politicians. Berger stated that he saw no solution until there were meaningful discussions between the two sides. Berger believed it possible that the situation would “go along in this confused fashion for awhile” with an uncertain outcome. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 S KOR)
3. In telegram 736 from Seoul, March 28, Berger reported on a 2-hour conversation he had with Pak Chong-hui that day. Pak told Berger he was trying to negotiate with the politicians and asked that the United States help him by issuing a public statement in favor of an interim coalition government. Berger believed that the SCNR was looking toward such a coalition as a temporary solution. (Ibid.)
4. Although he agreed with Berger’s recommendations and the solution proposed in paragraph 6 of telegram 710, Meloy stated that his mission charged him with the security of South Korea and that he was particularly sensitive to the ROK Service Chiefs, who were unequivocal supporters of Pak. Meloy stated that the United States could not afford disunity in the ROK armed forces. While he approved of the solution of a mixed civilian-military government—with Pak at its head—as a transition to full civilian rule, he did not believe political issues should govern U.S. policy if it resulted in a loss of faith in the United States by the ROK military. (Telegram UK 50188, to Taylor and Felt, March 25; ibid.)