Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

296. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, March 21, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Daily White House Staff Meeting, 21 March 1963

1. Mr. Kaysen presided throughout a rather desultory meeting, a large part of which was given over to possible items for President’s press conference at 1800 today.

2. Forrestal is now shooting for next Wednesday as a date for a Korea “background and review” for the President.¹ One of the reasons for the Wednesday date is that Governor Harriman will be out of town until early next week. Kaysen referred to some meeting recently held in General Meloy’s office² and remarked that this meeting had served to stress once more who was the “real head of the country team out there.” Forrestal defended the ability and role of Ambassador Berger, but Kaysen went on to note that the two most meaty and urgent messages to come out of Korea recently had come from Meloy.³ For some reason or other, possibly simply because of the weight Forrestal swings around here, the President will make a brief statement on the Korea situation at his press conference this afternoon.⁴ My impression had been that this 1800 television appearance was to be devoted entirely to a statement or speech on Latin America, but the story is that the prepared statements will only take up half the time, with the remainder devoted to questions as usual.

[Here follow paragraphs 3-7 on other subjects.]

LJL

0. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman’s Staff Group, T-210-69. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Colonel Legere.
1. March 27. See footnote 5, Document 295.
2. The meeting took place in Meloy’s office in Seoul on March 20 and was reported over military channels in telegram KRA 269, March 20, from Berger to Rusk, Taylor, and Felt. Berger reported that he and Meloy met with the four ROK Service Chiefs who had asked that the Kennedy administration make no public statements on the Korean situation to give them time to explore what could be done. Meloy and Berger urged the Chiefs to meet with other ROK military and civilian leaders to resolve the crisis. Meloy and Berger supported the Chiefs’ request that the Kennedy administration make no public statement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, Cables, 3/1/63-3/21/63)
3. Apparent references to KRA 269 cited in footnote 2 above and to KRA 0255 to Taylor and Felt, March 17. In KRA 0255, Meloy reported that coup plotting by many of the military officers and individuals arrested could have been an attempt to overthrow Kim Chong-p’il, but that after he resigned from the KCIA in January and left the country on February 25, it had turned against Pak. Meloy believed that Pak’s referendum was a scheme to retain power, but the ROK Service Chiefs told Meloy that in order to maintain stability they would support Pak’s referendum. Meloy observed: “The armed forces are the strongest and most reliable stabilizing influence in Korea. It is wrong to mess around with aid and force levels.” (Ibid.)
4. President Kennedy answered a question on Korea at his press conference on March 21. He noted that the situation was in flux, and his statement could not be final. “We are continuing to maintain very close contact with what’s going on there. We are anxious for stability in the area. We regard South Korea, of course, as an important interest in the security of Asia and therefore we are continuing to follow very closely the present discussions about the return of democratic government in South Korea. But as the situation is still not hardened, I don’t think that anything I say on it would be very helpful, at least this week.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 275)