Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

58. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, April 6, 1961, 8:21 p.m.

1937. For Stevenson from Secretary. Feel you should seek early opportunity have frank talk with SYG re our reaction his latest stand on Dayal. You should tell him we most disappointed he has thus far not felt able to agree to replace Dayal. We continue feel UN, Congo and India will all suffer result continuation Dayal in Léopoldville and that so much should not be sacrificed in interests one man. At very least we expect serious popular demonstration against his return, and later reactions may be more serious. More generally, we most interested rendering UN more effective Congo and re-establishing the original concept of UN partnership with GOC. We feel however partly as result either arrogance or apathy, which often characterize UN relations with Congolese, UN now being regarded as hostile (although ineffective) occupying force. We agree Congolese can be difficult deal with, but UN should be able demonstrate more maturity and more tolerance. The extent of anti-UN and anti-Indian feeling in Congo should be evident from current developments in Elisabethville. While we by no means siding with Tshombe in this matter, you should make clear we greatly concerned extent popular feeling against UN in Congo and the pressures to which Congo leaders subjected as result both popular opinion and CNA opposition UN.

In terms US policy, it most important SYG realize, while we will continue support UN efforts, our influence with GOC is limited, and unless more cooperative relationship developed between UN and GOC, we cannot assure SYG we will always be able take line he desires in our dealings with Kasavubu. To do so in face of increasing loss confidence in UN on part Congolese will in any case not produce result UN desires and will only compromise our own relations with Congolese.

Department fully concurs Léopoldville tel 2133 repeated you 720²and suggests you draw thereon as appropriate. We convinced UN cannot expect make much headway Matadi question until Dayal removed and continue feel it would be disastrous for UN attempt use force this situation.

In connection approach re Dayal, feel perhaps more effective pressure might be generated if Afro-Asian dels made similar approach SYG. Suggest you approach selected dels at discretion to elicit their views Dayal and sound out possibility parallel approach SYG.

This supplements telephone conversation today.³

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310/4–661. Confidential. Drafted by Woodruff; cleared by Ferguson, Wallner, Dumont, Penfield (in substance), Stoessel, and Williams; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Léopoldville, Brussels, Paris, and London.
2. Dated April 4. (Ibid., 770G.00/4–461)
3. No record of this telephone conversation has been found. Telegram 2775 from USUN, April 7, reported a discussion of various aspects of the Congo situation among Stevenson, Yost, and Hammarskjöld on the evening of April 6. The telegram reported that Hammarskjöld felt that because Nehru had made a public statement concerning Dayal and because Hammarskjöld believed yielding to “pressure” on Dayal would weaken his own position, he had to send Dayal back to the Congo, perhaps with a deputy to handle most negotiations with the Congolese Government. (Ibid., 770G.00/4– 761)